2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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2017-06-01 13:12:33 +02:00
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* \file hs_client.c
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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* \brief Implement next generation hidden service client functionality
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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#include "hs_circuit.h"
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2017-07-10 15:28:50 +02:00
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#include "hs_ident.h"
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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#include "connection_edge.h"
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2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
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#include "container.h"
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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#include "rendclient.h"
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2017-06-01 13:12:33 +02:00
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#include "hs_descriptor.h"
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#include "hs_cache.h"
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2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
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#include "hs_cell.h"
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#include "hs_ident.h"
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2017-06-01 13:12:33 +02:00
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#include "config.h"
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#include "directory.h"
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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#include "hs_client.h"
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2017-06-01 13:12:33 +02:00
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#include "router.h"
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2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "circpathbias.h"
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/* Get all connections that are waiting on a circuit and flag them back to
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* waiting for a hidden service descriptor for the given service key
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* service_identity_pk. */
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static void
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flag_all_conn_wait_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk)
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{
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tor_assert(service_identity_pk);
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smartlist_t *conns =
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connection_list_by_type_state(CONN_TYPE_AP, AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
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edge_connection_t *edge_conn;
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if (BUG(!CONN_IS_EDGE(conn))) {
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continue;
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}
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edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
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if (edge_conn->hs_ident &&
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ed25519_pubkey_eq(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
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service_identity_pk)) {
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connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
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conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
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smartlist_free(conns);
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}
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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2017-06-28 20:20:28 +02:00
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/* A v3 HS circuit successfully connected to the hidden service. Update the
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* stream state at <b>hs_conn_ident</b> appropriately. */
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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static void
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2017-06-28 20:20:28 +02:00
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note_connection_attempt_succeeded(const hs_ident_edge_conn_t *hs_conn_ident)
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2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
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{
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(void) hs_conn_ident;
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/* TODO: When implementing client side */
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return;
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}
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2017-06-01 13:12:33 +02:00
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/* Given the pubkey of a hidden service in <b>onion_identity_pk</b>, fetch its
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* descriptor by launching a dir connection to <b>hsdir</b>. Return 1 on
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* success or -1 on error. */
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static int
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directory_launch_v3_desc_fetch(const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk,
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const routerstatus_t *hsdir)
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{
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uint64_t current_time_period = hs_get_time_period_num(approx_time());
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ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
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char base64_blinded_pubkey[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1];
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hs_ident_dir_conn_t hs_conn_dir_ident;
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int retval;
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tor_assert(hsdir);
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tor_assert(onion_identity_pk);
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/* Get blinded pubkey */
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hs_build_blinded_pubkey(onion_identity_pk, NULL, 0,
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current_time_period, &blinded_pubkey);
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/* ...and base64 it. */
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retval = ed25519_public_to_base64(base64_blinded_pubkey, &blinded_pubkey);
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if (BUG(retval < 0)) {
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return -1;
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}
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/* Copy onion pk to a dir_ident so that we attach it to the dir conn */
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ed25519_pubkey_copy(&hs_conn_dir_ident.identity_pk, onion_identity_pk);
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/* Setup directory request */
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directory_request_t *req =
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directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC);
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directory_request_set_routerstatus(req, hsdir);
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directory_request_set_indirection(req, DIRIND_ANONYMOUS);
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directory_request_set_resource(req, base64_blinded_pubkey);
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directory_request_upload_set_hs_ident(req, &hs_conn_dir_ident);
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directory_initiate_request(req);
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directory_request_free(req);
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log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor fetch request for service %s with blinded "
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"key %s to directory %s",
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safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(onion_identity_pk)),
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safe_str_client(base64_blinded_pubkey),
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safe_str_client(routerstatus_describe(hsdir)));
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/* Cleanup memory. */
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memwipe(&blinded_pubkey, 0, sizeof(blinded_pubkey));
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memwipe(base64_blinded_pubkey, 0, sizeof(base64_blinded_pubkey));
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memwipe(&hs_conn_dir_ident, 0, sizeof(hs_conn_dir_ident));
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return 1;
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}
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/** Return the HSDir we should use to fetch the descriptor of the hidden
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* service with identity key <b>onion_identity_pk</b>. */
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static routerstatus_t *
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pick_hsdir_v3(const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk)
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{
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int retval;
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char base64_blinded_pubkey[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1];
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uint64_t current_time_period = hs_get_time_period_num(approx_time());
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smartlist_t *responsible_hsdirs;
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ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
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routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs = NULL;
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tor_assert(onion_identity_pk);
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responsible_hsdirs = smartlist_new();
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/* Get blinded pubkey of hidden service */
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hs_build_blinded_pubkey(onion_identity_pk, NULL, 0,
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current_time_period, &blinded_pubkey);
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/* ...and base64 it. */
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retval = ed25519_public_to_base64(base64_blinded_pubkey, &blinded_pubkey);
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if (BUG(retval < 0)) {
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Get responsible hsdirs of service for this time period */
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hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&blinded_pubkey, current_time_period, 0, 1,
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responsible_hsdirs);
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log_debug(LD_REND, "Found %d responsible HSDirs and about to pick one.",
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smartlist_len(responsible_hsdirs));
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/* Pick an HSDir from the responsible ones. The ownership of
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* responsible_hsdirs is given to this function so no need to free it. */
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hsdir_rs = hs_pick_hsdir(responsible_hsdirs, base64_blinded_pubkey);
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return hsdir_rs;
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}
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/** Fetch a v3 descriptor using the given <b>onion_identity_pk</b>.
