tor/changes/bug6252

  o Security fixes:
    - Tear down the circuit if we get an unexpected SENDME cell. Clients
      could use this trick to make their circuits receive cells faster
      than our flow control would have allowed, or to gum up the network,
      or possibly to do targeted memory denial-of-service attacks on
      entry nodes. Fixes bug 6252. Bugfix on the 54th commit on Tor --
      from July 2002, before the release of Tor 0.0.0.
Detect bug 6252 (unexpected sendme cell) I only check on circuits, not streams, since bloating your stream window past the initial circuit window can't help you much. Also, I compare to CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX so we don't have surprising races if we lower CIRCWINDOW_START for an experiment. 2012-06-28 20:00:01 +02:00			`o Security fixes:`
			`- Tear down the circuit if we get an unexpected SENDME cell. Clients`
			`could use this trick to make their circuits receive cells faster`
			`than our flow control would have allowed, or to gum up the network,`
			`or possibly to do targeted memory denial-of-service attacks on`
			`entry nodes. Fixes bug 6252. Bugfix on the 54th commit on Tor --`
			`from July 2002, before the release of Tor 0.0.0.`