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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-28 14:23:30 +01:00
start the process of reducing clutter in server logs
svn:r5253
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aca6fb5f5f
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03dcef4c78
@ -724,10 +724,10 @@ log_cert_lifetime(X509 *cert, const char *problem)
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/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
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* certificate that is currently valid and signed, then set
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* *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
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* 0. Else, return -1.
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* 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
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*/
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int
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tor_tls_verify(tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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{
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X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
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@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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* cert and the id_cert.
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*/
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if (num_in_chain < 1) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
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log_fn(severity,"Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
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num_in_chain);
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goto done;
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}
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@ -758,14 +758,14 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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break;
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}
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if (!id_cert) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"No distinct identity certificate found");
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log_fn(severity,"No distinct identity certificate found");
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goto done;
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}
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if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
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X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
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tls_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"verifying certificate");
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log_fn(severity,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
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tls_log_errors(severity,"verifying certificate");
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goto done;
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}
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls);
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void tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls);
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int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
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int tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t buflen);
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int tor_tls_verify(tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity);
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int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity);
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int tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int tolerance);
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int tor_tls_read(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len);
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int tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t n);
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@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ command_process_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn)
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#endif
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break;
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default:
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Cell of unknown type (%d) received. Dropping.", cell->command);
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
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"Cell of unknown type (%d) received. Dropping.", cell->command);
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break;
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}
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}
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@ -184,7 +185,9 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn)
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circ = circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn);
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if (circ) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"received CREATE cell (circID %d) for known circ. Dropping.", cell->circ_id);
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
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"received CREATE cell (circID %d) for known circ. Dropping.",
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cell->circ_id);
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return;
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}
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@ -238,7 +241,7 @@ command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn)
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}
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if (circ->n_circ_id != cell->circ_id) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"got created cell from OPward? Closing.");
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,"got created cell from OPward? Closing.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
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return;
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}
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@ -281,20 +284,20 @@ command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn)
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}
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if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"circuit in create_wait. Closing.");
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,"circuit in create_wait. Closing.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
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return;
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}
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if (cell->circ_id == circ->p_circ_id) { /* it's an outgoing cell */
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if (circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, circ, CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"circuit_receive_relay_cell (forward) failed. Closing.");
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,"circuit_receive_relay_cell (forward) failed. Closing.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
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return;
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}
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} else { /* it's an ingoing cell */
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if (circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, circ, CELL_DIRECTION_IN) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"circuit_receive_relay_cell (backward) failed. Closing.");
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,"circuit_receive_relay_cell (backward) failed. Closing.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
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return;
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}
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@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
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VAR("OutboundBindAddress", STRING, OutboundBindAddress, NULL),
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VAR("PathlenCoinWeight", DOUBLE, PathlenCoinWeight, "0.3"),
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VAR("PidFile", STRING, PidFile, NULL),
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VAR("ProtocolWarnings", BOOL, ProtocolWarnings, "0"),
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VAR("ReachableAddresses", LINELIST, ReachableAddresses, NULL),
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VAR("RecommendedVersions", LINELIST, RecommendedVersions, NULL),
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VAR("RecommendedClientVersions", LINELIST, RecommendedClientVersions, NULL),
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@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_handshake(connection_t *conn, char *digest_rcvd)
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be router '%s'",
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conn->address, conn->port, nickname);
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if (tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
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if (tor_tls_verify(severity, conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side, which claims to be router '%s' (%s:%d), has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
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nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
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return -1;
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@ -463,7 +463,13 @@ conn_close_if_marked(int i)
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return 0;
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}
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if (connection_wants_to_flush(conn)) {
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log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Something wrong with your network connection? Conn (addr %s, fd %d, type %s, state %d) tried to write %d bytes but timed out. (Marked at %s:%d)",
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int severity;
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if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT ||
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(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER))
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severity = LOG_INFO;
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else
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severity = LOG_NOTICE;
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log_fn(severity, "Something wrong with your network connection? Conn (addr %s, fd %d, type %s, state %d) tried to write %d bytes but timed out. (Marked at %s:%d)",
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safe_str(conn->address), conn->s, conn_type_to_string(conn->type),
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conn->state,
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(int)buf_datalen(conn->outbuf), conn->marked_for_close_file,
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@ -1290,6 +1290,9 @@ typedef struct {
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* long do we wait before exiting? */
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int SafeLogging; /**< Boolean: are we allowed to log sensitive strings
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* such as addresses (0), or do we scrub them first (1)? */
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#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_options()->ProtocolWarnings ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO)
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int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor
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* protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */
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int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware
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* acceleration where available? */
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int UseHelperNodes; /**< Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number
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@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, int cell_direction)
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}
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return 0;
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}
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Didn't recognize cell, but circ stops here! Closing circ.");
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,"Didn't recognize cell, but circ stops here! Closing circ.");
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return -1;
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}
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@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ connection_edge_send_command(connection_t *fromconn, circuit_t *circ,
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}
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if (!circ) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"no circ. Closing conn.");
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"no circ. Closing conn.");
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tor_assert(fromconn);
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if (fromconn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(fromconn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
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