tor/src/or/rendservice.c

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2005-04-01 22:15:56 +02:00
/* Copyright 2004-2005 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char rendservice_c_id[] = "$Id$";
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/**
* \file rendservice.c
* \brief The hidden-service side of rendezvous functionality.
**/
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#include "or.h"
static circuit_t *find_intro_circuit(routerinfo_t *router, const char *pk_digest);
/** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to
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* a real port on some IP.
*/
typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t {
uint16_t virtual_port;
uint16_t real_port;
uint32_t real_addr;
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} rend_service_port_config_t;
/** Try to maintain this many intro points per service if possible. */
#define NUM_INTRO_POINTS 3
/** If we can't build our intro circuits, don't retry for this long. */
#define INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD 60*5
/** Don't try to build more than this many circuits before giving up
* for a while.*/
#define MAX_INTRO_CIRCS_PER_PERIOD 10
/** How many times will a hidden service operator attempt to connect to
* a requested rendezvous point before giving up? */
#define MAX_REND_FAILURES 30
/** How many seconds should we spend trying to connect to a requested
* rendezvous point before giving up? */
#define MAX_REND_TIMEOUT 30
/** Represents a single hidden service running at this OP. */
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typedef struct rend_service_t {
/** Fields specified in config file */
char *directory; /**< where in the filesystem it stores it */
smartlist_t *ports; /**< List of rend_service_port_config_t */
char *intro_prefer_nodes; /**< comma-separated list of nicknames */
char *intro_exclude_nodes; /**< comma-separated list of nicknames */
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/* Other fields */
crypto_pk_env_t *private_key;
char service_id[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
char pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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smartlist_t *intro_nodes; /**< list of hexdigests for intro points we have,
* or are trying to establish. */
time_t intro_period_started;
int n_intro_circuits_launched; /**< count of intro circuits we have
* established in this period. */
rend_service_descriptor_t *desc;
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
time_t desc_is_dirty;
time_t next_upload_time;
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} rend_service_t;
/** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP.
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*/
static smartlist_t *rend_service_list = NULL;
/** Return the number of rendezvous services we have configured. */
int
num_rend_services(void)
{
if (!rend_service_list)
return 0;
return smartlist_len(rend_service_list);
}
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/** Release the storage held by <b>service</b>.
*/
static void
rend_service_free(rend_service_t *service)
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{
if (!service) return;
tor_free(service->directory);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, void*, p, tor_free(p));
smartlist_free(service->ports);
if (service->private_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(service->private_key);
tor_free(service->intro_prefer_nodes);
tor_free(service->intro_exclude_nodes);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->intro_nodes, void*, p, tor_free(p));
smartlist_free(service->intro_nodes);
if (service->desc)
rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
tor_free(service);
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}
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/** Release all the storage held in rend_service_list.
*/
void
rend_service_free_all(void)
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{
if (!rend_service_list) {
return;
}
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
rend_service_free(ptr));
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smartlist_free(rend_service_list);
rend_service_list = NULL;
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}
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/** Validate <b>service</b> and add it to rend_service_list if possible.
*/
static void
add_service(rend_service_t *service)
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{
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
struct in_addr addr;
if (!service->intro_prefer_nodes)
service->intro_prefer_nodes = tor_strdup("");
if (!service->intro_exclude_nodes)
service->intro_exclude_nodes = tor_strdup("");
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if (!smartlist_len(service->ports)) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service with no ports configured; ignoring.");
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rend_service_free(service);
} else {
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smartlist_set_capacity(service->ports, -1);
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smartlist_add(rend_service_list, service);
debug(LD_REND,"Configuring service with directory \"%s\"",service->directory);
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for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
char addrbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
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p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
addr.s_addr = htonl(p->real_addr);
tor_inet_ntoa(&addr, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
debug(LD_REND,"Service maps port %d to %s:%d",
p->virtual_port, addrbuf, p->real_port);
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}
}
}
/** Parses a real-port to virtual-port mapping and returns a new
* rend_service_port_config_t.
