tor/src/or/hs_common.c

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2017-03-15 21:13:17 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file hs_common.c
* \brief Contains code shared between different HS protocol version as well
* as useful data structures and accessors used by other subsystems.
* The rendcommon.c should only contains code relating to the v2
* protocol.
**/
#define HS_COMMON_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "hs_cache.h"
#include "hs_common.h"
#include "hs_service.h"
#include "rendcommon.h"
#include "rendservice.h"
#include "router.h"
#include "shared_random.h"
#include "shared_random_state.h"
/* Ed25519 Basepoint value. Taken from section 5 of
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 */
static const char *str_ed25519_basepoint =
"(15112221349535400772501151409588531511"
"454012693041857206046113283949847762202, "
"463168356949264781694283940034751631413"
"07993866256225615783033603165251855960)";
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
/** Given <b>ports</b>, a smarlist containing rend_service_port_config_t,
* add the given <b>p</b>, a AF_UNIX port to the list. Return 0 on success
* else return -ENOSYS if AF_UNIX is not supported (see function in the
* #else statement below). */
static int
add_unix_port(smartlist_t *ports, rend_service_port_config_t *p)
{
tor_assert(ports);
tor_assert(p);
tor_assert(p->is_unix_addr);
smartlist_add(ports, p);
return 0;
}
/** Given <b>conn</b> set it to use the given port <b>p</b> values. Return 0
* on success else return -ENOSYS if AF_UNIX is not supported (see function
* in the #else statement below). */
static int
set_unix_port(edge_connection_t *conn, rend_service_port_config_t *p)
{
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(p);
tor_assert(p->is_unix_addr);
conn->base_.socket_family = AF_UNIX;
tor_addr_make_unspec(&conn->base_.addr);
conn->base_.port = 1;
conn->base_.address = tor_strdup(p->unix_addr);
return 0;
}
#else /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
static int
set_unix_port(edge_connection_t *conn, rend_service_port_config_t *p)
{
(void) conn;
(void) p;
return -ENOSYS;
}
static int
add_unix_port(smartlist_t *ports, rend_service_port_config_t *p)
{
(void) ports;
(void) p;
return -ENOSYS;
}
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
/* Helper function: The key is a digest that we compare to a node_t object
* current hsdir_index. */
static int
compare_digest_to_current_hsdir_index(const void *_key, const void **_member)
{
const char *key = _key;
const node_t *node = *_member;
return tor_memcmp(key, node->hsdir_index->current, DIGEST256_LEN);
}
/* Helper function: The key is a digest that we compare to a node_t object
* next hsdir_index. */
static int
compare_digest_to_next_hsdir_index(const void *_key, const void **_member)
{
const char *key = _key;
const node_t *node = *_member;
return tor_memcmp(key, node->hsdir_index->next, DIGEST256_LEN);
}
/* Helper function: Compare two node_t objects current hsdir_index. */
static int
compare_node_current_hsdir_index(const void **a, const void **b)
{
const node_t *node1= *a;
const node_t *node2 = *b;
return tor_memcmp(node1->hsdir_index->current,
node2->hsdir_index->current,
DIGEST256_LEN);
}
/* Helper function: Compare two node_t objects next hsdir_index. */
static int
compare_node_next_hsdir_index(const void **a, const void **b)
{
const node_t *node1= *a;
const node_t *node2 = *b;
return tor_memcmp(node1->hsdir_index->next,
node2->hsdir_index->next,
DIGEST256_LEN);
}
/* Allocate and return a string containing the path to filename in directory.
* This function will never return NULL. The caller must free this path. */
char *
hs_path_from_filename(const char *directory, const char *filename)
{
char *file_path = NULL;
tor_assert(directory);
tor_assert(filename);
tor_asprintf(&file_path, "%s%s%s", directory, PATH_SEPARATOR, filename);
return file_path;
}
/* Make sure that the directory for <b>service</b> is private, using the config
* <b>username</b>.
* If <b>create</b> is true:
* - if the directory exists, change permissions if needed,
* - if the directory does not exist, create it with the correct permissions.
* If <b>create</b> is false:
* - if the directory exists, check permissions,
* - if the directory does not exist, check if we think we can create it.
* Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
int
hs_check_service_private_dir(const char *username, const char *path,
unsigned int dir_group_readable,
unsigned int create)
{
cpd_check_t check_opts = CPD_NONE;
tor_assert(path);
if (create) {
check_opts |= CPD_CREATE;
} else {
check_opts |= CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY;
check_opts |= CPD_CHECK;
}
if (dir_group_readable) {
check_opts |= CPD_GROUP_READ;
}
/* Check/create directory */
if (check_private_dir(path, check_opts, username) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Get the default HS time period length in minutes from the consensus. */
STATIC uint64_t
get_time_period_length(void)
{
/* If we are on a test network, make the time period smaller than normal so
that we actually see it rotate. Specifically, make it the same length as
an SRV protocol run. */
if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
unsigned run_duration = sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration();
/* An SRV run should take more than a minute (it's 24 rounds) */
tor_assert_nonfatal(run_duration > 60);
/* Turn it from seconds to minutes before returning: */
return sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration() / 60;
}
int32_t time_period_length = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hsdir-interval",
HS_TIME_PERIOD_LENGTH_DEFAULT,
HS_TIME_PERIOD_LENGTH_MIN,
HS_TIME_PERIOD_LENGTH_MAX);
/* Make sure it's a positive value. */
tor_assert(time_period_length >= 0);
/* uint64_t will always be able to contain a int32_t */
return (uint64_t) time_period_length;
}
/** Get the HS time period number at time <b>now</b> */
uint64_t
hs_get_time_period_num(time_t now)
{
uint64_t time_period_num;
/* Start by calculating minutes since the epoch */
uint64_t time_period_length = get_time_period_length();
uint64_t minutes_since_epoch = now / 60;
/* Apply the rotation offset as specified by prop224 (section
* [TIME-PERIODS]), so that new time periods synchronize nicely with SRV
* publication */
unsigned int time_period_rotation_offset = sr_state_get_phase_duration();
time_period_rotation_offset /= 60; /* go from seconds to minutes */
tor_assert(minutes_since_epoch > time_period_rotation_offset);
minutes_since_epoch -= time_period_rotation_offset;
/* Calculate the time period */
time_period_num = minutes_since_epoch / time_period_length;
return time_period_num;
}
/** Get the number of the _upcoming_ HS time period, given that the current
* time is <b>now</b>. */
uint64_t
hs_get_next_time_period_num(time_t now)
{
return hs_get_time_period_num(now) + 1;
}
/* Return the start time of the upcoming time period based on <b>now</b>. */
time_t
hs_get_start_time_of_next_time_period(time_t now)
{
uint64_t time_period_length = get_time_period_length();
/* Get start time of next time period */
uint64_t next_time_period_num = hs_get_next_time_period_num(now);
uint64_t start_of_next_tp_in_mins = next_time_period_num *time_period_length;
/* Apply rotation offset as specified by prop224 section [TIME-PERIODS] */
unsigned int time_period_rotation_offset = sr_state_get_phase_duration();
return start_of_next_tp_in_mins * 60 + time_period_rotation_offset;
}
/* Create a new rend_data_t for a specific given <b>version</b>.
* Return a pointer to the newly allocated data structure. */
static rend_data_t *
rend_data_alloc(uint32_t version)
{
rend_data_t *rend_data = NULL;
switch (version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
{
rend_data_v2_t *v2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*v2));
v2->base_.version = HS_VERSION_TWO;
v2->base_.hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new();
rend_data = &v2->base_;
break;
}
default:
tor_assert(0);
break;
}
return rend_data;
}
/** Free all storage associated with <b>data</b> */
void
rend_data_free(rend_data_t *data)
{
if (!data) {
return;
}
/* By using our allocation function, this should always be set. */
tor_assert(data->hsdirs_fp);
/* Cleanup the HSDir identity digest. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data->hsdirs_fp, char *, d, tor_free(d));
smartlist_free(data->hsdirs_fp);
/* Depending on the version, cleanup. */
switch (data->version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
{
rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(data);
tor_free(v2_data);
break;
}
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
}
/* Allocate and return a deep copy of <b>data</b>. */
rend_data_t *
rend_data_dup(const rend_data_t *data)
{
rend_data_t *data_dup = NULL;
smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new();
tor_assert(data);
tor_assert(data->hsdirs_fp);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data->hsdirs_fp, char *, fp,
smartlist_add(hsdirs_fp, tor_memdup(fp, DIGEST_LEN)));
switch (data->version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
{
rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = tor_memdup(TO_REND_DATA_V2(data),
sizeof(*v2_data));
data_dup = &v2_data->base_;
data_dup->hsdirs_fp = hsdirs_fp;
break;
}
default:
tor_assert(0);
break;
}
return data_dup;
}
/* Compute the descriptor ID for each HS descriptor replica and save them. A
* valid onion address must be present in the <b>rend_data</b>.
