Use safe_mem_is_zero in a few more places.

I don't believe any of these represent a real timing vulnerability
(remote timing against memcmp() on a modern CPU is not easy), but
these are the ones where I believe we should be more careful.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2019-04-30 14:45:58 -04:00
parent 309467c64e
commit 0034f10956
4 changed files with 8 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
tor_free(fname);
}
}
if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
if (safe_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
else
sign_signing_key_with_id = id;

View File

@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
#include "feature/rend/rend_intro_point_st.h"
#include "feature/rend/rend_service_descriptor_st.h"
#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
/** Map from service id (as generated by rend_get_service_id) to
* rend_cache_entry_t. */
STATIC strmap_t *rend_cache = NULL;
@ -889,8 +891,8 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc,
if (intro_content && intro_size > 0) {
int n_intro_points;
if (rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
!tor_mem_is_zero(rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_cookie))) {
!safe_mem_is_zero(rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_cookie))) {
char *ipos_decrypted = NULL;
size_t ipos_decrypted_size;
if (rend_decrypt_introduction_points(&ipos_decrypted,

View File

@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong)
int
ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
{
return tor_mem_is_zero((char*)pubkey->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
return safe_mem_is_zero((char*)pubkey->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
}
/* Return a heap-allocated array that contains <b>msg</b> prefixed by the

View File

@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "lib/defs/digest_sizes.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_NSS
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_nss_mgt.h"
@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_raw(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
}
}
if ((out_len < sanity_min_size) || !tor_mem_is_zero((char*)out, out_len))
if ((out_len < sanity_min_size) || !safe_mem_is_zero((char*)out, out_len))
return 0;
}