tor/src/or/circuitlist.c

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/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright 2004 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char circuitlist_c_id[] = "$Id$";
/**
* \file circuitlist.c
* \brief Manage the global circuit list.
**/
#include "or.h"
/********* START VARIABLES **********/
/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
circuit_t *global_circuitlist=NULL;
/** Array of strings to make circ-\>state human-readable */
const char *circuit_state_to_string[] = {
"doing handshakes", /* 0 */
"processing the onion", /* 1 */
"connecting to firsthop", /* 2 */
"open" /* 3 */
};
/********* END VARIABLES ************/
static void circuit_free(circuit_t *circ);
static void circuit_free_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
static void circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim);
/** Add <b>circ</b> to the global list of circuits. This is called only from
* within circuit_new.
*/
static void circuit_add(circuit_t *circ) {
if (!global_circuitlist) { /* first one */
global_circuitlist = circ;
circ->next = NULL;
} else {
circ->next = global_circuitlist;
global_circuitlist = circ;
}
}
/** Detach from the global circuit list, and deallocate, all
* circuits that have been marked for close.
*/
void circuit_close_all_marked(void)
{
circuit_t *tmp,*m;
while (global_circuitlist && global_circuitlist->marked_for_close) {
tmp = global_circuitlist->next;
circuit_free(global_circuitlist);
global_circuitlist = tmp;
}
tmp = global_circuitlist;
while (tmp && tmp->next) {
if (tmp->next->marked_for_close) {
m = tmp->next->next;
circuit_free(tmp->next);
tmp->next = m;
/* Need to check new tmp->next; don't advance tmp. */
} else {
/* Advance tmp. */
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
}
/** Allocate space for a new circuit, initializing with <b>p_circ_id</b>
* and <b>p_conn</b>. Add it to the global circuit list.
*/
circuit_t *circuit_new(uint16_t p_circ_id, connection_t *p_conn) {
circuit_t *circ;
static uint32_t n_circuits_allocated = 0;
circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circuit_t));
circ->magic = CIRCUIT_MAGIC;
circ->timestamp_created = time(NULL);
circ->p_circ_id = p_circ_id;
circ->p_conn = p_conn;
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING;
/* CircIDs */
circ->p_circ_id = p_circ_id;
/* circ->n_circ_id remains 0 because we haven't identified the next hop yet */
circ->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
circ->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
circ->next_stream_id = crypto_pseudo_rand_int(1<<16);
circ->global_identifier = n_circuits_allocated++;
circuit_add(circ);
return circ;
}
/** Deallocate space associated with circ.
*/
static void circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) {
tor_assert(circ);
tor_assert(circ->magic == CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (circ->n_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(circ->n_crypto);
if (circ->p_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(circ->p_crypto);
if (circ->n_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(circ->n_digest);
if (circ->p_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(circ->p_digest);
if (circ->build_state) {
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tor_free(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
if (circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath)
circuit_free_cpath_node(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
}
tor_free(circ->build_state);
circuit_free_cpath(circ->cpath);
if (circ->rend_splice) {
circ->rend_splice->rend_splice = NULL;
}
memset(circ, 0xAA, sizeof(circuit_t)); /* poison memory */
tor_free(circ);
}
/** Deallocate space associated with the linked list <b>cpath</b>. */
static void circuit_free_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath) {
crypt_path_t *victim, *head=cpath;
if (!cpath)
return;
/* it's a doubly linked list, so we have to notice when we've
* gone through it once. */
while (cpath->next && cpath->next != head) {
victim = cpath;
cpath = victim->next;
circuit_free_cpath_node(victim);
}
circuit_free_cpath_node(cpath);
}
/** Deallocate space associated with the cpath node <b>victim</b>. */
static void
circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim) {
if (victim->f_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(victim->f_crypto);
if (victim->b_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(victim->b_crypto);
if (victim->f_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(victim->f_digest);
if (victim->b_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(victim->b_digest);
if (victim->handshake_state)
crypto_dh_free(victim->handshake_state);
tor_free(victim);
}
/** Return a circ such that:
* - circ-\>n_circ_id or circ-\>p_circ_id is equal to <b>circ_id</b>, and
* - circ is attached to <b>conn</b>, either as p_conn, n-conn, or
* in p_streams or n_streams.