*
* Return 0 on success else -1. */
static int
compute_desc_id(rend_data_t *rend_data)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned replica;
time_t now = time(NULL);
tor_assert(rend_data);
switch (rend_data->version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
{
rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data);
/* Compute descriptor ID for each replicas. */
for (replica = 0; replica < ARRAY_LENGTH(v2_data->descriptor_id);
replica++) {
ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(v2_data->descriptor_id[replica],
v2_data->onion_address,
v2_data->descriptor_cookie,
now, replica);
if (ret < 0) {
goto end;
}
}
break;
}
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
end:
return ret;
}
/* Allocate and initialize a rend_data_t object for a service using the
* provided arguments. All arguments are optional (can be NULL), except from
* <b>onion_address</b> which MUST be set. The <b>pk_digest</b> is the hash of
* the service private key. The <b>cookie</b> is the rendezvous cookie and
* <b>auth_type</b> is which authentiation this service is configured with.
*
* Return a valid rend_data_t pointer. This only returns a version 2 object of
* rend_data_t. */
rend_data_t *
rend_data_service_create(const char *onion_address, const char *pk_digest,
const uint8_t *cookie, rend_auth_type_t auth_type)
{
/* Create a rend_data_t object for version 2. */
rend_data_t *rend_data = rend_data_alloc(HS_VERSION_TWO);
rend_data_v2_t *v2= TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data);
/* We need at least one else the call is wrong. */
tor_assert(onion_address != NULL);
if (pk_digest) {
memcpy(v2->rend_pk_digest, pk_digest, sizeof(v2->rend_pk_digest));
}
if (cookie) {
memcpy(rend_data->rend_cookie, cookie, sizeof(rend_data->rend_cookie));
}
strlcpy(v2->onion_address, onion_address, sizeof(v2->onion_address));
v2->auth_type = auth_type;
return rend_data;
}
/* Allocate and initialize a rend_data_t object for a client request using the
* given arguments. Either an onion address or a descriptor ID is needed. Both
* can be given but in this case only the onion address will be used to make
* the descriptor fetch. The <b>cookie</b> is the rendezvous cookie and
* <b>auth_type</b> is which authentiation the service is configured with.
*
* Return a valid rend_data_t pointer or NULL on error meaning the
* descriptor IDs couldn't be computed from the given data. */
rend_data_t *
rend_data_client_create(const char *onion_address, const char *desc_id,
const char *cookie, rend_auth_type_t auth_type)
{
/* Create a rend_data_t object for version 2. */
rend_data_t *rend_data = rend_data_alloc(HS_VERSION_TWO);
rend_data_v2_t *v2= TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data);
/* We need at least one else the call is wrong. */
tor_assert(onion_address != NULL || desc_id != NULL);
if (cookie) {
memcpy(v2->descriptor_cookie, cookie, sizeof(v2->descriptor_cookie));
}
if (desc_id) {
memcpy(v2->desc_id_fetch, desc_id, sizeof(v2->desc_id_fetch));
}
if (onion_address) {
strlcpy(v2->onion_address, onion_address, sizeof(v2->onion_address));
if (compute_desc_id(rend_data) < 0) {
goto error;
}
}
v2->auth_type = auth_type;
return rend_data;
error:
rend_data_free(rend_data);
return NULL;
}
/* Return the onion address from the rend data. Depending on the version,
* the size of the address can vary but it's always NUL terminated. */
const char *
rend_data_get_address(const rend_data_t *rend_data)
{
tor_assert(rend_data);
switch (rend_data->version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
return TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data)->onion_address;
default:
/* We should always have a supported version. */
tor_assert(0);
}
}
/* Return the descriptor ID for a specific replica number from the rend
* data. The returned data is a binary digest and depending on the version its
* size can vary. The size of the descriptor ID is put in <b>len_out</b> if
* non NULL. */
const char *
rend_data_get_desc_id(const rend_data_t *rend_data, uint8_t replica,
size_t *len_out)
{
tor_assert(rend_data);
switch (rend_data->version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
tor_assert(replica < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS);
if (len_out) {
*len_out = DIGEST_LEN;
}
return TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data)->descriptor_id[replica];
default:
/* We should always have a supported version. */
tor_assert(0);
}
}
/* Return the public key digest using the given <b>rend_data</b>. The size of
* the digest is put in <b>len_out</b> (if set) which can differ depending on
* the version. */
const uint8_t *
rend_data_get_pk_digest(const rend_data_t *rend_data, size_t *len_out)
{
tor_assert(rend_data);
switch (rend_data->version) {
case HS_VERSION_TWO:
{
const rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data);
if (len_out) {
*len_out = sizeof(v2_data->rend_pk_digest);
}
return (const uint8_t *) v2_data->rend_pk_digest;
}
default:
/* We should always have a supported version. */
tor_assert(0);
}
}
2016-12-23 16:46:14 +01:00
/* Using the given time period number, compute the disaster shared random
* value and put it in srv_out. It MUST be at least DIGEST256_LEN bytes. */
static void
get_disaster_srv(uint64_t time_period_num, uint8_t *srv_out)
{
crypto_digest_t *digest;
tor_assert(srv_out);
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
/* Start setting up payload:
* H("shared-random-disaster" | INT_8(period_length) | INT_8(period_num)) */
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, HS_SRV_DISASTER_PREFIX,
HS_SRV_DISASTER_PREFIX_LEN);
/* Setup INT_8(period_length) | INT_8(period_num) */
{
uint64_t time_period_length = get_time_period_length();
char period_stuff[sizeof(uint64_t)*2];
size_t offset = 0;
set_uint64(period_stuff, tor_htonll(time_period_num));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
set_uint64(period_stuff+offset, tor_htonll(time_period_length));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
tor_assert(offset == sizeof(period_stuff));
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, period_stuff, sizeof(period_stuff));
}
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) srv_out, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
}
/* When creating a blinded key, we need a parameter which construction is as
* follow: H(pubkey | [secret] | ed25519-basepoint | nonce).
