2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
# include "or.h"
/*
*
* these two functions are the main ways ' in ' to connection_or
*
*/
int connection_or_process_inbuf ( connection_t * conn ) {
assert ( conn & & conn - > type = = CONN_TYPE_OR ) ;
if ( conn - > inbuf_reached_eof ) {
/* eof reached, kill it. */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_process_inbuf(): conn reached eof. Closing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_process_inbuf(): state %d. " , conn - > state ) ;
switch ( conn - > state ) {
case OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_AUTH_WAIT :
return or_handshake_client_process_auth ( conn ) ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_AUTH_WAIT :
return or_handshake_server_process_auth ( conn ) ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_NONCE_WAIT :
return or_handshake_server_process_nonce ( conn ) ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN :
return connection_process_cell_from_inbuf ( conn ) ;
default :
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_process_inbuf() called in state where I'm writing. Ignoring buf for now. " ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
int connection_or_finished_flushing ( connection_t * conn ) {
int e , len = sizeof ( e ) ;
assert ( conn & & conn - > type = = CONN_TYPE_OR ) ;
switch ( conn - > state ) {
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
case OR_CONN_STATE_OP_CONNECTING :
if ( getsockopt ( conn - > s , SOL_SOCKET , SO_ERROR , & e , & len ) < 0 ) { /* not yet */
if ( errno ! = EINPROGRESS ) {
/* yuck. kill it. */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing(): in-progress connect failed. Removing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
} else {
return 0 ; /* no change, see if next time is better */
}
}
/* the connect has finished. */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing() : Connection to router %s:%u established. " ,
conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
return or_handshake_op_send_keys ( conn ) ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_OP_SENDING_KEYS :
return or_handshake_op_finished_sending_keys ( conn ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
case OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTING :
if ( getsockopt ( conn - > s , SOL_SOCKET , SO_ERROR , & e , & len ) < 0 ) { /* not yet */
if ( errno ! = EINPROGRESS ) {
/* yuck. kill it. */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing(): in-progress connect failed. Removing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
} else {
return 0 ; /* no change, see if next time is better */
}
}
/* the connect has finished. */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing() : Connection to router %s:%u established. " ,
conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
return or_handshake_client_send_auth ( conn ) ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING_AUTH :
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing(): client finished sending auth. " ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_AUTH_WAIT ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING_NONCE :
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing(): client finished sending nonce. " ) ;
conn_or_init_crypto ( conn ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_SENDING_AUTH :
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_finished_flushing(): server finished sending auth. " ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_NONCE_WAIT ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN :
/* FIXME down the road, we'll clear out circuits that are pending to close */
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
default :
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " Bug: connection_or_finished_flushing() called in unexpected state. " ) ;
return 0 ;
}
return 0 ;
}
/*********************/
void conn_or_init_crypto ( connection_t * conn ) {
int x ;
assert ( conn ) ;
printf ( " f_session_key: " ) ;
for ( x = 0 ; x < 8 ; x + + ) {
printf ( " %d " , conn - > f_session_key [ x ] ) ;
}
printf ( " \n b_session_key: " ) ;
for ( x = 0 ; x < 8 ; x + + ) {
printf ( " %d " , conn - > b_session_key [ x ] ) ;
}
printf ( " \n " ) ;
memset ( conn - > f_session_iv , 0 , 8 ) ;
memset ( conn - > b_session_iv , 0 , 8 ) ;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init ( & conn - > f_ctx ) ;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init ( & conn - > b_ctx ) ;
EVP_EncryptInit ( & conn - > f_ctx , EVP_des_ofb ( ) , conn - > f_session_key , conn - > f_session_iv ) ;
EVP_DecryptInit ( & conn - > b_ctx , EVP_des_ofb ( ) , conn - > b_session_key , conn - > b_session_iv ) ;
/* always encrypt with f, always decrypt with b */
}
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
/* helper function for connection_or_connect_as_or and _as_op.
