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210 lines
9.2 KiB
Plaintext
210 lines
9.2 KiB
Plaintext
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Filename: 112-bring-back-pathlencoinweight.txt
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Title: Bring Back Pathlen Coin Weight
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Version:
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Last-Modified:
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Author: Mike Perry
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Created:
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Status: Open
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Overview:
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The idea is that users should be able to choose a weight which
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probabilistically chooses their path lengths to be 2 or 3 hops. This
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weight will essentially be a biased coin that indicates an
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additional hop (beyond 2) with probability P. The user should be
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allowed to choose 0 for this weight to always get 2 hops and 1 to
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always get 3.
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This value should be modifiable from the controller, and should be
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available from Vidalia.
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Motivation:
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The Tor network is slow and overloaded. Increasingly often I hear
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stories about friends and friends of friends who are behind firewalls,
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annoying censorware, or under surveillance that interferes with their
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productivity and Internet usage, or chills their speech. These people
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know about Tor, but they choose to put up with the censorship because
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Tor is too slow to be usable for them. In fact, to download a fresh,
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complete copy of levine-timing.pdf for the Anonymity Implications
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section of this proposal over Tor took me 3 tries.
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There are many ways to improve the speed problem, and of course we
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should and will implement as many as we can. Johannes's GSoC project
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and my reputation system are longer term, higher-effort things that
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will still provide benefit independent of this proposal.
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However, reducing the path length to 2 for those who do not need the
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(questionable) extra anonymity 3 hops provide not only improves
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their Tor experience but also reduces their load on the Tor network by
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33%, and can be done in less than 10 lines of code. That's not just
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Win-Win, it's Win-Win-Win.
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Furthermore, when blocking resistance measures insert an extra relay
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hop into the equation, 4 hops will certainly be completely unusable
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for these users, especially since it will be considerably more
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difficult to balance the load across a dark relay net than balancing
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the load on Tor itself (which today is still not without its flaws).
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Anonymity Implications:
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It has long been established that timing attacks against mixed
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networks are extremely effective, and that regardless of path
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length, if the adversary has compromised your first and last
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hop of your path, you can assume they have compromised your
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identity for that connection.
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In [1], it is demonstrated that for all but the slowest, lossiest
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networks, error rates for false positives and false negatives were
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very near zero. Only for constant streams of traffic over slow and
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(more importantly) extremely lossy network links did the error rate
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hit 20%. For loss rates typical to the Internet, even the error rate
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for slow nodes with constant traffic streams was 13%.
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When you take into account that most Tor streams are not constant,
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but probably much more like their "HomeIP" dataset, which consists
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mostly of web traffic that exists over finite intervals at specific
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times, error rates drop to fractions of 1%, even for the "worst"
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network nodes.
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Therefore, the user has little benefit from the extra hop, assuming
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the adversary does timing correlation on their nodes. The real
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protection is the probability of getting both the first and last hop,
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and this is constant whether the client chooses 2 hops, 3 hops, or 42.
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Partitioning attacks form another concern. Since Tor uses telescoping
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to build circuits, it is possible to tell a user is constructing only
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two hop paths at the entry node. It is questionable if this data is
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actually worth anything though, especially if the majority of users
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have easy access to this option, and do actually choose their path
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lengths semi-randomly.
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Nick has postulated that exits may also be able to tell that you are
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using only 2 hops by the amount of time between sending their
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RELAY_CONNECTED cell and the first bit of RELAY_DATA traffic they
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see from the OP. I doubt that they will be able to make much use
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of this timing pattern, since it will likely vary widely depending
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upon the type of node selected for that first hop, and the user's
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connection rate to that first hop. It is also questionable if this
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data is worth anything, especially if many users are using this
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option (and I imagine many will).
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Perhaps most seriously, two hop paths do allow malicious guards
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to easily fail circuits if they do not extend to their colluding peers
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for the exit hop. Since guards can detect the number of hops in a
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path, they could always fail the 3 hop circuits and focus on
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selectively failing the two hop ones until a peer was chosen.
