2004-11-07 02:33:06 +01:00
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/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright 2004 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* $Id$ */
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2004-11-29 23:25:31 +01:00
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const char circuituse_c_id[] = "$Id$";
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/**
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* \file circuituse.c
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* \brief Launch the right sort of circuits, attach streams to them.
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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2004-11-10 15:28:47 +01:00
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/** Longest time to wait for a circuit before closing an AP connection */
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2004-12-04 04:26:35 +01:00
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#define CONN_AP_MAX_ATTACH_DELAY 59
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2004-11-10 15:28:47 +01:00
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/********* START VARIABLES **********/
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extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist; /* from circuitlist.c */
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2004-07-13 03:25:39 +02:00
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extern int has_fetched_directory; /* from main.c */
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/********* END VARIABLES ************/
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static void circuit_expire_old_circuits(void);
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static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void);
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/* Return 1 if <b>circ</b> could be returned by circuit_get_best().
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* Else return 0.
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*/
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static int circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ,
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connection_t *conn,
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int must_be_open,
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uint8_t purpose,
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time_t now)
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{
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routerinfo_t *exitrouter;
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
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return 0; /* this circ doesn't start at us */
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if (must_be_open && (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN || !circ->n_conn))
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return 0; /* ignore non-open circs */
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if (circ->marked_for_close)
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return 0;
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/* if this circ isn't our purpose, skip. */
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED && !must_be_open) {
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if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
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2005-01-19 18:13:11 +01:00
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 0;
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} else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT && !must_be_open) {
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if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
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return 0;
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} else {
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (purpose != circ->purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 0;
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}
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
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if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 0;
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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/* decide if this circ is suitable for this conn */
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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/* for rend circs, circ->cpath->prev is not the last router in the
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* circuit, it's the magical extra bob hop. so just check the nickname
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* of the one we meant to finish at.
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*/
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exitrouter = router_get_by_digest(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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if (!exitrouter) {
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Skipping broken circ (exit router vanished)");
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return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet */
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}
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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if (!circ->build_state->need_uptime &&
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smartlist_string_num_isin(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
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conn->socks_request->port))
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return 0;
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2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
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2005-02-02 07:26:52 +01:00
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
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if (!connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter)) {
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/* can't exit from this router */
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return 0;
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}
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} else { /* not general */
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if (rend_cmp_service_ids(conn->rend_query, circ->rend_query)) {
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/* this circ is not for this conn */
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return 0;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* Return 1 if circuit <b>a</b> is better than circuit <b>b</b> for
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* <b>purpose</b>, and return 0 otherwise. Used by circuit_get_best.
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*/
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static int circuit_is_better(circuit_t *a, circuit_t *b, uint8_t purpose)
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{
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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switch (purpose) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
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/* if it's used but less dirty it's best;
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* else if it's more recently created it's best
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*/
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (b->timestamp_dirty) {
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if (a->timestamp_dirty &&
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2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
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a->timestamp_dirty > b->timestamp_dirty)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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} else {
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (a->timestamp_dirty ||
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2005-01-20 08:02:24 +01:00
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b->build_state->is_internal ||
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2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
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a->timestamp_created > b->timestamp_created)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
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/* the closer it is to ack_wait the better it is */
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
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/* the closer it is to rend_joined the better it is */
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Find the best circ that conn can use, preferably one which is
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* dirty. Circ must not be too old.
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*
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* Conn must be defined.
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*
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* If must_be_open, ignore circs not in CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN.
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*
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* circ_purpose specifies what sort of circuit we must have.
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* It can be C_GENERAL, C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, or C_REND_JOINED.
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*
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* If it's REND_JOINED and must_be_open==0, then return the closest
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* rendezvous-purposed circuit that you can find.
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*
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* If it's INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT and must_be_open==0, then return the
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* closest introduce-purposed circuit that you can find.
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*/
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static circuit_t *
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circuit_get_best(connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose)
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{
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circuit_t *circ, *best=NULL;
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
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for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
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if (!circuit_is_acceptable(circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose,now))
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continue;
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/* now this is an acceptable circ to hand back. but that doesn't
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* mean it's the *best* circ to hand back. try to decide.
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*/
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (!best || circuit_is_better(circ,best,purpose))
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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best = circ;
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}
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return best;
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}
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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/** If we find a circuit that isn't open yet and was born this many
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* seconds ago, then assume something went wrong, and cull it.
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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*/
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#define MIN_SECONDS_BEFORE_EXPIRING_CIRC 30
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/** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born
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* at least MIN_SECONDS_BEFORE_EXPIRING_CIRC seconds ago.