* returns NULL if the connection fails . If it succeeds , it sets
* * result to 1 if connect ( ) returned before completing , or to 2
* if it completed , and returns the new conn .
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
*/
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
connection_t * connection_or_connect ( routerinfo_t * router , RSA * prkey , struct sockaddr_in * local ,
uint16_t port , int * result ) {
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
connection_t * conn ;
struct sockaddr_in router_addr ;
int s ;
2002-06-30 09:37:49 +02:00
conn = connection_new ( CONN_TYPE_OR ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
if ( ! conn )
return NULL ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
/* set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember */
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
conn - > addr = router - > addr , conn - > port = router - > or_port ; /* NOTE we store or_port here always */
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
conn - > prkey = prkey ;
conn - > min = router - > min , conn - > max = router - > max ;
conn - > pkey = router - > pkey ;
conn - > address = strdup ( router - > address ) ;
memcpy ( & conn - > local , local , sizeof ( struct sockaddr_in ) ) ;
s = socket ( PF_INET , SOCK_STREAM , IPPROTO_TCP ) ;
if ( s < 0 )
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Error creating network socket. " ) ;
connection_free ( conn ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
return NULL ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
}
fcntl ( s , F_SETFL , O_NONBLOCK ) ; /* set s to non-blocking */
memset ( ( void * ) & router_addr , 0 , sizeof ( router_addr ) ) ;
router_addr . sin_family = AF_INET ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
router_addr . sin_port = port ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
memcpy ( ( void * ) & router_addr . sin_addr , & router - > addr , sizeof ( uint32_t ) ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_connect() : Trying to connect to %s:%u. " , inet_ntoa ( * ( struct in_addr * ) & router - > addr ) , ntohs ( port ) ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
if ( connect ( s , ( struct sockaddr * ) & router_addr , sizeof ( router_addr ) ) < 0 ) {
if ( errno ! = EINPROGRESS ) {
/* yuck. kill it. */
connection_free ( conn ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
return NULL ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
} else {
/* it's in progress. set state appropriately and return. */
conn - > s = s ;
if ( connection_add ( conn ) < 0 ) { /* no space, forget it */
connection_free ( conn ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
return NULL ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
}
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
/* i think only pollout is needed, but i'm curious if pollin ever gets caught -RD */
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_connect() : connect in progress. " ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLOUT | POLLIN ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
* result = 1 ; /* connecting */
return conn ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
}
}
/* it succeeded. we're connected. */
conn - > s = s ;
if ( connection_add ( conn ) < 0 ) { /* no space, forget it */
connection_free ( conn ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
return NULL ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_connect() : Connection to router %s:%u established. " , router - > address , ntohs ( port ) ) ;
* result = 2 ; /* connection finished */
return ( conn ) ;
}
/*
*
* handshake for connecting to the op_port of an onion router
*
*/
connection_t * connection_or_connect_as_op ( routerinfo_t * router , RSA * prkey , struct sockaddr_in * local ) {
connection_t * conn ;
int result = 0 ; /* so connection_or_connect() can tell us what happened */
assert ( router & & prkey & & local ) ;
if ( router - > addr = = local - > sin_addr . s_addr & & router - > or_port = = local - > sin_port ) {
/* this is me! don't connect to me. */
return NULL ;
}
/* this function should never be called if we're already connected to router, but */
/* FIXME we should check here if we're already connected, and return the conn */
conn = connection_or_connect ( router , prkey , local , router - > op_port , & result ) ;
if ( ! conn )
return NULL ;
assert ( result ! = 0 ) ; /* if conn is defined, then it must have set result */
/* now we know it succeeded */
if ( result = = 1 ) {
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_OP_CONNECTING ;
return conn ;
}
if ( result = = 2 ) {