*
* The format is: VirtualPort (IP|RealPort|IP:RealPort)?
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*
* IP defaults to 127.0.0.1; RealPort defaults to VirtualPort.
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*/
static rend_service_port_config_t *
parse_port_config(const char *string)
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{
smartlist_t *sl;
int virtport;
int realport;
uint16_t p;
uint32_t addr;
const char *addrport;
rend_service_port_config_t *result = NULL;
sl = smartlist_create();
smartlist_split_string(sl, string, " ", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
if (smartlist_len(sl) < 1 || smartlist_len(sl) > 2) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Bad syntax in hidden service port configuration.");
goto err;
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}
virtport = atoi(smartlist_get(sl,0));
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if (virtport < 1 || virtport > 65535) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Missing or invalid port in hidden service port configuration.");
goto err;
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}
if (smartlist_len(sl) == 1) {
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/* No addr:port part; use default. */
realport = virtport;
addr = 0x7F000001u; /* 127.0.0.1 */
} else {
addrport = smartlist_get(sl,1);
if (strchr(addrport, ':') || strchr(addrport, '.')) {
if (parse_addr_port(addrport, NULL, &addr, &p)<0) {
warn(LD_CONFIG,"Unparseable address in hidden service port configuration.");
goto err;
}
realport = p?p:virtport;
} else {
/* No addr:port, no addr -- must be port. */
realport = atoi(addrport);
if (realport < 1 || realport > 65535)
goto err;
addr = 0x7F000001u; /* Default to 127.0.0.1 */
}
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}
result = tor_malloc(sizeof(rend_service_port_config_t));
result->virtual_port = virtport;
result->real_port = realport;
result->real_addr = addr;
err:
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
smartlist_free(sl);
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return result;
}
/** Set up rend_service_list, based on the values of HiddenServiceDir and
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* HiddenServicePort in <b>options</b>. Return 0 on success and -1 on
* failure. (If <b>validate_only</b> is set, parse, warn and return as
* normal, but don't actually change the configured services.)
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*/
int
rend_config_services(or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
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{
config_line_t *line;
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rend_service_t *service = NULL;
rend_service_port_config_t *portcfg;
if (!validate_only) {
rend_service_free_all();
rend_service_list = smartlist_create();
}
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for (line = options->RendConfigLines; line; line = line->next) {
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceDir")) {
if (service) {
if (validate_only)
rend_service_free(service);
else
add_service(service);
}
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service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
service->directory = tor_strdup(line->value);
service->ports = smartlist_create();
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_create();
service->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
continue;
}
if (!service) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServicePort with no preceding HiddenServiceDir directive.");
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServicePort")) {
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portcfg = parse_port_config(line->value);
if (!portcfg) {
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rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
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}
smartlist_add(service->ports, portcfg);
} else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceNodes")) {
if (service->intro_prefer_nodes) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Got multiple HiddenServiceNodes lines for a single service.");
return -1;
}
service->intro_prefer_nodes = tor_strdup(line->value);
} else {
tor_assert(!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceExcludeNodes"));
if (service->intro_exclude_nodes) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Got multiple HiddenServiceExcludedNodes lines for a single service.");
return -1;
}
service->intro_exclude_nodes = tor_strdup(line->value);
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}
}
if (service) {
if (validate_only)
rend_service_free(service);
else
add_service(service);
}
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return 0;
}
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/** Replace the old value of <b>service</b>-\>desc with one that reflects
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* the other fields in service.