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*
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* On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.
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* On error, -1 is returned. */
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static int
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fetch_v3_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk)
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{
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routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs =NULL;
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tor_assert(onion_identity_pk);
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hsdir_rs = pick_hsdir_v3(onion_identity_pk);
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if (!hsdir_rs) {
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log_info(LD_REND, "Couldn't pick a v3 hsdir.");
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return 0;
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}
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return directory_launch_v3_desc_fetch(onion_identity_pk, hsdir_rs);
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}
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2017-06-29 19:29:23 +02:00
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/* Make sure that the given origin circuit circ is a valid correct
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* introduction circuit. This asserts on validation failure. */
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static void
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2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
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assert_intro_circ_ok(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
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2017-06-29 19:29:23 +02:00
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{
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
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tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
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tor_assert(hs_ident_intro_circ_is_valid(circ->hs_ident));
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assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, get_options());
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}
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2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
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/* Find a descriptor intro point object that matches the given ident in the
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* given descriptor desc. Return NULL if not found. */
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static const hs_desc_intro_point_t *
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find_desc_intro_point_by_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident,
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const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
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{
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const hs_desc_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL;
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tor_assert(ident);
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tor_assert(desc);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
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const hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
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if (ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ident->intro_auth_pk,
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&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)) {
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intro_point = ip;
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break;
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
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return intro_point;
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}
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/* Send an INTRODUCE1 cell along the intro circuit and populate the rend
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* circuit identifier with the needed key material for the e2e encryption.
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* Return 0 on success, -1 if there is a transient error such that an action
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* has been taken to recover and -2 if there is a permanent error indicating
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* that both circuits were closed. */
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static int
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send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ,
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origin_circuit_t *rend_circ)
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{
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int status;
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char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
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const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk = NULL;
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const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip;
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assert_intro_circ_ok(intro_circ);
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tor_assert(rend_circ);
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service_identity_pk = &intro_circ->hs_ident->identity_pk;
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/* For logging purposes. There will be a time where the hs_ident will have a
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* version number but for now there is none because it's all v3. */
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hs_build_address(service_identity_pk, HS_VERSION_THREE, onion_address);
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log_info(LD_REND, "Sending INTRODUCE1 cell to service %s on circuit %u",
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safe_str_client(onion_address), TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->n_circ_id);
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/* 1) Get descriptor from our cache. */
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const hs_descriptor_t *desc =
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hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_identity_pk);
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if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(desc)) {
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log_info(LD_REND, "Request to %s %s. Trying to fetch a new descriptor.",
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safe_str_client(onion_address),
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(desc) ? "didn't have usable intro points" :
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"didn't have a descriptor");
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hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(service_identity_pk);
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/* We just triggered a refetch, make sure every connections are back
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* waiting for that descriptor. */
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flag_all_conn_wait_desc(service_identity_pk);
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/* We just asked for a refetch so this is a transient error. */
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goto tran_err;
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}
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/* We need to find which intro point in the descriptor we are connected to
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* on intro_circ. */
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ip = find_desc_intro_point_by_ident(intro_circ->hs_ident, desc);
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if (BUG(ip == NULL)) {
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/* If we can find a descriptor from this introduction circuit ident, we
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* must have a valid intro point object. Permanent error. */
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goto perm_err;
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}
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/* Send the INTRODUCE1 cell. */
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if (hs_circ_send_introduce1(intro_circ, rend_circ, ip,
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desc->subcredential) < 0) {
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/* Unable to send the cell, the intro circuit has been marked for close so
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* this is a permanent error. */
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tor_assert_nonfatal(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close);
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goto perm_err;
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}
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/* Cell has been sent successfully. Copy the introduction point
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* authentication and encryption key in the rendezvous circuit identifier so
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* we can compute the ntor keys when we receive the RENDEZVOUS2 cell. */
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memcpy(&rend_circ->hs_ident->intro_enc_pk, &ip->enc_key,
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sizeof(rend_circ->hs_ident->intro_enc_pk));
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ed25519_pubkey_copy(&rend_circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
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&intro_circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk);
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/* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
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circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
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CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT);
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/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it to