*
* The nonce has a pre-defined format which uses the time period number
* period_num and the start of the period in second start_time_period.
*
* The secret of size secret_len is optional meaning that it can be NULL and
* thus will be ignored for the param construction.
*
* The result is put in param_out. */
static void
build_blinded_key_param(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey,
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
uint64_t period_num, uint64_t period_length,
uint8_t *param_out)
{
size_t offset = 0;
uint8_t nonce[HS_KEYBLIND_NONCE_LEN];
crypto_digest_t *digest;
tor_assert(pubkey);
tor_assert(param_out);
/* Create the nonce N. The construction is as follow:
* N = "key-blind" || INT_8(period_num) || INT_8(period_length) */
memcpy(nonce, HS_KEYBLIND_NONCE_PREFIX, HS_KEYBLIND_NONCE_PREFIX_LEN);
offset += HS_KEYBLIND_NONCE_PREFIX_LEN;
set_uint64(nonce + offset, tor_htonll(period_num));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
set_uint64(nonce + offset, tor_htonll(period_length));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
tor_assert(offset == HS_KEYBLIND_NONCE_LEN);
/* Generate the parameter h and the construction is as follow:
* h = H(pubkey | [secret] | ed25519-basepoint | nonce) */
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char *) pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
/* Optional secret. */
if (secret) {
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char *) secret, secret_len);
}
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, str_ed25519_basepoint,
strlen(str_ed25519_basepoint));
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char *) nonce, sizeof(nonce));
/* Extract digest and put it in the param. */
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) param_out, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
2017-08-03 14:42:30 +02:00
memwipe(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce));
}
/* Using an ed25519 public key and version to build the checksum of an
* address. Put in checksum_out. Format is:
* SHA3-256(".onion checksum" || PUBKEY || VERSION)
*
* checksum_out must be large enough to receive 32 bytes (DIGEST256_LEN). */
static void
build_hs_checksum(const ed25519_public_key_t *key, uint8_t version,
uint8_t *checksum_out)
{
size_t offset = 0;
char data[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_INPUT_LEN];
/* Build checksum data. */
memcpy(data, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_PREFIX,
HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_PREFIX_LEN);
offset += HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_PREFIX_LEN;
memcpy(data + offset, key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
offset += ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
set_uint8(data + offset, version);
offset += sizeof(version);
tor_assert(offset == HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_INPUT_LEN);
/* Hash the data payload to create the checksum. */
crypto_digest256((char *) checksum_out, data, sizeof(data),
DIGEST_SHA3_256);
}
/* Using an ed25519 public key, checksum and version to build the binary
* representation of a service address. Put in addr_out. Format is:
* addr_out = PUBKEY || CHECKSUM || VERSION
*
* addr_out must be large enough to receive HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN bytes. */
static void
build_hs_address(const ed25519_public_key_t *key, const uint8_t *checksum,
uint8_t version, char *addr_out)
{
size_t offset = 0;
tor_assert(key);
tor_assert(checksum);
memcpy(addr_out, key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
offset += ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
memcpy(addr_out + offset, checksum, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_LEN_USED);
offset += HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_LEN_USED;
set_uint8(addr_out + offset, version);
offset += sizeof(uint8_t);
tor_assert(offset == HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN);
}
/* Helper for hs_parse_address(): Using a binary representation of a service
* address, parse its content into the key_out, checksum_out and version_out.
* Any out variable can be NULL in case the caller would want only one field.
