tor/doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-geoip-survey-plan.txt

Abstract

   This document explains how to tell about how many Tor users there
   are, and how many there are in which country.  Statistics are
   involved.

Motivation

   There are a few reasons we need to keep track of which countries
   Tor users (in aggregate) are coming from:

      - Resource allocation.  Knowing about underserved countries with
        lots of users can let us know about where we need to direct
        translation and outreach efforts.

      - Anticensorship.  Sudden drops in usage on a national basis can
        indicate the arrival of a censorious firewall.

      - Sponsor outreach and self-evalutation.  Many people and
        organizations who are interested in funding The Tor Project's
        work want to know that we're successfully serving parts of the
        world they're interested in, and that efforts to expand our
        userbase are actually succeeding.  So, when you come right
        down to it, do we.

Goals

   We want to know about how many Tor users there are, and which
   countries they're in, even in the presence of a hypothetical
   "directory guard" feature.  Some uncertainty is okay, but we'd like
   to be able to put a bound on the uncertainty.

   We need to make sure this information isn't exposed in a way that
   helps an adversary.

Methods:

   Every client downloads network status documents.  There are
   currently three methods (one hypothetical) for clients to get them.
      - 0.1.2.x clients (and earlier) fetch a v2 networkstatus
        document about every NETWORKSTATUS_CLIENT_DL_INTERVAL [30
        minutes].

      - 0.2.0.x clients fetch a v3 networkstatus consensus document
        at a random interval between when their current document is no
        longer freshest, and when their current document is about to
        expire.

        [In both of the above cases, clients choose a directory cache at
        random with odds roughly proportional to its bandwidth.]

      - In some future version, clients will choose directory caches
        to serve as their "directory guards" to avoid profiling
        attacks, similarly to how clients currently start all their
        circuits at guard nodes.

    We assume that a directory cache can tell which of these three
    categories a client is in by the format of its status request.

    A directory cache can be made to count distinct client IP
    addresses that make a certain request of it in a given timeframe.
    For the first two cases, a cache can get a picture of the overall
    number and countries of users in the network by dividing the IP
    count by the probability with which they (as a cache) would be
    chosen.  Assuming that our listed bandwidth is such that we expect
    to be chosen with probability P for any given request, and we've
    been counting IPs for long enough that we expect the average
    client to have made N requests, they will have visited us at least
    once with probability P' = 1-(1-P)^N, and so we divide the IP
    counts we've seen by P' for our estimate.

    If directory guards are in use, directory guards get a picture of
    all those users who chose them as a guard when they were listed
    as a good choice for a guard, and who are also on the network
    now.  The cleanest data here will come from nodes that were listed
    as good new-guards choices for a while, and have not been so for a
    while longer (to study decay rates); nodes that have been listed
    as good new-guard choices consistently for a long time (to get a
    sample of the network); and nodes that have been listed as good
    new-guard choices only recently (to get a sample of new users and
    users whose guards have died out.)

    Note that these measurements *shouldn't* be taken at directory
    authorities: their picture of the network is too skewed by the
    special cases in which clients fetch from them directly.