*/
static void
rend_service_update_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
{
rend_service_descriptor_t *d;
circuit_t *circ;
int i,n;
routerinfo_t *router;
if (service->desc) {
rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
service->desc = NULL;
}
d = service->desc = tor_malloc(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
d->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(service->private_key);
d->timestamp = time(NULL);
d->version = 1;
n = smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes);
d->n_intro_points = 0;
d->intro_points = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*n);
d->intro_point_extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*n);
d->protocols = (1<<2) | (1<<0); /* We support protocol 2 and protocol 0. */
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
router = router_get_by_nickname(smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, i),1);
if (!router) {
info(LD_REND,"Router '%s' not found. Skipping.",
(char*)smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, i));
continue;
}
circ = find_intro_circuit(router, service->pk_digest);
if (circ && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
/* We have an entirely established intro circuit. */
d->intro_points[d->n_intro_points] = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
d->intro_point_extend_info[d->n_intro_points] =
extend_info_from_router(router);
d->n_intro_points++;
}
}
}
/** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services. Return 0 on
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* success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
rend_service_load_keys(void)
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{
int i;
rend_service_t *s;
char fname[512];
char buf[128];
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for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
s = smartlist_get(rend_service_list,i);
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if (s->private_key)
continue;
info(LD_REND, "Loading hidden-service keys from \"%s\"", s->directory);
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/* Check/create directory */
if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE) < 0)
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return -1;
/* Load key */
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
strlcat(fname,"/private_key",sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname)) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long: \"%s\".", s->directory);
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return -1;
}
s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname);
if (!s->private_key)
return -1;
/* Create service file */
if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
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return -1;
}
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
warn(LD_BUG, "Bug: Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
return -1;
}
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
strlcat(fname,"/hostname",sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname)) {
warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long: \"%s\".", s->directory);
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return -1;
}
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id);
if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0)
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return -1;
}
return 0;
}
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/** Return the service whose public key has a digest of <b>digest</b>. Return
* NULL if no such service exists.
*/
static rend_service_t *
rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(const char* digest)
{
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, s,
if (!memcmp(s->pk_digest,digest,DIGEST_LEN)) return s);
return NULL;
}
/** Return 1 if any virtual port in <b>service</b> wants a circuit
* to have good uptime. Else return 0.
*/
static int
rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service)
{
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
if (smartlist_string_num_isin(get_options()->LongLivedPorts, p->virtual_port))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/******
* Handle cells
******/
/** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
* rendezvous point.
*/
int
rend_service_introduce(circuit_t *circuit, const char *request, size_t request_len)
{
char *ptr, *r_cookie;
extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; /* Holds KH, Df, Db, Kf, Kb */
rend_service_t *service;
int r, i;
size_t len, keylen;
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
circuit_t *launched = NULL;
crypt_path_t *cpath = NULL;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
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char hexcookie[9];
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
int circ_needs_uptime;
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base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1,
circuit->rend_pk_digest,10);
info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE2 cell for service %s on circ %d.",
serviceid, circuit->n_circ_id);
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if (circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got an INTRODUCE2 over a non-introduction circuit %d.",
circuit->n_circ_id);
return -1;
}
/* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */
if (request_len < DIGEST_LEN+REND_COOKIE_LEN+(MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)+
DH_KEY_LEN+42) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got a truncated INTRODUCE2 cell on circ %d.",
circuit->n_circ_id);
return -1;
}
/* first DIGEST_LEN bytes of request is service pk digest */
