Remove support for PK_NO_PADDING in crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt

We never use it, and it would be a stupid thing if we started using it.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2012-03-08 14:51:57 -05:00
parent fc35674567
commit 00b4784575
2 changed files with 4 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -1001,8 +1001,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
* bytes of data from <b>from</b>, with padding type 'padding', * bytes of data from <b>from</b>, with padding type 'padding',
* storing the results on <b>to</b>. * storing the results on <b>to</b>.
* *
* If no padding is used, the public key must be at least as large as * (Padding is required; the PK_NO_PADDING value is not supported.)
* <b>from</b>.
* *
* Returns the number of bytes written on success, -1 on failure. * Returns the number of bytes written on success, -1 on failure.
* *
@ -1030,13 +1029,11 @@ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env,
tor_assert(from); tor_assert(from);
tor_assert(to); tor_assert(to);
tor_assert(fromlen < SIZE_T_CEILING); tor_assert(fromlen < SIZE_T_CEILING);
tor_assert(padding != PK_NO_PADDING);
overhead = crypto_get_rsa_padding_overhead(crypto_get_rsa_padding(padding)); overhead = crypto_get_rsa_padding_overhead(crypto_get_rsa_padding(padding));
pkeylen = crypto_pk_keysize(env); pkeylen = crypto_pk_keysize(env);
if (padding == PK_NO_PADDING && fromlen < pkeylen)
return -1;
if (!force && fromlen+overhead <= pkeylen) { if (!force && fromlen+overhead <= pkeylen) {
/* It all fits in a single encrypt. */ /* It all fits in a single encrypt. */
return crypto_pk_public_encrypt(env,to, return crypto_pk_public_encrypt(env,to,
@ -1050,14 +1047,6 @@ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env,
if (!cipher) return -1; if (!cipher) return -1;
if (crypto_cipher_generate_key(cipher)<0) if (crypto_cipher_generate_key(cipher)<0)
goto err; goto err;
/* You can't just run around RSA-encrypting any bitstream: if it's
* greater than the RSA key, then OpenSSL will happily encrypt, and
* later decrypt to the wrong value. So we set the first bit of
* 'cipher->key' to 0 if we aren't padding. This means that our
* symmetric key is really only 127 bits.
*/
if (padding == PK_NO_PADDING)
cipher->key[0] &= 0x7f;
if (crypto_cipher_encrypt_init_cipher(cipher)<0) if (crypto_cipher_encrypt_init_cipher(cipher)<0)
goto err; goto err;
buf = tor_malloc(pkeylen+1); buf = tor_malloc(pkeylen+1);

View File

@ -485,14 +485,11 @@ test_crypto_pk(void)
/* Try with hybrid encryption wrappers. */ /* Try with hybrid encryption wrappers. */
crypto_rand(data1, 1024); crypto_rand(data1, 1024);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) { for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
for (j = 85; j < 140; ++j) { for (j = 85; j < 140; ++j) {
memset(data2,0,1024); memset(data2,0,1024);
memset(data3,0,1024); memset(data3,0,1024);
if (i == 0 && j < 129) p = (i==0)?PK_PKCS1_PADDING:PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
continue;
p = (i==0)?PK_NO_PADDING:
(i==1)?PK_PKCS1_PADDING:PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2), len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2),
data1,j,p,0); data1,j,p,0);
test_assert(len>=0); test_assert(len>=0);