* Return NULL if no such circuit exists.
*/
circuit_t *circuit_get_by_circ_id_conn(uint16_t circ_id, connection_t *conn) {
circuit_t *circ;
connection_t *tmpconn;
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
if (circ->marked_for_close)
continue;
if (circ->p_circ_id == circ_id) {
if (circ->p_conn == conn)
return circ;
for (tmpconn = circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn = tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
}
}
if (circ->n_circ_id == circ_id) {
if (circ->n_conn == conn)
return circ;
for (tmpconn = circ->n_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn = tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
}
for (tmpconn = circ->resolving_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn = tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
/** Return a circ such that circ is attached to <b>conn</b>, either as
* p_conn, n-conn, or in p_streams or n_streams or resolving_streams.
*
* Return NULL if no such circuit exists.
*/
circuit_t *circuit_get_by_conn(connection_t *conn) {
circuit_t *circ;
connection_t *tmpconn;
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
if (circ->marked_for_close)
continue;
if (circ->p_conn == conn)
return circ;
if (circ->n_conn == conn)
return circ;
for (tmpconn = circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream)
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
for (tmpconn = circ->n_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream)
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
for (tmpconn = circ->resolving_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream)
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
}
return NULL;
}
/** Return a circ such that:
* - circ-\>rend_query is equal to <b>rend_query</b>, and
* - circ-\>purpose is equal to <b>purpose</b>.
*
* Return NULL if no such circuit exists.
*/
circuit_t *circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query, uint8_t purpose) {
circuit_t *circ;
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
circ->purpose == purpose &&
!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query, circ->rend_query))
return circ;
}
return NULL;
}
/** Return the first circuit in global_circuitlist after <b>start</b> whose
* rend_pk_digest field is <b>digest</b> and whose purpose is <b>purpose</b>. Returns
* NULL if no circuit is found. If <b>start</b> is NULL, begin at the start of
* the list.
*/
circuit_t *
circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circuit_t *start,
const char *digest, uint8_t purpose)
{
circuit_t *circ;
if (start == NULL)
circ = global_circuitlist;
else
circ = start->next;
for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (circ->marked_for_close)
continue;
if (circ->purpose != purpose)
continue;
if (!memcmp(circ->rend_pk_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
return circ;
}
return NULL;
}
/** Return the circuit waiting for a rendezvous with the provided cookie.
* Return NULL if no such circuit is found.
*/
circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const char *cookie)
{
circuit_t *circ;
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (! circ->marked_for_close &&
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING &&
! memcmp(circ->rend_cookie, cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN) )
return circ;
}
return NULL;
}
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
/** Return a circuit that is open, has specified <b>purpose</b>,
* has a timestamp_dirty value of 0, and is uptime/capacity/internal
* if required; or NULL if no circuit fits this description.
*
* Avoid returning need_uptime circuits if not necessary.
* FFFF As a more important goal, not yet implemented, avoid returning
* internal circuits if not necessary.
*/
circuit_t *
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
circuit_get_clean_open(uint8_t purpose, int need_uptime,
int need_capacity, int internal) {
circuit_t *circ;
circuit_t *best=NULL;
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Hunting for a circ to cannibalize: purpose %d, uptime %d, capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
for (circ=global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
!circ->marked_for_close &&
circ->purpose == purpose &&
!circ->timestamp_dirty &&
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
(!need_uptime || circ->build_state->need_uptime) &&
(!need_capacity || circ->build_state->need_capacity) &&
(!internal || circ->build_state->is_internal)) {
if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime))
best = circ;
}
}
return best;
}
/** Mark <b>circ</b> to be closed next time we call
* circuit_close_all_marked(). Do any cleanup needed:
* - If state is onionskin_pending, remove circ from the onion_pending
* list.
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* - If circ isn't open yet: call circuit_build_failed() if we're
* the origin, and in either case call circuit_rep_hist_note_result()
* to note stats.
* - If purpose is C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, remove the intro point we
* just tried from our list of intro points for that service
* descriptor.
* - Send appropriate destroys and edge_destroys for conns and
* streams attached to circ.