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(request);
if (!service) {
warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for an unrecognized service %s.",
serviceid);
return -1;
}
if (memcmp(circuit->rend_pk_digest, request, DIGEST_LEN)) {
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1, request, 10);
warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for the wrong service (%s).",
serviceid);
return -1;
}
keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(service->private_key);
if (request_len < keylen+DIGEST_LEN) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "PK-encrypted portion of INTRODUCE2 cell was truncated.");
return -1;
}
/* Next N bytes is encrypted with service key */
r = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(
service->private_key,buf,request+DIGEST_LEN,request_len-DIGEST_LEN,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1);
if (r<0) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE2 cell.");
return -1;
}
len = r;
if (*buf == 2) {
/* Version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell. */
int klen;
extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
extend_info->addr = ntohl(get_uint32(buf+1));
extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+5));
memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf+7, DIGEST_LEN);
extend_info->nickname[0] = '$';
base16_encode(extend_info->nickname+1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname)-1,
extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+7+DIGEST_LEN));
if ((int)len != 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+20+128) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad length %u for version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell.", (int)len);
goto err;
}
extend_info->onion_key = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(buf+7+DIGEST_LEN+2, klen);
if (!extend_info->onion_key) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Error decoding onion key in version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell.");
goto err;
}
ptr = buf+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
len -= 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
} else {
char *rp_nickname;
size_t nickname_field_len;
routerinfo_t *router;
int version;
if (*buf == 1) {
rp_nickname = buf+1;
nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1;
version = 1;
} else {
nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1;
rp_nickname = buf;
version = 0;
}
/* XXX when 0.1.0.x is obsolete, change this to reject version < 2. */
ptr=memchr(rp_nickname,0,nickname_field_len);
if (!ptr || ptr == rp_nickname) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't find a null-padded nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
return -1;
}
if ((version == 0 && !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
(version == 1 && !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
return -1;
}
/* Okay, now we know that a nickname is at the start of the buffer. */
ptr = rp_nickname+nickname_field_len;
len -= nickname_field_len;
len -= rp_nickname - buf; /* also remove header space used by version, if any */
router = router_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0);
if (!router) {
info(LD_REND, "Couldn't find router '%s' named in rendezvous cell.",
rp_nickname);
goto err;
}
extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router);
}
if (len != REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad length %u for INTRODUCE2 cell.", (int)len);
return -1;
}
r_cookie = ptr;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4);
/* Try DH handshake... */
dh = crypto_dh_new();
if (!dh || crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) {
warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: couldn't build DH state or generate public key.");
goto err;
}
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
goto err;
}
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
circ_needs_uptime = rend_service_requires_uptime(service);
/* help predict this next time */
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), circ_needs_uptime, 1);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
/* Launch a circuit to alice's chosen rendezvous point.
*/
for (i=0;i<MAX_REND_FAILURES;i++) {
launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, extend_info, circ_needs_uptime, 1, 1);
if (launched)
break;
}
if (!launched) { /* give up */
warn(LD_REND,"Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point '%s' for service %s.",
extend_info->nickname, serviceid);
2004-10-25 01:09:48 +02:00
goto err;
}
info(LD_REND,
"Accepted intro; launching circuit to '%s' (cookie %s) for service %s.",
extend_info->nickname, hexcookie, serviceid);
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
memcpy(launched->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_pk_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(launched->rend_cookie, r_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
2004-10-27 08:48:16 +02:00
strlcpy(launched->rend_query, service->service_id,
sizeof(launched->rend_query));
launched->build_state->pending_final_cpath = cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
launched->build_state->expiry_time = time(NULL) + MAX_REND_TIMEOUT;
cpath->dh_handshake_state = dh;
dh = NULL;
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0)
goto err;
memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
return 0;
err:
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
if (launched) circuit_mark_for_close(launched);
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
return -1;
}
/** Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other
* than the last hop: launches a new circuit to the same rendezvous point.
