tor/src/test/test_hs_service.c

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2017-03-15 21:13:17 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file test_hs_service.c
* \brief Test hidden service functionality.
*/
#define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE
#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE
#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE
#define HS_COMMON_PRIVATE
#define HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE
#define MAIN_PRIVATE
#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
#include "test.h"
#include "log_test_helpers.h"
#include "rend_test_helpers.h"
#include "or.h"
#include "channeltls.h"
#include "circuitbuild.h"
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "circuituse.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "connection.h"
#include "hs_circuit.h"
#include "hs_common.h"
#include "hs_ident.h"
#include "hs_intropoint.h"
#include "hs_ntor.h"
#include "hs_service.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "rendservice.h"
/** We simulate the creation of an outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, and then we
* parse it from the receiver side. */
static void
test_gen_establish_intro_cell(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
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ssize_t retval;
uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
uint8_t buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell_out = NULL;
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell_in = NULL;
crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
attempt to parse it. */
{
cell_out = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
sizeof(circuit_key_material));
tt_assert(cell_out);
retval = get_establish_intro_payload(buf, sizeof(buf), cell_out);
tt_int_op(retval, >=, 0);
}
/* Parse it as the receiver */
{
ssize_t parse_result = trn_cell_establish_intro_parse(&cell_in,
buf, sizeof(buf));
tt_int_op(parse_result, >=, 0);
retval = verify_establish_intro_cell(cell_in,
circuit_key_material,
sizeof(circuit_key_material));
tt_int_op(retval, >=, 0);
}
done:
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell_out);
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell_in);
}
/* Mocked ed25519_sign_prefixed() function that always fails :) */
static int
mock_ed25519_sign_prefixed(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const char *prefix_str,
const ed25519_keypair_t *keypair) {
(void) signature_out;
(void) msg;
(void) msg_len;
(void) prefix_str;
(void) keypair;
return -1;
}
/** We simulate a failure to create an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell */
static void
test_gen_establish_intro_cell_bad(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL;
uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
MOCK(ed25519_sign_prefixed, mock_ed25519_sign_prefixed);
crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
/* Easiest way to make that function fail is to mock the
ed25519_sign_prefixed() function and make it fail. */
cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
sizeof(circuit_key_material));
expect_log_msg_containing("Unable to gen signature for "
"ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_assert(!cell);
done:
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell);
UNMOCK(ed25519_sign_prefixed);
}
/** Test the HS ntor handshake. Simulate the sending of an encrypted INTRODUCE1
* cell, and verify the proper derivation of decryption keys on the other end.
* Then simulate the sending of an authenticated RENDEZVOUS1 cell and verify
* the proper verification on the other end. */
static void
test_hs_ntor(void *arg)
{
int retval;
uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN];
ed25519_keypair_t service_intro_auth_keypair;
curve25519_keypair_t service_intro_enc_keypair;
curve25519_keypair_t service_ephemeral_rend_keypair;
curve25519_keypair_t client_ephemeral_enc_keypair;
hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t client_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys;
hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t service_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys;
hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t service_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys;
hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t client_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys;
(void) arg;
/* Generate fake data for this unittest */
{
/* Generate fake subcredential */
memset(subcredential, 'Z', DIGEST256_LEN);
/* service */
curve25519_keypair_generate(&service_intro_enc_keypair, 0);
ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_intro_auth_keypair, 0);
curve25519_keypair_generate(&service_ephemeral_rend_keypair, 0);
/* client */
curve25519_keypair_generate(&client_ephemeral_enc_keypair, 0);
}
/* Client: Simulate the sending of an encrypted INTRODUCE1 cell */
retval =
hs_ntor_client_get_introduce1_keys(&service_intro_auth_keypair.pubkey,
&service_intro_enc_keypair.pubkey,
&client_ephemeral_enc_keypair,
subcredential,
&client_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
/* Service: Simulate the decryption of the received INTRODUCE1 */
retval =
hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(&service_intro_auth_keypair.pubkey,
&service_intro_enc_keypair,
&client_ephemeral_enc_keypair.pubkey,
subcredential,
&service_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
/* Test that the INTRODUCE1 encryption/mac keys match! */
tt_mem_op(client_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys.enc_key, OP_EQ,
service_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys.enc_key,
CIPHER256_KEY_LEN);
tt_mem_op(client_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys.mac_key, OP_EQ,
service_hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys.mac_key,
DIGEST256_LEN);
/* Service: Simulate creation of RENDEZVOUS1 key material. */
retval =
hs_ntor_service_get_rendezvous1_keys(&service_intro_auth_keypair.pubkey,
&service_intro_enc_keypair,
&service_ephemeral_rend_keypair,
&client_ephemeral_enc_keypair.pubkey,
&service_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
/* Client: Simulate the verification of a received RENDEZVOUS1 cell */
retval =
hs_ntor_client_get_rendezvous1_keys(&service_intro_auth_keypair.pubkey,
&client_ephemeral_enc_keypair,
&service_intro_enc_keypair.pubkey,
&service_ephemeral_rend_keypair.pubkey,
&client_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
/* Test that the RENDEZVOUS1 key material match! */
tt_mem_op(client_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys.rend_cell_auth_mac, OP_EQ,
service_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys.rend_cell_auth_mac,
DIGEST256_LEN);
tt_mem_op(client_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys.ntor_key_seed, OP_EQ,
service_hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys.ntor_key_seed,
DIGEST256_LEN);
done:
;
}
/** Test that our HS time period calculation functions work properly */
static void
test_time_period(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
uint64_t tn;
int retval;
time_t fake_time;
/* Let's do the example in prop224 section [TIME-PERIODS] */
retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 13 Apr 2016 11:00:00 UTC",
&fake_time);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
/* Check that the time period number is right */
tn = get_time_period_num(fake_time);
tt_u64_op(tn, ==, 16903);
/* Increase current time to 11:59:59 UTC and check that the time period
number is still the same */
fake_time += 3599;
tn = get_time_period_num(fake_time);
tt_u64_op(tn, ==, 16903);
/* Now take time to 12:00:00 UTC and check that the time period rotated */
fake_time += 1;
tn = get_time_period_num(fake_time);
tt_u64_op(tn, ==, 16904);
/* Now also check our hs_get_next_time_period_num() function */
tn = hs_get_next_time_period_num(fake_time);
tt_u64_op(tn, ==, 16905);
done:
;
}
/* Test: Ensure that setting up rendezvous circuits works correctly. */
static void
test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup(void *arg)
{
ed25519_public_key_t service_pk;
origin_circuit_t *or_circ;
int retval;
/** In this test we create a v3 prop224 service-side rendezvous circuit.
* We simulate an HS ntor key exchange with a client, and check that
* the circuit was setup correctly and is ready to accept rendezvous data */
(void) arg;
/* Now make dummy circuit */
{
or_circ = origin_circuit_new();
or_circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND;
or_circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
or_circ->build_state->is_internal = 1;
/* prop224: Setup hs conn identifier on the stream */
ed25519_secret_key_t sk;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_secret_key_generate(&sk, 0));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &sk));
or_circ->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_pk,
HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_RENDEZVOUS);
TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
}
/* Check number of hops */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Setup the circuit: do the ntor key exchange */
{
uint8_t ntor_key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN] = {2};
retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(or_circ, ntor_key_seed, 1);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
}
/* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1);
/* Check the digest algo */
tt_int_op(or_circ->cpath->f_digest->algorithm, OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
tt_int_op(or_circ->cpath->b_digest->algorithm, OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->f_crypto);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->b_crypto);
/* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */
tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
done:
circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
}
struct testcase_t hs_service_tests[] = {
{ "gen_establish_intro_cell", test_gen_establish_intro_cell, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
{ "gen_establish_intro_cell_bad", test_gen_establish_intro_cell_bad, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
{ "hs_ntor", test_hs_ntor, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
{ "time_period", test_time_period, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
{ "e2e_rend_circuit_setup", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};