/* move to the next step in the handshake */
if ( or_handshake_op_send_keys ( conn ) < 0 ) {
connection_remove ( conn ) ;
connection_free ( conn ) ;
return NULL ;
}
return conn ;
}
return NULL ; /* shouldn't get here; to keep gcc happy */
}
int or_handshake_op_send_keys ( connection_t * conn ) {
int x ;
uint32_t bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP ;
unsigned char message [ 20 ] ; /* bandwidth(32bits), forward key(64bits), backward key(64bits) */
unsigned char cipher [ 128 ] ;
int retval ;
assert ( conn & & conn - > type = = CONN_TYPE_OR ) ;
/* generate random keys */
if ( ! RAND_bytes ( conn - > f_session_key , 8 ) | |
! RAND_bytes ( conn - > b_session_key , 8 ) ) {
log ( LOG_ERR , " Cannot generate a secure DES key. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_op_send_keys() : Generated DES keys. " ) ;
/* compose the message */
memcpy ( ( void * ) message , ( void * ) & bandwidth , 4 ) ;
memcpy ( ( void * ) ( message + 4 ) , ( void * ) conn - > f_session_key , 8 ) ;
memcpy ( ( void * ) ( message + 12 ) , ( void * ) conn - > b_session_key , 8 ) ;
printf ( " f_session_key: " ) ;
for ( x = 0 ; x < 8 ; x + + ) {
printf ( " %d " , conn - > f_session_key [ x ] ) ;
}
printf ( " \n b_session_key: " ) ;
for ( x = 0 ; x < 8 ; x + + ) {
printf ( " %d " , conn - > b_session_key [ x ] ) ;
}
printf ( " \n " ) ;
/* encrypt with RSA */
if ( RSA_public_encrypt ( 20 , message , cipher , conn - > pkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_ERR , " or_handshake_op_send_keys(): Public key encryption failed. " ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
return - 1 ;
}
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_op_send_keys() : Encrypted authentication message. " ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
/* send message */
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
if ( connection_write_to_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_op_send_keys(): my outbuf is full. Oops. " ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
return - 1 ;
}
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
retval = connection_flush_buf ( conn ) ;
if ( retval < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_op_send_keys(): bad socket while flushing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
if ( retval > 0 ) {
/* still stuff on the buffer. */
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_OP_SENDING_KEYS ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLOUT | POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
}
/* it finished sending */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_op_send_keys(): Finished sending authentication message. " ) ;
return or_handshake_op_finished_sending_keys ( conn ) ;
}
int or_handshake_op_finished_sending_keys ( connection_t * conn ) {
/* do crypto initialization, etc */
conn_or_init_crypto ( conn ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ; /* give it a default, tho the ap_handshake call may change it */
ap_handshake_n_conn_open ( conn ) ; /* send the pending onion */
return 0 ;
}
/*
*
* auth handshake , as performed by OR * initiating * the connection
*
*/
connection_t * connection_or_connect_as_or ( routerinfo_t * router , RSA * prkey , struct sockaddr_in * local ) {
connection_t * conn ;
int result = 0 ; /* so connection_or_connect() can tell us what happened */
assert ( router & & prkey & & local ) ;
if ( router - > addr = = local - > sin_addr . s_addr & & router - > or_port = = local - > sin_port ) {
/* this is me! don't connect to me. */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_or_connect_as_or(): This is me. Skipping. " ) ;
return NULL ;
}
conn = connection_or_connect ( router , prkey , local , router - > or_port , & result ) ;
if ( ! conn )
return NULL ;
/* now we know it succeeded */
if ( result = = 1 ) {
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTING ;
return conn ;
}
if ( result = = 2 ) {
/* move to the next step in the handshake */
if ( or_handshake_client_send_auth ( conn ) < 0 ) {
connection_remove ( conn ) ;
connection_free ( conn ) ;
return NULL ;
}
return conn ;
}
return NULL ; /* shouldn't get here; to keep gcc happy */
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
}
int or_handshake_client_send_auth ( connection_t * conn ) {
int retval ;
char buf [ 44 ] ;
char cipher [ 128 ] ;
if ( ! conn )
return - 1 ;
/* generate random keys */
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
if ( ! RAND_bytes ( conn - > f_session_key , 8 ) | |
! RAND_bytes ( conn - > b_session_key , 8 ) ) {
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