* - If circ->rend_splice is set (we are the midpoint of a joined
* rendezvous stream), then mark the other circuit to close as well.
*/
int _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ) {
connection_t *conn;
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
if (circ->marked_for_close)
return -1;
if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING) {
onion_pending_remove(circ);
}
/* If the circuit ever became OPEN, we sent it to the reputation history
* module then. If it isn't OPEN, we send it there now to remember which
* links worked and which didn't.
*/
if (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
circuit_build_failed(circ); /* take actions if necessary */
}
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
}
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
control_event_circuit_status(circ,
(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)?CIRC_EVENT_CLOSED:CIRC_EVENT_FAILED);
}
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
/* treat this like getting a nack from it */
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). Removing from descriptor.",
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circ->rend_query, circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, circ->rend_query);
}
if (circ->n_conn)
connection_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_conn);
for (conn=circ->n_streams; conn; conn=conn->next_stream)
connection_edge_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, conn);
while (circ->resolving_streams) {
conn = circ->resolving_streams;
circ->resolving_streams = conn->next_stream;
if (!conn->marked_for_close)
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
}
if (circ->p_conn)
connection_send_destroy(circ->p_circ_id, circ->p_conn);
for (conn=circ->p_streams; conn; conn=conn->next_stream)
connection_edge_destroy(circ->p_circ_id, conn);
circ->marked_for_close = 1;
if (circ->rend_splice && !circ->rend_splice->marked_for_close) {
/* do this after marking this circuit, to avoid infinite recursion. */
circuit_mark_for_close(circ->rend_splice);
circ->rend_splice = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
/** Verify that cpath layer <b>cp</b> has all of its invariants
* correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid.
*/
void assert_cpath_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp)
{
// tor_assert(cp->addr); /* these are zero for rendezvous extra-hops */
// tor_assert(cp->port);
switch (cp->state)
{
case CPATH_STATE_OPEN:
tor_assert(cp->f_crypto);
tor_assert(cp->b_crypto);
/* fall through */
case CPATH_STATE_CLOSED:
tor_assert(!cp->handshake_state);
break;
case CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS:
tor_assert(cp->handshake_state);
break;
default:
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log_fn(LOG_ERR,"Unexpected state %d",cp->state);
tor_assert(0);
}
tor_assert(cp->package_window >= 0);
tor_assert(cp->deliver_window >= 0);
}
/** Verify that cpath <b>cp</b> has all of its invariants
* correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid.
*/
static void
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assert_cpath_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp)
{
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const crypt_path_t *start = cp;
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do {
assert_cpath_layer_ok(cp);
/* layers must be in sequence of: "open* awaiting? closed*" */
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if (cp != start) {
if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
} else if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
}
}
cp = cp->next;
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tor_assert(cp);
} while (cp != start);
}
/** Verify that circuit <b>c</b> has all of its invariants
* correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid.
*/
void assert_circuit_ok(const circuit_t *c)
{
connection_t *conn;
tor_assert(c);
tor_assert(c->magic == CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
tor_assert(c->purpose >= _CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN &&
c->purpose <= _CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX);
if (c->n_conn) {
tor_assert(c->n_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
tor_assert(!memcmp(c->n_conn->identity_digest, c->n_conn_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
}
if (c->p_conn)
tor_assert(c->p_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
for (conn = c->p_streams; conn; conn = conn->next_stream)
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
for (conn = c->n_streams; conn; conn = conn->next_stream)
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT);
tor_assert(c->deliver_window >= 0);
tor_assert(c->package_window >= 0);
if (c->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
if (c->cpath) {
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c));
tor_assert(!c->n_crypto);
tor_assert(!c->p_crypto);
tor_assert(!c->n_digest);
tor_assert(!c->p_digest);
} else {
tor_assert(!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c));
tor_assert(c->n_crypto);
tor_assert(c->p_crypto);
tor_assert(c->n_digest);
tor_assert(c->p_digest);
}
}
if (c->cpath) {
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assert_cpath_ok(c->cpath);
}
if (c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED) {
if (!c->marked_for_close) {
tor_assert(c->rend_splice);
tor_assert(c->rend_splice->rend_splice == c);
}
tor_assert(c->rend_splice != c);
} else {
tor_assert(!c->rend_splice);
}
}