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* specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT state. */
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TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
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pathbias_count_use_attempt(intro_circ);
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/* Success. */
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status = 0;
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goto end;
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perm_err:
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/* Permanent error: it is possible that the intro circuit was closed prior
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* because we weren't able to send the cell. Make sure we don't double close
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* it which would result in a warning. */
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if (!TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
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}
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
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status = -2;
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goto end;
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tran_err:
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status = -1;
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end:
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memwipe(onion_address, 0, sizeof(onion_address));
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return status;
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}
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2017-07-21 19:56:10 +02:00
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/* Using the introduction circuit circ, setup the authentication key of the
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* intro point this circuit has extended to. */
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static void
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setup_intro_circ_auth_key(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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const hs_descriptor_t *desc;
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tor_assert(circ);
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desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk);
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if (BUG(desc == NULL)) {
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/* Opening intro circuit without the descriptor is no good... */
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goto end;
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}
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/* We will go over every intro point and try to find which one is linked to
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* that circuit. Those lists are small so it's not that expensive. */
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|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
|
|
|
|
const hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->link_specifiers,
|
|
|
|
const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, lspec) {
|
|
|
|
/* Not all tor node have an ed25519 identity key so we still rely on the
|
|
|
|
* legacy identity digest. */
|
|
|
|
if (lspec->type != LS_LEGACY_ID) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fast_memneq(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
|
|
|
|
lspec->u.legacy_id, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We got it, copy its authentication key to the identifier. */
|
|
|
|
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
|
|
|
|
&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(lspec);
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Reaching this point means we didn't find any intro point for this circuit
|
|
|
|
* which is not suppose to happen. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Called when an introduction circuit has opened. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
client_intro_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Introduction circuit %u has opened. Attaching streams.",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is an introduction circuit so we'll attach the correct
|
|
|
|
* authentication key to the circuit identifier so it can be identified
|
|
|
|
* properly later on. */
|
|
|
|
setup_intro_circ_auth_key(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Called when a rendezvous circuit has opened. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit has opened to %s.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(
|
|
|
|
extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX Send ESTABLISH REND cell. */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
/* ========== */
|
|
|
|
/* Public API */
|
|
|
|
/* ========== */
|
2017-06-29 19:29:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
|
|
|
/** A circuit just finished connecting to a hidden service that the stream
|
|
|
|
* <b>conn</b> has been waiting for. Let the HS subsystem know about this. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_client_note_connection_attempt_succeeded(const edge_connection_t *conn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(conn->rend_data && conn->hs_ident)) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Stream had both rend_data and hs_ident..."
|
|
|
|
"Prioritizing hs_ident");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (conn->hs_ident) { /* It's v3: pass it to the prop224 handler */
|
2017-06-28 20:20:28 +02:00
|
|
|
note_connection_attempt_succeeded(conn->hs_ident);
|
2017-05-02 15:22:00 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
} else if (conn->rend_data) { /* It's v2: pass it to the legacy handler */
|
|
|
|
rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(conn->rend_data);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-01 12:37:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* With the given encoded descriptor in desc_str and the service key in
|
|
|
|
* service_identity_pk, decode the descriptor and set the desc pointer with a
|
|
|
|
* newly allocated descriptor object.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return 0 on success else a negative value and desc is set to NULL. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
|
|
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
hs_descriptor_t **desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc_str);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service_identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create subcredential for this HS so that we can decrypt */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t current_time_period = hs_get_time_period_num(approx_time());
|
|
|
|
hs_build_blinded_pubkey(service_identity_pk, NULL, 0, current_time_period,
|
|
|
|
&blinded_pubkey);
|
|
|
|
hs_get_subcredential(service_identity_pk, &blinded_pubkey, subcredential);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse descriptor */
|
|
|
|
ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential, desc);
|
|
|
|
memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential));
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Could not parse received descriptor as client");
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-01 13:12:33 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return true if there are any usable intro points in the v3 HS descriptor
|
|
|
|
* <b>desc</b>. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* XXX stub waiting for more client-side work:
|
|
|
|
equivalent to v2 rend_client_any_intro_points_usable() */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Launch a connection to a hidden service directory to fetch a hidden
|
|
|
|
* service descriptor using <b>identity_pk</b> to get the necessary keys.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.
|
|
|
|
* On error, -1 is returned. (retval is only used by unittests right now) */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Are we configured to fetch descriptors? */
|
|
|
|
if (!get_options()->FetchHidServDescriptors) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "We received an onion address for a hidden service "
|
|
|
|
"descriptor but we are configured to not fetch.");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if fetching a desc for this HS is useful to us right now */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const hs_descriptor_t *cached_desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cached_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
if (cached_desc && hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(cached_desc)) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We would fetch a v3 hidden service descriptor "
|
|
|
|
"but we already have a useable descriprot.");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fetch_v3_desc(identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-14 16:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
/* This is called when we are trying to attach an AP connection to these
|
|
|
|
* hidden service circuits from connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit().
|
|
|
|
* Return 0 on success, -1 for a transient error that is actions were
|
|
|
|
* triggered to recover or -2 for a permenent error where both circuits will
|
|
|
|
* marked for close.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The following supports every hidden service version. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_client_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ,
|
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *rend_circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (intro_circ->hs_ident) ? send_introduce1(intro_circ, rend_circ) :
|
|
|
|
rend_client_send_introduction(intro_circ,
|
|
|
|
rend_circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-21 19:56:10 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Called when the client circuit circ has been established. It can be either
|
|
|
|
* an introduction or rendezvous circuit. This function handles all hidden
|
|
|
|
* service versions. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_client_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
|
|
|
|
* identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
|
|
|
|
switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident) {
|
|
|
|
client_intro_circ_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident) {
|
|
|
|
client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|