* checksum_out MUST at least be 2 bytes long. address must be at least
* HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN bytes but doesn't need to be NUL terminated. */
static void
hs_parse_address_impl(const char *address, ed25519_public_key_t *key_out,
uint8_t *checksum_out, uint8_t *version_out)
{
size_t offset = 0;
tor_assert(address);
if (key_out) {
/* First is the key. */
memcpy(key_out->pubkey, address, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
}
offset += ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
if (checksum_out) {
/* Followed by a 2 bytes checksum. */
memcpy(checksum_out, address + offset, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_LEN_USED);
}
offset += HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_LEN_USED;
if (version_out) {
/* Finally, version value is 1 byte. */
*version_out = get_uint8(address + offset);
}
offset += sizeof(uint8_t);
/* Extra safety. */
tor_assert(offset == HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN);
}
/* Using the given identity public key and a blinded public key, compute the
* subcredential and put it in subcred_out. This can't fail. */
void
hs_get_subcredential(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk,
uint8_t *subcred_out)
{
uint8_t credential[DIGEST256_LEN];
crypto_digest_t *digest;
tor_assert(identity_pk);
tor_assert(blinded_pk);
tor_assert(subcred_out);
/* First, build the credential. Construction is as follow:
* credential = H("credential" | public-identity-key) */
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, HS_CREDENTIAL_PREFIX,
HS_CREDENTIAL_PREFIX_LEN);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) identity_pk->pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) credential, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
/* Now, compute the subcredential. Construction is as follow:
* subcredential = H("subcredential" | credential | blinded-public-key). */
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, HS_SUBCREDENTIAL_PREFIX,
HS_SUBCREDENTIAL_PREFIX_LEN);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) credential,
sizeof(credential));
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) blinded_pk->pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) subcred_out, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
2017-08-03 14:42:30 +02:00
memwipe(credential, 0, sizeof(credential));
}
/* From the given list of hidden service ports, find the matching one from the
* given edge connection conn and set the connection address from the service
* port object. Return 0 on success or -1 if none. */
int
hs_set_conn_addr_port(const smartlist_t *ports, edge_connection_t *conn)
{
rend_service_port_config_t *chosen_port;
unsigned int warn_once = 0;
smartlist_t *matching_ports;
tor_assert(ports);
tor_assert(conn);
matching_ports = smartlist_new();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p) {
if (TO_CONN(conn)->port != p->virtual_port) {
continue;
}
if (!(p->is_unix_addr)) {
smartlist_add(matching_ports, p);
} else {
if (add_unix_port(matching_ports, p)) {
if (!warn_once) {
/* Unix port not supported so warn only once. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Saw AF_UNIX virtual port mapping for port %d "
"which is unsupported on this platform. "
"Ignoring it.",
TO_CONN(conn)->port);
}
warn_once++;
}
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
chosen_port = smartlist_choose(matching_ports);
smartlist_free(matching_ports);
if (chosen_port) {
if (!(chosen_port->is_unix_addr)) {
/* Get a non-AF_UNIX connection ready for connection_exit_connect() */
tor_addr_copy(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &chosen_port->real_addr);
TO_CONN(conn)->port = chosen_port->real_port;
} else {
if (set_unix_port(conn, chosen_port)) {
/* Simply impossible to end up here else we were able to add a Unix
* port without AF_UNIX support... ? */
tor_assert(0);
}
}
}
return (chosen_port) ? 0 : -1;
}
/* Using a base32 representation of a service address, parse its content into
* the key_out, checksum_out and version_out. Any out variable can be NULL in
* case the caller would want only one field. checksum_out MUST at least be 2
* bytes long.
*
* Return 0 if parsing went well; return -1 in case of error. */
int
hs_parse_address(const char *address, ed25519_public_key_t *key_out,
uint8_t *checksum_out, uint8_t *version_out)
{
char decoded[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN];
tor_assert(address);
/* Obvious length check. */
if (strlen(address) != HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Service address %s has an invalid length. "
2017-07-14 17:33:12 +02:00
"Expected %lu but got %lu.",
escaped_safe_str(address),
(unsigned long) HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32,
(unsigned long) strlen(address));
goto invalid;
}
/* Decode address so we can extract needed fields. */
if (base32_decode(decoded, sizeof(decoded), address, strlen(address)) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Service address %s can't be decoded.",
escaped_safe_str(address));
goto invalid;
}
/* Parse the decoded address into the fields we need. */
hs_parse_address_impl(decoded, key_out, checksum_out, version_out);
return 0;
invalid:
return -1;
}
/* Validate a given onion address. The length, the base32 decoding and
* checksum are validated. Return 1 if valid else 0. */
int
hs_address_is_valid(const char *address)
{
uint8_t version;
uint8_t checksum[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_CHECKSUM_LEN_USED];
uint8_t target_checksum[DIGEST256_LEN];
ed25519_public_key_t key;
/* Parse the decoded address into the fields we need. */
if (hs_parse_address(address, &key, checksum, &version) < 0) {
goto invalid;
}
/* Get the checksum it's suppose to be and compare it with what we have
* encoded in the address. */
build_hs_checksum(&key, version, target_checksum);
if (tor_memcmp(checksum, target_checksum, sizeof(checksum))) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Service address %s invalid checksum.",
escaped_safe_str(address));
goto invalid;
}
/* Valid address. */
return 1;
invalid:
return 0;
}
/* Build a service address using an ed25519 public key and a given version.