*/
void
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circuit_t *oldcirc)
{
circuit_t *newcirc;
cpath_build_state_t *newstate, *oldstate;
2004-05-18 17:35:21 +02:00
tor_assert(oldcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
if (!oldcirc->build_state ||
oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES ||
oldcirc->build_state->expiry_time < time(NULL)) {
info(LD_REND,"Attempt to build circuit to %s for rendezvous has failed too many times or expired; giving up.",
oldcirc->build_state ? oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname :
"*unknown*");
return;
}
oldstate = oldcirc->build_state;
tor_assert(oldstate);
if (oldstate->pending_final_cpath == NULL) {
info(LD_REND,"Skipping relaunch of circ that failed on its first hop. Initiator will retry.");
return;
}
info(LD_REND,"Reattempting rendezvous circuit to %s",
oldstate->chosen_exit->nickname);
newcirc = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND,
oldstate->chosen_exit, 0, 1, 1);
if (!newcirc) {
warn(LD_REND,"Couldn't relaunch rendezvous circuit to %s.",
oldstate->chosen_exit->nickname);
return;
}
newstate = newcirc->build_state;
tor_assert(newstate);
newstate->failure_count = oldstate->failure_count+1;
newstate->expiry_time = oldstate->expiry_time;
newstate->pending_final_cpath = oldstate->pending_final_cpath;
oldstate->pending_final_cpath = NULL;
memcpy(newcirc->rend_query, oldcirc->rend_query, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1);
memcpy(newcirc->rend_pk_digest, oldcirc->rend_pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
2004-04-30 18:35:48 +02:00
memcpy(newcirc->rend_cookie, oldcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
}
/** Launch a circuit to serve as an introduction point for the service
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
* <b>service</b> at the introduction point <b>nickname</b>
*/
static int
rend_service_launch_establish_intro(rend_service_t *service, const char *nickname)
{
circuit_t *launched;
info(LD_REND, "Launching circuit to introduction point %s for service %s",
nickname, service->service_id);
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), 1, 0);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
++service->n_intro_circuits_launched;
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
launched = circuit_launch_by_nickname(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO, nickname, 1, 0, 1);
if (!launched) {
info(LD_REND, "Can't launch circuit to establish introduction at '%s'.",
nickname);
return -1;
}
2004-10-27 08:48:16 +02:00
strlcpy(launched->rend_query, service->service_id,
sizeof(launched->rend_query));
memcpy(launched->rend_pk_digest, service->pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
if (launched->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
rend_service_intro_has_opened(launched);
return 0;
}
/** Called when we're done building a circuit to an introduction point:
* sends a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.
*/
void
rend_service_intro_has_opened(circuit_t *circuit)
{
rend_service_t *service;
size_t len;
int r;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char auth[DIGEST_LEN + 9];
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
tor_assert(circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circuit));
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1,
circuit->rend_pk_digest,10);
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(circuit->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized service ID %s on introduction circuit %d.",
serviceid, circuit->n_circ_id);
goto err;
}
info(LD_REND,
"Established circuit %d as introduction point for service %s",
circuit->n_circ_id, serviceid);
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
/* Build the payload for a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */
len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(service->private_key, buf+2,
RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-2);
set_uint16(buf, htons((uint16_t)len));
len += 2;
memcpy(auth, circuit->cpath->prev->handshake_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(auth+DIGEST_LEN, "INTRODUCE", 9);
if (crypto_digest(buf+len, auth, DIGEST_LEN+9))
goto err;
len += 20;
r = crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(service->private_key, buf+len, buf, len);
if (r<0) {
warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't sign introduction request.");
goto err;
}
len += r;
if (connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circuit,RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
buf, len, circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {
info(LD_GENERAL,
"Couldn't send introduction request for service %s on circuit %d",
serviceid, circuit->n_circ_id);
goto err;
}
return;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(circuit);
}
/** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a
* live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is
* now out-of-date.*/
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
int
rend_service_intro_established(circuit_t *circuit, const char *request, size_t request_len)
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
{
rend_service_t *service;
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
if (circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on non-intro circuit.");
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
goto err;
}
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(circuit->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service on introduction circuit %d.",
circuit->n_circ_id);
goto err;
}
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
service->desc_is_dirty = time(NULL);
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
circuit->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO;
return 0;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(circuit);
return -1;
}
/** Called once a circuit to a rendezvous point is established: sends a
* RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 cell.
*/
void
rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circuit_t *circuit)
{
rend_service_t *service;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
crypt_path_t *hop;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
char hexcookie[9];
tor_assert(circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
hop = circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop);
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,circuit->rend_cookie,4);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1,
circuit->rend_pk_digest,10);
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
info(LD_REND,
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
"Done building circuit %d to rendezvous with cookie %s for service %s",
circuit->n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid);
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(circuit->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
warn(LD_GENERAL, "Internal error: unrecognized service ID on introduction circuit.");
goto err;
}
/* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */
memcpy(buf, circuit->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->dh_handshake_state,
buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key.");
goto err;
}
memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN, hop->handshake_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
/* Send the cell */
if (connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circuit, RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1,
buf, REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN,
circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {
warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send RENDEZVOUS1 cell.");
goto err;
}
crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state);
hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
/* Append the cpath entry. */
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
/* set the windows to default. these are the windows
* that bob thinks alice has.