log ( LOG_ERR , " Cannot generate a secure DES key. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth() : Generated DES keys. " ) ;
/* generate first message */
memcpy ( buf , & conn - > local . sin_addr , 4 ) ; /* local address */
memcpy ( buf + 4 , ( void * ) & conn - > local . sin_port , 2 ) ; /* local port */
memcpy ( buf + 6 , ( void * ) & conn - > addr , 4 ) ; /* remote address */
memcpy ( buf + 10 , ( void * ) & conn - > port , 2 ) ; /* remote port */
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
memcpy ( buf + 12 , conn - > f_session_key , 8 ) ; /* keys */
memcpy ( buf + 20 , conn - > b_session_key , 8 ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
* ( ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 28 ) ) = htonl ( conn - > min ) ; /* min link utilisation */
* ( ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 32 ) ) = htonl ( conn - > max ) ; /* maximum link utilisation */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth() : Generated first authentication message. " ) ;
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
/* encrypt message */
retval = RSA_public_encrypt ( 36 , buf , cipher , conn - > pkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 ) /* error */
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Public-key encryption failed during authentication to %s:%u. " , conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth() : Reason : %s. " , ERR_reason_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth() : Encrypted authentication message. " ) ;
/* send message */
if ( connection_write_to_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth(): my outbuf is full. Oops. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
retval = connection_flush_buf ( conn ) ;
if ( retval < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth(): bad socket while flushing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
if ( retval > 0 ) {
/* still stuff on the buffer. */
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING_AUTH ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLOUT | POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
}
/* it finished sending */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_send_auth(): Finished sending authentication message. " ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_AUTH_WAIT ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
}
int or_handshake_client_process_auth ( connection_t * conn ) {
char buf [ 128 ] ; /* only 44 of this is expected to be used */
char cipher [ 128 ] ;
uint32_t min , max ;
int retval ;
assert ( conn ) ;
if ( conn - > inbuf_datalen < 128 ) /* entire response available? */
return 0 ; /* not yet */
if ( connection_fetch_from_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth() : Received auth. " ) ;
/* decrypt response */
retval = RSA_private_decrypt ( 128 , cipher , buf , conn - > prkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 )
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Public-key decryption failed during authentication to %s:%u. " ,
conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth() : Reason : %s. " ,
ERR_reason_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
else if ( retval ! = 44 )
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Received an incorrect response from router %s:%u during authentication. " ,
conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth() : Decrypted response. " ) ;
/* check validity */
if ( ( memcmp ( & conn - > local . sin_addr , buf , 4 ) ) | | /* local address */
( memcmp ( & conn - > local . sin_port , buf + 4 , 2 ) ) | | /* local port */
( memcmp ( & conn - > addr , buf + 6 , 4 ) ) | | /* remote address */
( memcmp ( & conn - > port , buf + 10 , 2 ) ) | | /* remote port */
( memcmp ( & conn - > f_session_key , buf + 12 , 8 ) ) | | /* keys */
( memcmp ( & conn - > b_session_key , buf + 20 , 8 ) ) )
{ /* incorrect response */
log ( LOG_ERR , " Router %s:%u failed to authenticate. Either the key I have is obsolete or they're doing something they're not supposed to. " , conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth() : Response valid. " ) ;
/* update link info */
min = * ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 28 ) ;
max = * ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 32 ) ;
min = ntohl ( min ) ;
max = ntohl ( max ) ;
if ( conn - > min > min )
conn - > min = min ;
if ( conn - > max > max )
conn - > max = max ;
/* reply is just local addr/port, remote addr/port, nonce */
memcpy ( buf + 12 , buf + 36 , 8 ) ;
/* encrypt reply */
retval = RSA_public_encrypt ( 20 , buf , cipher , conn - > pkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 ) /* error */