* The returned address is base32 encoded and put in addr_out. The caller MUST
* make sure the addr_out is at least HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1 long.
*
* Format is as follow:
* base32(PUBKEY || CHECKSUM || VERSION)
* CHECKSUM = H(".onion checksum" || PUBKEY || VERSION)
* */
void
hs_build_address(const ed25519_public_key_t *key, uint8_t version,
char *addr_out)
{
uint8_t checksum[DIGEST256_LEN];
char address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN];
tor_assert(key);
tor_assert(addr_out);
/* Get the checksum of the address. */
build_hs_checksum(key, version, checksum);
/* Get the binary address representation. */
build_hs_address(key, checksum, version, address);
/* Encode the address. addr_out will be NUL terminated after this. */
base32_encode(addr_out, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1, address,
sizeof(address));
/* Validate what we just built. */
tor_assert(hs_address_is_valid(addr_out));
}
/* Return a newly allocated copy of lspec. */
link_specifier_t *
hs_link_specifier_dup(const link_specifier_t *lspec)
{
link_specifier_t *dup = link_specifier_new();
memcpy(dup, lspec, sizeof(*dup));
/* The unrecognized field is a dynamic array so make sure to copy its
* content and not the pointer. */
link_specifier_setlen_un_unrecognized(
dup, link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(lspec));
if (link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(dup)) {
memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_unrecognized(dup),
link_specifier_getconstarray_un_unrecognized(lspec),
link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(dup));
}
return dup;
}
/* From a given ed25519 public key pk and an optional secret, compute a
* blinded public key and put it in blinded_pk_out. This is only useful to
* the client side because the client only has access to the identity public
* key of the service. */
void
hs_build_blinded_pubkey(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk,
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
uint64_t time_period_num,
ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk_out)
{
/* Our blinding key API requires a 32 bytes parameter. */
uint8_t param[DIGEST256_LEN];
tor_assert(pk);
tor_assert(blinded_pk_out);
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) pk, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN));
build_blinded_key_param(pk, secret, secret_len,
time_period_num, get_time_period_length(), param);
ed25519_public_blind(blinded_pk_out, pk, param);
2017-08-03 14:42:30 +02:00
memwipe(param, 0, sizeof(param));
}
/* From a given ed25519 keypair kp and an optional secret, compute a blinded
* keypair for the current time period and put it in blinded_kp_out. This is
* only useful by the service side because the client doesn't have access to
* the identity secret key. */
void
hs_build_blinded_keypair(const ed25519_keypair_t *kp,
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
uint64_t time_period_num,
ed25519_keypair_t *blinded_kp_out)
{
/* Our blinding key API requires a 32 bytes parameter. */
uint8_t param[DIGEST256_LEN];
tor_assert(kp);
tor_assert(blinded_kp_out);
/* Extra safety. A zeroed key is bad. */
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &kp->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN));
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &kp->seckey, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN));
build_blinded_key_param(&kp->pubkey, secret, secret_len,
time_period_num, get_time_period_length(), param);
ed25519_keypair_blind(blinded_kp_out, kp, param);
2017-08-03 14:42:30 +02:00
memwipe(param, 0, sizeof(param));
}
/* Return true if overlap mode is active given the date in consensus. If
* consensus is NULL, then we use the latest live consensus we can find. */
MOCK_IMPL(int,
hs_overlap_mode_is_active, (const networkstatus_t *consensus, time_t now))
{
time_t valid_after;
time_t srv_start_time, tp_start_time;
if (!consensus) {
consensus = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
if (!consensus) {
return 0;
}
}
/* We consider to be in overlap mode when we are in the period of time
* between a fresh SRV and the beginning of the new time period (in the
* normal network this is between 00:00 (inclusive) and 12:00 UTC
* (exclusive)) */
valid_after = consensus->valid_after;
srv_start_time =sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run(valid_after);
tp_start_time = hs_get_start_time_of_next_time_period(srv_start_time);
if (valid_after >= srv_start_time && valid_after < tp_start_time) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Return 1 if any virtual port in ports needs a circuit with good uptime.