*/
hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
onion_append_to_cpath(&circuit->cpath, hop);
circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */
/* Change the circuit purpose. */
circuit->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED;
return;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(circuit);
}
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/*
* Manage introduction points
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
*/
/** Return the (possibly non-open) introduction circuit ending at
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
* <b>router</b> for the service whose public key is <b>pk_digest</b>. Return
* NULL if no such service is found.
*/
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
static circuit_t *
find_intro_circuit(routerinfo_t *router, const char *pk_digest)
{
circuit_t *circ = NULL;
tor_assert(router);
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,pk_digest,
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) {
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
if (!strcasecmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
router->nickname)) {
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
return circ;
}
}
circ = NULL;
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,pk_digest,
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) {
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
if (!strcasecmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
router->nickname)) {
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
return circ;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/** Encode and sign an up-to-date service descriptor for <b>service</b>,
* and upload it to all the dirservers.
*/
static void
upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service, int version)
{
char *desc;
size_t desc_len;
/* Update the descriptor. */
rend_service_update_descriptor(service);
if (rend_encode_service_descriptor(service->desc,
version,
service->private_key,
&desc, &desc_len)<0) {
warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service descriptor; not uploading.");
return;
}
/* Post it to the dirservers */
2004-05-13 01:48:57 +02:00
directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC, desc, desc_len);
tor_free(desc);
service->desc_is_dirty = 0;
}
/* XXXX Make this longer once directories remember service descriptors across
* restarts.*/
#define MAX_SERVICE_PUBLICATION_INTERVAL (15*60)
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
/** For every service, check how many intro points it currently has, and:
* - Pick new intro points as necessary.
* - Launch circuits to any new intro points.
*/
void
rend_services_introduce(void)
{
int i,j,r;
routerinfo_t *router;
rend_service_t *service;
char *intro;
int changed, prev_intro_nodes;
smartlist_t *intro_routers, *exclude_routers;
time_t now;
intro_routers = smartlist_create();
exclude_routers = smartlist_create();
now = time(NULL);
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
smartlist_clear(intro_routers);
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
tor_assert(service);
changed = 0;
if (now > service->intro_period_started+INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD) {
/* One period has elapsed; we can try building circuits again. */
service->intro_period_started = now;
service->n_intro_circuits_launched = 0;
} else if (service->n_intro_circuits_launched >=
MAX_INTRO_CIRCS_PER_PERIOD) {
/* We have failed too many times in this period; wait for the next
* one before we try again. */
continue;
}
/* Find out which introduction points we have in progress for this service. */
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
router = router_get_by_nickname(intro, 0);
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
if (!router || !find_intro_circuit(router,service->pk_digest)) {
info(LD_REND,"Giving up on %s as intro point for %s.",
intro, service->service_id);
tor_free(intro);
2004-04-03 06:55:22 +02:00
smartlist_del(service->intro_nodes,j--);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
changed = 1;
service->desc_is_dirty = now;
}
smartlist_add(intro_routers, router);
}
/* We have enough intro points, and the intro points we thought we had were
* all connected.