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Public-key encryption failed during authentication to %s:%u. " , conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth() : Reason : %s. " , ERR_reason_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
/* send the message */
if ( connection_write_to_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth(): my outbuf is full. Oops. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
retval = connection_flush_buf ( conn ) ;
if ( retval < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth(): bad socket while flushing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
if ( retval > 0 ) {
/* still stuff on the buffer. */
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING_NONCE ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLOUT | POLLIN ) ;
/* return(connection_process_inbuf(conn)); process the rest of the inbuf */
return 0 ;
}
/* it finished sending */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_client_process_auth(): Finished sending nonce. " ) ;
conn_or_init_crypto ( conn ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return connection_process_inbuf ( conn ) ; /* process the rest of the inbuf */
}
/*
*
* auth handshake , as performed by OR * receiving * the connection
*
*/
int or_handshake_server_process_auth ( connection_t * conn ) {
int retval ;
char buf [ 128 ] ; /* only 42 of this is expected to be used */
char cipher [ 128 ] ;
uint32_t addr ;
uint16_t port ;
uint32_t min , max ;
routerinfo_t * router ;
assert ( conn ) ;
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() entered. " ) ;
if ( conn - > inbuf_datalen < 128 ) /* entire response available? */
return 0 ; /* not yet */
if ( connection_fetch_from_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Received auth. " ) ;
/* decrypt response */
retval = RSA_private_decrypt ( 128 , cipher , buf , conn - > prkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 )
{
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
log ( LOG_ERR , " Public-key decryption failed processing auth message from new client. " ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Reason : %s. " ,
ERR_reason_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
else if ( retval ! = 36 )
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Received an incorrect authentication request. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Decrypted authentication message. " ) ;
/* identify the router */
memcpy ( & addr , buf , 4 ) ; /* save the IP address */
memcpy ( & port , buf + 4 , 2 ) ; /* save the port */
router = router_get_by_addr_port ( addr , port ) ;
if ( ! router )
{
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Received a connection from an unknown router. Will drop. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Router identified as %s:%u. " ,
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
router - > address , ntohs ( router - > or_port ) ) ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
if ( connection_get_by_addr_port ( addr , port ) ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth(): That router is already connected. Dropping. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
/* save keys */
memcpy ( conn - > b_session_key , buf + 12 , 8 ) ;
memcpy ( conn - > f_session_key , buf + 20 , 8 ) ;
/* update link info */
min = * ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 28 ) ;
max = * ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 32 ) ;
min = ntohl ( min ) ;
max = ntohl ( max ) ;
conn - > min = router - > min ;
conn - > max = router - > max ;
if ( conn - > min > min )
conn - > min = min ;
if ( conn - > max > max )
conn - > max = max ;
/* copy all relevant info to conn */
Integrated onion proxy into or/
The 'or' process can now be told (by the global_role variable) what
roles this server should play -- connect to all ORs, listen for ORs,
listen for OPs, listen for APs, or any combination.
* everything in /src/op/ is now obsolete.
* connection_ap.c now handles all interactions with application proxies
* "port" is now or_port, op_port, ap_port. But routers are still always
referenced (say, in conn_get_by_addr_port()) by addr / or_port. We
should make routers.c actually read these new ports (currently I've
kludged it so op_port = or_port+10, ap_port=or_port+20)
* circuits currently know if they're at the beginning of the path because
circ->cpath is set. They use this instead for crypts (both ways),
if it's set.
* I still obey the "send a 0 back to the AP when you're ready" protocol,
but I think we should phase it out. I can simply not read from the AP
socket until I'm ready.