* Else return 0. */
int
hs_service_requires_uptime_circ(const smartlist_t *ports)
{
tor_assert(ports);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p) {
if (smartlist_contains_int_as_string(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
p->virtual_port)) {
return 1;
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
return 0;
}
/* Build hs_index which is used to find the responsible hsdirs. This index
* value is used to select the responsible HSDir where their hsdir_index is
* closest to this value.
* SHA3-256("store-at-idx" | blinded_public_key |
* INT_8(replicanum) | INT_8(period_length) | INT_8(period_num) )
*
* hs_index_out must be large enough to receive DIGEST256_LEN bytes. */
void
hs_build_hs_index(uint64_t replica, const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk,
uint64_t period_num, uint8_t *hs_index_out)
{
crypto_digest_t *digest;
tor_assert(blinded_pk);
tor_assert(hs_index_out);
/* Build hs_index. See construction at top of function comment. */
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, HS_INDEX_PREFIX, HS_INDEX_PREFIX_LEN);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) blinded_pk->pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
/* Now setup INT_8(replicanum) | INT_8(period_length) | INT_8(period_num) */
{
uint64_t period_length = get_time_period_length();
char buf[sizeof(uint64_t)*3];
size_t offset = 0;
set_uint64(buf, tor_htonll(replica));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
set_uint64(buf, tor_htonll(period_length));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
set_uint64(buf, tor_htonll(period_num));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
tor_assert(offset == sizeof(buf));
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) hs_index_out, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
}
/* Build hsdir_index which is used to find the responsible hsdirs. This is the
* index value that is compare to the hs_index when selecting an HSDir.
* SHA3-256("node-idx" | node_identity |
* shared_random_value | INT_8(period_length) | INT_8(period_num) )
*
* hsdir_index_out must be large enough to receive DIGEST256_LEN bytes. */
void
hs_build_hsdir_index(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
const uint8_t *srv_value, uint64_t period_num,
uint8_t *hsdir_index_out)
{
crypto_digest_t *digest;
tor_assert(identity_pk);
tor_assert(srv_value);
tor_assert(hsdir_index_out);
/* Build hsdir_index. See construction at top of function comment. */
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, HSDIR_INDEX_PREFIX, HSDIR_INDEX_PREFIX_LEN);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) identity_pk->pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) srv_value, DIGEST256_LEN);
{
uint64_t time_period_length = get_time_period_length();
char period_stuff[sizeof(uint64_t)*2];
size_t offset = 0;
set_uint64(period_stuff, tor_htonll(period_num));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
set_uint64(period_stuff+offset, tor_htonll(time_period_length));
offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
tor_assert(offset == sizeof(period_stuff));
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, period_stuff, sizeof(period_stuff));
}
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) hsdir_index_out, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
}
/* Return a newly allocated buffer containing the current shared random value
* or if not present, a disaster value is computed using the given time period
* number. This function can't fail. */
uint8_t *
hs_get_current_srv(uint64_t time_period_num)
{
uint8_t *sr_value = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN);
const sr_srv_t *current_srv = sr_get_current();
if (current_srv) {
memcpy(sr_value, current_srv->value, sizeof(current_srv->value));
} else {
/* Disaster mode. */
get_disaster_srv(time_period_num, sr_value);
}
return sr_value;
}
/* Return a newly allocated buffer containing the previous shared random
* value or if not present, a disaster value is computed using the given time
* period number. This function can't fail. */
uint8_t *
hs_get_previous_srv(uint64_t time_period_num)
{
uint8_t *sr_value = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN);
const sr_srv_t *previous_srv = sr_get_previous();
if (previous_srv) {
memcpy(sr_value, previous_srv->value, sizeof(previous_srv->value));
} else {
/* Disaster mode. */
get_disaster_srv(time_period_num, sr_value);
}
return sr_value;
}
/* Return the number of replicas defined by a consensus parameter or the
* default value. */
int32_t
hs_get_hsdir_n_replicas(void)
{
/* The [1,16] range is a specification requirement. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hsdir_n_replicas",
HS_DEFAULT_HSDIR_N_REPLICAS, 1, 16);
}
/* Return the spread fetch value defined by a consensus parameter or the
* default value. */
int32_t
hs_get_hsdir_spread_fetch(void)
{
/* The [1,128] range is a specification requirement. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hsdir_spread_fetch",
HS_DEFAULT_HSDIR_SPREAD_FETCH, 1, 128);
}
/* Return the spread store value defined by a consensus parameter or the
* default value. */
int32_t
hs_get_hsdir_spread_store(void)
{
/* The [1,128] range is a specification requirement. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hsdir_spread_store",
HS_DEFAULT_HSDIR_SPREAD_STORE, 1, 128);
}
/* For a given blinded key and time period number, get the responsible HSDir
* and put their routerstatus_t object in the responsible_dirs list. If
* is_next_period is true, the next hsdir_index of the node_t is used. If
* is_client is true, the spread fetch consensus parameter is used else the
* spread store is used which is only for upload. This function can't fail but
* it is possible that the responsible_dirs list contains fewer nodes than
* expected.