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I believe currently guards are rotated if circuits fail, which does
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provide some protection, but this could be changed so that an entry
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guard is completely abandoned after a certain number of extend or
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general circuit failures, though perhaps this also could be gamed
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to increase guard turnover. Such a game would be much more noticeable
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than an individual guard failing circuits, though, since it would
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affect all clients, not just those who chose a particular guard.
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Why not fix Pathlen=2?:
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The main reason I am not advocating that we always use 2 hops is that
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in some situations, timing correlation evidence by itself may not be
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considered as solid and convincing as an actual, uninterrupted, fully
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traced path. Are these timing attacks as effective on a real network
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as they are in simulation? Would an extralegal adversary or authoritarian
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government even care? In the face of these situation-dependent unknowns,
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it should be up to the user to decide if this is a concern for them or not.
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Implementation:
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new_route_len() can be modified directly with a check of the
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PathlenCoinWeight option (converted to percent) and a call to
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crypto_rand_int(0,100) for the weighted coin.
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The Vidalia setting should probably be in the network status window
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as a slider, complete with tooltip, help documentation, and perhaps
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an "Are you Sure?" checkbox.
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The entry_guard_t structure could have a num_circ_failed member
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such that if it exceeds N circuit extend failure to a second hop,
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it is removed from the entry list. N should be sufficiently high
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to avoid churn from normal Tor circuit failure, and could possibly be
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represented as a ratio of failed to successful circuits through that
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guard.
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Migration:
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Phase one: Re-enable config and modify new_route_len() to add an
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extra hop if coin comes up "heads".
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Phase two: Experiment with the proper ratio of circuit failures
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used to expire garbage or malicious guards.
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Phase three: Make slider or entry box in Vidalia, along with help entry
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that explains in layman's terms the risks involved.
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[1] http://www.cs.umass.edu/~mwright/papers/levine-timing.pdf
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============================================================
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I love replying to myself. I can't resist doing it. Sorry. "Think twice
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post once" is a concept totally lost on me, especially when I'm wrong
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the first two times ;)
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Thus spake Mike Perry (mikepery@fscked.org):
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> Why not fix Pathlen=2?:
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>
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> The main reason I am not advocating that we always use 2 hops is that
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> in some situations, timing correlation evidence by itself may not be
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> considered as solid and convincing as an actual, uninterrupted, fully
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> traced path. Are these timing attacks as effective on a real network
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> as they are in simulation? Would an extralegal adversary or authoritarian
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> government even care? In the face of these situation-dependent unknowns,
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> it should be up to the user to decide if this is a concern for them or not.
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Hrmm.. it should probably also be noted that even a false positive
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rate of 1% for a 200k concurrent-user network could mean that for a
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given node, a given stream could be confused with something like 10
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users, assuming ~200 nodes carry most of the traffic (ie 1000 users
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each). Though of course to really know for sure, someone needs to do
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an attack on a real network, unfortunately.
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For this reason this option should instead be represented not as a
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slider, but as a straight boolean value, at least in Vidalia.
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Perhaps something like a radiobutton:
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* "I use Tor for Censorship Resistance, not Anonymity. Speed is more
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important to me than Anonymity."
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* "I use Tor for Anonymity. I need extra protection at the cost of speed."
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and then some explanation in the help for exactly what this means, and
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the risks involved with eliminating the adversary's need for timing attacks
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wrt to false positives, etc.
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This radio button can then also be used to toggle Johannes's work,
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should it be discovered that using latency/bandwidth measurements
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gives the adversary some information as to your location or likely
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node choices. Or we can create a series of choices along these lines
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as more load balancing/path choice optimizations are developed.
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----
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So what does this change mean wrt to the proposal process? Should I
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submit a new proposal? I'm still on the fence if the underlying torrc
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option and Tor implementation should be a coin weight or a fixed
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value, so at this point really all this changes is the proposed
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Vidalia behavior (Vidalia is an imporant part of this proposal,
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because it would be nice to take 33% of the load off the network for
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all users who do not need 3 hops).
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