*/
if (!changed && smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes) >= NUM_INTRO_POINTS) {
/* We have all our intro points! Start a fresh period and reset the
* circuit count. */
service->intro_period_started = now;
service->n_intro_circuits_launched = 0;
continue;
}
/* Remember how many introduction circuits we started with. */
2004-04-03 02:58:54 +02:00
prev_intro_nodes = smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes);
smartlist_add_all(exclude_routers, intro_routers);
/* The directory is now here. Pick three ORs as intro points. */
for (j=prev_intro_nodes; j < NUM_INTRO_POINTS; ++j) {
char *hex_digest;
router = router_choose_random_node(service->intro_prefer_nodes,
service->intro_exclude_nodes, exclude_routers, 1, 0,
get_options()->_AllowUnverified & ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_INTRODUCTION, 0);
if (!router) {
warn(LD_REND, "Could only establish %d introduction points for %s.",
smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes), service->service_id);
break;
}
changed = 1;
hex_digest = tor_malloc_zero(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
hex_digest[0] = '$';
base16_encode(hex_digest+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
router->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
smartlist_add(intro_routers, router);
smartlist_add(exclude_routers, router);
smartlist_add(service->intro_nodes, hex_digest);
info(LD_REND, "Picked router %s as an intro point for %s.",
router->nickname, service->service_id);
}
/* Reset exclude_routers, for the next time around the loop. */
smartlist_clear(exclude_routers);
/* If there's no need to launch new circuits, stop here. */
if (!changed)
continue;
/* Establish new introduction points. */
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for (j=prev_intro_nodes; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
r = rend_service_launch_establish_intro(service, intro);
if (r<0) {
warn(LD_REND, "Error launching circuit to node %s for service %s.",
intro, service->service_id);
}
}
}
smartlist_free(intro_routers);
smartlist_free(exclude_routers);
}
/** Regenerate and upload rendezvous service descriptors for all
* services, if necessary. If the descriptor has been dirty enough
* for long enough, definitely upload; else only upload when the
* periodic timeout has expired.
*
* For the first upload, pick a random time between now and two periods
* from now, and pick it independently for each service.
*/
void
rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now)
{
int i;
rend_service_t *service;
int rendpostperiod = get_options()->RendPostPeriod;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
if (!service->next_upload_time) { /* never been uploaded yet */
service->next_upload_time =
now + crypto_rand_int(2*rendpostperiod);
}
if (service->next_upload_time < now ||
(service->desc_is_dirty &&
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
service->desc_is_dirty < now-5)) {
/* if it's time, or if the directory servers have a wrong service
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
* descriptor and ours has been stable for 5 seconds, upload a
* new one of each format. */
upload_service_descriptor(service, 0);
// XXXX011 upload_service_descriptor(service, 1);
service->next_upload_time = now + rendpostperiod;
}
}
}
/** Log the status of introduction points for all rendezvous services
* at log severity <b>severity</b>.
*/
void
rend_service_dump_stats(int severity)
{
int i,j;
routerinfo_t *router;
rend_service_t *service;
char *nickname;
circuit_t *circ;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Service configured in \"%s\":", service->directory);
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
nickname = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
router = router_get_by_nickname(smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes,j),1);
if (!router) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point at %s: unrecognized router",nickname);
continue;
}
circ = find_intro_circuit(router, service->pk_digest);
if (!circ) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point at %s: no circuit",nickname);
continue;
}
log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point at %s: circuit is %s",nickname,
circuit_state_to_string(circ->state));
}
}
}
2004-05-10 09:27:29 +02:00
/** Given <b>conn</b>, a rendezvous exit stream, look up the hidden service for
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
* 'circ', and look up the port and address based on conn-\>port.
* Assign the actual conn-\>addr and conn-\>port. Return -1 if failure,
* or 0 for success.
*/
int
rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(connection_t *conn, circuit_t *circ)
{
rend_service_t *service;
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
2004-04-15 04:02:46 +02:00
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
debug(LD_REND,"beginning to hunt for addr/port");
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1,
circ->rend_pk_digest,10);
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(circ->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't find any service associated with pk %s on rendezvous circuit %d; closing.",
serviceid, circ->n_circ_id);
2004-04-15 03:23:43 +02:00
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
if (conn->port == p->virtual_port) {
conn->addr = p->real_addr;
conn->port = p->real_port;
return 0;
}
}
info(LD_REND, "No virtual port mapping exists for port %d on service %s",
conn->port,serviceid);
return -1;
}