2013-01-16 07:54:56 +01:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* Wrapper code for a curve25519 implementation. */
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#define CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE
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#include "orconfig.h"
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2012-12-04 21:57:16 +01:00
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#endif
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
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#include "util.h"
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2012-12-04 21:57:16 +01:00
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#include "torlog.h"
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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/* ==============================
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Part 1: wrap a suitable curve25519 implementation as curve25519_impl
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============================== */
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#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
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int curve25519_donna(uint8_t *mypublic,
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const uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *basepoint);
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_NACL
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#include <crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
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#endif
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int
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curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret,
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const uint8_t *basepoint)
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{
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#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
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return curve25519_donna(output, secret, basepoint);
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#elif defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL)
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return crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(output, secret, basepoint);
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#else
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#error "No implementation of curve25519 is available."
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#endif
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}
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/* ==============================
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Part 2: Wrap curve25519_impl with some convenience types and functions.
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============================== */
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/**
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* Return true iff a curve25519_public_key_t seems valid. (It's not necessary
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* to see if the point is on the curve, since the twist is also secure, but we
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* do need to make sure that it isn't the point at infinity.) */
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int
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curve25519_public_key_is_ok(const curve25519_public_key_t *key)
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{
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2012-12-26 04:25:09 +01:00
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return !safe_mem_is_zero(key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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}
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/** Generate a new keypair and return the secret key. If <b>extra_strong</b>
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* is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
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2012-12-26 04:43:01 +01:00
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* use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
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int
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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curve25519_secret_key_generate(curve25519_secret_key_t *key_out,
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int extra_strong)
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{
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2012-12-04 05:31:07 +01:00
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uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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2012-12-26 04:43:01 +01:00
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if (crypto_rand((char*)key_out->secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
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return -1;
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2012-12-04 05:31:07 +01:00
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if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
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/* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
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* HMAC key to improve not-so-good entopy rather than using it directly,
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* just in case the extra-strong entropy is less amazing than we hoped. */
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crypto_hmac_sha256((char *)key_out->secret_key,
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(const char *)k_tmp, sizeof(k_tmp),
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(const char *)key_out->secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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}
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memwipe(k_tmp, 0, sizeof(k_tmp));
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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key_out->secret_key[0] &= 248;
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key_out->secret_key[31] &= 127;
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key_out->secret_key[31] |= 64;
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2012-12-26 04:43:01 +01:00
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return 0;
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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}
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void
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curve25519_public_key_generate(curve25519_public_key_t *key_out,
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const curve25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
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{
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static const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9};
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curve25519_impl(key_out->public_key, seckey->secret_key, basepoint);
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}
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2012-12-26 04:43:01 +01:00
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int
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2012-12-04 21:57:16 +01:00
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curve25519_keypair_generate(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
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int extra_strong)
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{
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2012-12-26 04:43:01 +01:00
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if (curve25519_secret_key_generate(&keypair_out->seckey, extra_strong) < 0)
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return -1;
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2012-12-04 21:57:16 +01:00
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curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
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2012-12-26 04:43:01 +01:00
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return 0;
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2012-12-04 21:57:16 +01:00
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}
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int
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curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(const curve25519_keypair_t *keypair,
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const char *fname,
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const char *tag)
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{
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char contents[32 + CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
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int r;
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memset(contents, 0, sizeof(contents));
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tor_snprintf(contents, sizeof(contents), "== c25519v1: %s ==", tag);
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tor_assert(strlen(contents) <= 32);
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memcpy(contents+32, keypair->seckey.secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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memcpy(contents+32+CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
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keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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r = write_bytes_to_file(fname, contents, sizeof(contents), 1);
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memwipe(contents, 0, sizeof(contents));
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return r;
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}
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int
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curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
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char **tag_out,
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const char *fname)
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{
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char prefix[33];
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char *content;
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struct stat st;
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int r = -1;
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*tag_out = NULL;
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st.st_size = 0;
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content = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st);
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if (! content)
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goto end;
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if (st.st_size != 32 + CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)
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goto end;
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memcpy(prefix, content, 32);
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prefix[32] = '\0';
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if (strcmpstart(prefix, "== c25519v1: ") ||
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strcmpend(prefix, " =="))
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goto end;
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*tag_out = tor_strndup(prefix+strlen("== c25519v1: "),
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strlen(prefix) - strlen("== c25519v1: =="));
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memcpy(keypair_out->seckey.secret_key, content+32, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
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if (tor_memneq(keypair_out->pubkey.public_key,
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content + 32 + CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
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CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
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goto end;
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r = 0;
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end:
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if (content) {
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memwipe(content, 0, st.st_size);
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tor_free(content);
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}
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if (r != 0) {
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memset(keypair_out, 0, sizeof(*keypair_out));
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tor_free(*tag_out);
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}
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return r;
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}
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2012-12-03 21:44:21 +01:00
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/** Perform the curve25519 ECDH handshake with <b>skey</b> and <b>pkey</b>,
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* writing CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN bytes of output into <b>output</b>. */
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void
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curve25519_handshake(uint8_t *output,
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const curve25519_secret_key_t *skey,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *pkey)
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{
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curve25519_impl(output, skey->secret_key, pkey->public_key);
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}
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2013-01-06 04:53:32 +01:00
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int
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curve25519_public_to_base64(char *output,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *pkey)
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{
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char buf[128];
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base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf),
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(const char*)pkey->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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buf[CURVE25519_BASE64_PADDED_LEN] = '\0';
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memcpy(output, buf, CURVE25519_BASE64_PADDED_LEN+1);
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return 0;
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}
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int
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curve25519_public_from_base64(curve25519_public_key_t *pkey,
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const char *input)
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{
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size_t len = strlen(input);
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if (len == CURVE25519_BASE64_PADDED_LEN - 1) {
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/* not padded */
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return digest256_from_base64((char*)pkey->public_key, input);
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} else if (len == CURVE25519_BASE64_PADDED_LEN) {
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char buf[128];
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if (base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), input, len) != CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)
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return -1;
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memcpy(pkey->public_key, buf, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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return 0;
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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}
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2013-01-15 21:40:17 +01:00
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