tor/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.c

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/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file crypto_digest.c
* \brief Block of functions related with digest and xof utilities and
* operations.
**/
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#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "lib/log/log.h"
#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
#include "keccak-tiny/keccak-tiny.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
/** Set the common_digests_t in <b>ds_out</b> to contain every digest on the
* <b>len</b> bytes in <b>m</b> that we know how to compute. Return 0 on
* success, -1 on failure. */
int
crypto_common_digests(common_digests_t *ds_out, const char *m, size_t len)
{
tor_assert(ds_out);
memset(ds_out, 0, sizeof(*ds_out));
if (crypto_digest(ds_out->d[DIGEST_SHA1], m, len) < 0)
return -1;
if (crypto_digest256(ds_out->d[DIGEST_SHA256], m, len, DIGEST_SHA256) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/** Return the name of an algorithm, as used in directory documents. */
const char *
crypto_digest_algorithm_get_name(digest_algorithm_t alg)
{
switch (alg) {
case DIGEST_SHA1:
return "sha1";
case DIGEST_SHA256:
return "sha256";
case DIGEST_SHA512:
return "sha512";
case DIGEST_SHA3_256:
return "sha3-256";
case DIGEST_SHA3_512:
return "sha3-512";
// LCOV_EXCL_START
default:
tor_fragile_assert();
return "??unknown_digest??";
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
}
}
/** Given the name of a digest algorithm, return its integer value, or -1 if
* the name is not recognized. */
int
crypto_digest_algorithm_parse_name(const char *name)
{
if (!strcmp(name, "sha1"))
return DIGEST_SHA1;
else if (!strcmp(name, "sha256"))
return DIGEST_SHA256;
else if (!strcmp(name, "sha512"))
return DIGEST_SHA512;
else if (!strcmp(name, "sha3-256"))
return DIGEST_SHA3_256;
else if (!strcmp(name, "sha3-512"))
return DIGEST_SHA3_512;
else
return -1;
}
/** Given an algorithm, return the digest length in bytes. */
size_t
crypto_digest_algorithm_get_length(digest_algorithm_t alg)
{
switch (alg) {
case DIGEST_SHA1:
return DIGEST_LEN;
case DIGEST_SHA256:
return DIGEST256_LEN;
case DIGEST_SHA512:
return DIGEST512_LEN;
case DIGEST_SHA3_256:
return DIGEST256_LEN;
case DIGEST_SHA3_512:
return DIGEST512_LEN;
default:
tor_assert(0); // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return 0; /* Unreachable */ // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
}
/** Compute a MAC using SHA3-256 of <b>msg_len</b> bytes in <b>msg</b> using a
* <b>key</b> of length <b>key_len</b> and a <b>salt</b> of length
* <b>salt_len</b>. Store the result of <b>len_out</b> bytes in in
* <b>mac_out</b>. This function can't fail. */
void
crypto_mac_sha3_256(uint8_t *mac_out, size_t len_out,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len)
{
crypto_digest_t *digest;
const uint64_t key_len_netorder = tor_htonll(key_len);
tor_assert(mac_out);
tor_assert(key);
tor_assert(msg);
digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
/* Order matters here that is any subsystem using this function should
* expect this very precise ordering in the MAC construction. */
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) &key_len_netorder,
sizeof(key_len_netorder));
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) key, key_len);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) msg, msg_len);
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) mac_out, len_out);
crypto_digest_free(digest);
}
/* xof functions */
/** Internal state for a eXtendable-Output Function (XOF). */
struct crypto_xof_t {
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_SHAKE3_EVP
/* XXXX We can't enable this yet, because OpenSSL's
* DigestFinalXOF function can't be called repeatedly on the same
* XOF.
*
* We could in theory use the undocumented SHA3_absorb and SHA3_squeeze
* functions, but let's not mess with undocumented OpenSSL internals any
* more than we have to.
*
* We could also revise our XOF code so that it only allows a single
* squeeze operation; we don't require streaming squeeze operations
* outside the tests yet.
*/
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
#else
keccak_state s;
#endif
};
/** Allocate a new XOF object backed by SHAKE-256. The security level
* provided is a function of the length of the output used. Read and
* understand FIPS-202 A.2 "Additional Consideration for Extendable-Output
* Functions" before using this construct.
*/
crypto_xof_t *
crypto_xof_new(void)
{
crypto_xof_t *xof;
xof = tor_malloc(sizeof(crypto_xof_t));
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_SHAKE256
xof->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
tor_assert(xof->ctx);
int r = EVP_DigestInit(xof->ctx, EVP_shake256());
tor_assert(r == 1);
#else
keccak_xof_init(&xof->s, 256);
#endif
return xof;
}
/** Absorb bytes into a XOF object. Must not be called after a call to
* crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes() for the same instance, and will assert
* if attempted.
*/
void
crypto_xof_add_bytes(crypto_xof_t *xof, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_SHAKE256
int r = EVP_DigestUpdate(xof->ctx, data, len);
tor_assert(r == 1);
#else
int i = keccak_xof_absorb(&xof->s, data, len);
tor_assert(i == 0);
#endif
}
/** Squeeze bytes out of a XOF object. Calling this routine will render
* the XOF instance ineligible to absorb further data.
*/
void
crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(crypto_xof_t *xof, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_SHAKE256
int r = EVP_DigestFinalXOF(xof->ctx, out, len);
tor_assert(r == 1);
#else
int i = keccak_xof_squeeze(&xof->s, out, len);
tor_assert(i == 0);
#endif
}
/** Cleanse and deallocate a XOF object. */
void
crypto_xof_free_(crypto_xof_t *xof)
{
if (!xof)
return;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_SHAKE256
if (xof->ctx)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(xof->ctx);
#endif
memwipe(xof, 0, sizeof(crypto_xof_t));
tor_free(xof);
}
/** Compute the XOF (SHAKE256) of a <b>input_len</b> bytes at <b>input</b>,
* putting <b>output_len</b> bytes at <b>output</b>. */
void
crypto_xof(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len,
const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_SHA3
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
tor_assert(ctx);
int r = EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_shake256());
tor_assert(r == 1);
r = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, input, input_len);
tor_assert(r == 1);
r = EVP_DigestFinalXOF(ctx, output, output_len);
tor_assert(r == 1);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
#else
crypto_xof_t *xof = crypto_xof_new();
crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, input, input_len);
crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, output, output_len);
crypto_xof_free(xof);
#endif
}