I need to do a lot of cleanup work here, but the code appears to work, so
now's a good time for a checkin.
svn:r22
2002-07-02 11:36:58 +02:00
conn - > addr = router - > addr , conn - > port = router - > or_port ;
2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
conn - > pkey = router - > pkey ;
conn - > address = strdup ( router - > address ) ;
/* generate a nonce */
retval = RAND_pseudo_bytes ( conn - > nonce , 8 ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 ) /* error */
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Cannot generate a nonce. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Nonce generated. " ) ;
/* generate message */
memcpy ( buf + 36 , conn - > nonce , 8 ) ; /* append the nonce to the end of the message */
* ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 28 ) = htonl ( conn - > min ) ; /* send min link utilisation */
* ( uint32_t * ) ( buf + 32 ) = htonl ( conn - > max ) ; /* send max link utilisation */
/* encrypt message */
retval = RSA_public_encrypt ( 44 , buf , cipher , conn - > pkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 ) /* error */
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Public-key encryption failed during authentication to %s:%u. " , conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Reason : %s. " , ERR_reason_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth() : Reply encrypted. " ) ;
/* send message */
if ( connection_write_to_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth(): my outbuf is full. Oops. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
retval = connection_flush_buf ( conn ) ;
if ( retval < 0 ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth(): bad socket while flushing. " ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
if ( retval > 0 ) {
/* still stuff on the buffer. */
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_SENDING_AUTH ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLOUT | POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
}
/* it finished sending */
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_auth(): Finished sending auth. " ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_NONCE_WAIT ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return 0 ;
}
int or_handshake_server_process_nonce ( connection_t * conn ) {
char buf [ 128 ] ;
char cipher [ 128 ] ;
int retval ;
assert ( conn ) ;
if ( conn - > inbuf_datalen < 128 ) /* entire response available? */
return 0 ; /* not yet */
if ( connection_fetch_from_buf ( cipher , 128 , conn ) < 0 ) {
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_nonce() : Received auth. " ) ;
/* decrypt response */
retval = RSA_private_decrypt ( 128 , cipher , buf , conn - > prkey , RSA_PKCS1_PADDING ) ;
if ( retval = = - 1 )
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Public-key decryption failed during authentication to %s:%u. " ,
conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_nonce() : Reason : %s. " ,
ERR_reason_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
else if ( retval ! = 20 )
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Received an incorrect response from router %s:%u during authentication. " ,
conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_nonce() : Response decrypted. " ) ;
/* check validity */
if ( ( memcmp ( & conn - > addr , buf , 4 ) ) | | /* remote address */
( memcmp ( & conn - > port , buf + 4 , 2 ) ) | | /* remote port */
( memcmp ( & conn - > local . sin_addr , buf + 6 , 4 ) ) | | /* local address */
( memcmp ( & conn - > local . sin_port , buf + 10 , 2 ) ) | | /* local port */
( memcmp ( conn - > nonce , buf + 12 , 8 ) ) ) /* nonce */
{
log ( LOG_ERR , " Router %s:%u failed to authenticate. Either the key I have is obsolete or they're doing something they're not supposed to. " , conn - > address , ntohs ( conn - > port ) ) ;
return - 1 ;
}
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " or_handshake_server_process_nonce() : Response valid. Authentication complete. " ) ;
conn_or_init_crypto ( conn ) ;
conn - > state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ;
connection_watch_events ( conn , POLLIN ) ;
return connection_process_inbuf ( conn ) ; /* process the rest of the inbuf */
}
/* ********************************** */
int connection_or_create_listener ( RSA * prkey , struct sockaddr_in * local ) {
log ( LOG_DEBUG , " connection_create_or_listener starting " ) ;
return connection_create_listener ( prkey , local , CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ) ;
}
int connection_or_handle_listener_read ( connection_t * conn ) {
log ( LOG_NOTICE , " OR: Received a connection request from a router. Attempting to authenticate. " ) ;
return connection_handle_listener_read ( conn , CONN_TYPE_OR , OR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_AUTH_WAIT ) ;
}