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A few more minor tweaks

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svn:r3587
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Paul Syverson 2005-02-08 20:47:12 +00:00
parent 1d569eb492
commit 097f12dc7a
1 changed files with 7 additions and 3 deletions
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10
doc/design-paper/challenges.tex
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@ -150,7 +150,10 @@ messaging server. Using ``rendezvous points'', other Tor users can
connect to these hidden services, each without knowing the other's network connect to these hidden services, each without knowing the other's network
identity. identity.
Tor attempts to anonymize the transport layer, not the application layer, so Tor attempts to anonymize the transport layer, not the application layer.
This is useful for applications such as ssh
where authenticated communication is desired. However, when anonymity from
those with whom we communicate is desired,
application protocols that include personally identifying information need application protocols that include personally identifying information need
additional application-level scrubbing proxies, such as additional application-level scrubbing proxies, such as
Privoxy~\cite{privoxy} for HTTP\@. Furthermore, Tor does not permit arbitrary Privoxy~\cite{privoxy} for HTTP\@. Furthermore, Tor does not permit arbitrary
@ -761,7 +764,7 @@ tolerably well for them in practice.
But of course, we would prefer that legitimate anonymous users be able to But of course, we would prefer that legitimate anonymous users be able to
access abuse-prone services. One conceivable approach would be to require access abuse-prone services. One conceivable approach would be to require
would-be IRC users, for instance, to register accounts if they wanted to would-be IRC users, for instance, to register accounts if they wanted to
access the IRC network from Tor. In practise this would not access the IRC network from Tor. In practice this would not
significantly impede abuse if creating new accounts were easily automatable; significantly impede abuse if creating new accounts were easily automatable;
this is why services use IP blocking. In order to deter abuse, pseudonymous this is why services use IP blocking. In order to deter abuse, pseudonymous
identities need to require a significant switching cost in resources or human identities need to require a significant switching cost in resources or human
@ -1454,7 +1457,8 @@ network: as Tor grows more popular, other groups who need an overlay
network on the Internet are starting to adapt Tor to their needs. network on the Internet are starting to adapt Tor to their needs.
% %
Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy online. Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy online.
To keep identifying information out of application traffic, someone must build For applications where it is desirable to
keep identifying information out of application traffic, someone must build
more and better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people. more and better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people.
% %
Third, we need to gain a reputation for social good, and learn how to Third, we need to gain a reputation for social good, and learn how to