*
* This function goes over the latest consensus routerstatus list and sorts it
* by their node_t hsdir_index then does a binary search to find the closest
* node. All of this makes it a bit CPU intensive so use it wisely. */
void
hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk,
uint64_t time_period_num, int is_next_period,
int is_client, smartlist_t *responsible_dirs)
{
smartlist_t *sorted_nodes;
/* The compare function used for the smartlist bsearch. We have two
* different depending on is_next_period. */
int (*cmp_fct)(const void *, const void **);
tor_assert(blinded_pk);
tor_assert(responsible_dirs);
sorted_nodes = smartlist_new();
/* Add every node_t that support HSDir v3 for which we do have a valid
* hsdir_index already computed for them for this consensus. */
{
networkstatus_t *c = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus();
if (!c || smartlist_len(c->routerstatus_list) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "No valid consensus so we can't get the responsible "
"hidden service directories.");
goto done;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(c->routerstatus_list, const routerstatus_t *, rs) {
/* Even though this node_t object won't be modified and should be const,
* we can't add const object in a smartlist_t. */
node_t *n = node_get_mutable_by_id(rs->identity_digest);
tor_assert(n);
if (node_supports_v3_hsdir(n) && rs->is_hs_dir) {
if (BUG(n->hsdir_index == NULL)) {
continue;
}
smartlist_add(sorted_nodes, n);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(rs);
}
if (smartlist_len(sorted_nodes) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "No nodes found to be HSDir or supporting v3.");
goto done;
}
/* First thing we have to do is sort all node_t by hsdir_index. The
* is_next_period tells us if we want the current or the next one. Set the
* bsearch compare function also while we are at it. */
if (is_next_period) {
smartlist_sort(sorted_nodes, compare_node_next_hsdir_index);
cmp_fct = compare_digest_to_next_hsdir_index;
} else {
smartlist_sort(sorted_nodes, compare_node_current_hsdir_index);
cmp_fct = compare_digest_to_current_hsdir_index;
}
/* For all replicas, we'll select a set of HSDirs using the consensus
* parameters and the sorted list. The replica starting at value 1 is
* defined by the specification. */
for (int replica = 1; replica <= hs_get_hsdir_n_replicas(); replica++) {
int idx, start, found, n_added = 0;
uint8_t hs_index[DIGEST256_LEN] = {0};
/* Number of node to add to the responsible dirs list depends on if we are
* trying to fetch or store. A client always fetches. */
int n_to_add = (is_client) ? hs_get_hsdir_spread_fetch() :
hs_get_hsdir_spread_store();
/* Get the index that we should use to select the node. */
hs_build_hs_index(replica, blinded_pk, time_period_num, hs_index);
/* The compare function pointer has been set correctly earlier. */
start = idx = smartlist_bsearch_idx(sorted_nodes, hs_index, cmp_fct,
&found);
/* Getting the length of the list if no member is greater than the key we
* are looking for so start at the first element. */
if (idx == smartlist_len(sorted_nodes)) {
start = idx = 0;
}
while (n_added < n_to_add) {
const node_t *node = smartlist_get(sorted_nodes, idx);
/* If the node has already been selected which is possible between
* replicas, the specification says to skip over. */
if (!smartlist_contains(responsible_dirs, node->rs)) {
smartlist_add(responsible_dirs, node->rs);
++n_added;
}
if (++idx == smartlist_len(sorted_nodes)) {
/* Wrap if we've reached the end of the list. */
idx = 0;
}
if (idx == start) {
/* We've gone over the whole list, stop and avoid infinite loop. */
break;
}
}
}
done:
smartlist_free(sorted_nodes);
}
/* Initialize the entire HS subsytem. This is called in tor_init() before any
* torrc options are loaded. Only for >= v3. */
void
hs_init(void)
{
hs_circuitmap_init();
hs_service_init();
hs_cache_init();
}
/* Release and cleanup all memory of the HS subsystem (all version). This is
* called by tor_free_all(). */
void
hs_free_all(void)
{
hs_circuitmap_free_all();
hs_service_free_all();
hs_cache_free_all();
}