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*/
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void circuit_expire_building(time_t now) {
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|
|
circuit_t *victim, *circ = global_circuitlist;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
while (circ) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim = circ;
|
|
|
|
circ = circ->next;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(victim))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* didn't originate here */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->marked_for_close)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* don't mess with marked circs */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->timestamp_created + MIN_SECONDS_BEFORE_EXPIRING_CIRC > now)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* it's young still, don't mess with it */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-17 19:49:13 +01:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* some debug logs, to help track bugs */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purp %d to %s (circid %d). (clean).",
|
|
|
|
victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purp %d to %s (circid %d). %d secs since dirty.",
|
|
|
|
victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
(int)(now - victim->timestamp_dirty));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-01-17 19:49:13 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if circ is !open, or if it's open but purpose is a non-finished
|
|
|
|
* intro or rend, then mark it for close */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ||
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND ||
|
|
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING ||
|
|
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* it's a rend_ready circ, but it's already picked a query */
|
|
|
|
(victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
|
|
|
|
victim->rend_query[0]) ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* c_rend_ready circs measure age since timestamp_dirty,
|
|
|
|
* because that's set when they switch purposes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they
|
|
|
|
* make an introduction attempt. so timestamp_dirty
|
|
|
|
* will reflect the time since the last attempt.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
((victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY ||
|
|
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED ||
|
|
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) &&
|
|
|
|
victim->timestamp_dirty + MIN_SECONDS_BEFORE_EXPIRING_CIRC > now)) {
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->n_conn)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)",
|
|
|
|
victim->n_conn->address, victim->n_port, victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
victim->state, circuit_state_to_string[victim->state], victim->purpose);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Abandoning circ %d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
victim->state, circuit_state_to_string[victim->state], victim->purpose);
|
|
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,victim);
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(victim);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Remove any elements in <b>needed_ports</b> that are handled by an
|
|
|
|
* open or in-progress circuit.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *port;
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
port = smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(*port);
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_stream_is_being_handled(NULL, *port, 2)) {
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Port %d is already being handled; removing.", port);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_del(needed_ports, i--);
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(port);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Port %d is not handled.", *port);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if at least <b>min</b> general-purpose circuits will have
|
|
|
|
* an acceptable exit node for conn if conn is defined, else for "*:port".
|
|
|
|
* Else return 0.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
int circuit_stream_is_being_handled(connection_t *conn, uint16_t port, int min) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *exitrouter;
|
|
|
|
int num=0;
|
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2005-01-13 08:23:19 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime = smartlist_string_num_isin(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
|
|
|
|
conn ? conn->socks_request->port : port);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
|
|
|
!circ->marked_for_close &&
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
|
|
|
(!circ->timestamp_dirty ||
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness < now)) {
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
exitrouter = router_get_by_digest(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (exitrouter &&
|
2005-03-19 07:57:16 +01:00
|
|
|
(!need_uptime || circ->build_state->need_uptime)) {
|
|
|
|
int ok;
|
|
|
|
if (conn) {
|
|
|
|
ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
addr_policy_result_t r =
|
|
|
|
router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy(0, port, exitrouter->exit_policy);
|
|
|
|
ok = r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
|
|
if (++num >= min)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Don't keep more than 10 unused open circuits around. */
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS 10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Figure out how many circuits we have open that are clean. Make
|
|
|
|
* sure it's enough for all the upcoming behaviors we predict we'll have.
|
|
|
|
* But if we have too many, close the not-so-useful ones.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
int num=0, num_internal=0, num_uptime_internal=0;
|
|
|
|
int hidserv_needs_uptime=0, hidserv_needs_capacity=1;
|
|
|
|
int port_needs_uptime=0, port_needs_capacity=1;
|
|
|
|
int need_ports, need_hidserv;
|
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check if we know of a port that's been requested recently
|
|
|
|
* and no circuit is currently available that can handle it. */
|
|
|
|
need_ports = !circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(now, &port_needs_uptime,
|
|
|
|
&port_needs_capacity);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
need_hidserv = rep_hist_get_predicted_hidserv(now, &hidserv_needs_uptime,
|
|
|
|
&hidserv_needs_capacity);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* don't mess with marked circs */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* only count clean circs */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* only pay attention to general-purpose circs */
|
|
|
|
num++;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->build_state->is_internal)
|
|
|
|
num_internal++;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->build_state->need_uptime && circ->build_state->is_internal)
|
|
|
|
num_uptime_internal++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (num < MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS) {
|
|
|
|
/* perhaps we want another */
|
|
|
|
if (need_ports) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another exit circ.",
|
|
|
|
num, num_internal);
|
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_identity(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL,
|
|
|
|
port_needs_uptime, port_needs_capacity, 0);
|
|
|
|
} else if (need_hidserv &&
|
|
|
|
((num_uptime_internal<2 && hidserv_needs_uptime) ||
|
|
|
|
num_internal<2)) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Have %d clean circs (%d uptime-internal, %d internal),"
|
|
|
|
" need another hidserv circ.", num, num_uptime_internal, num_internal);
|
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_identity(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL,
|
|
|
|
hidserv_needs_uptime, hidserv_needs_capacity, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Build a new test circuit every 5 minutes */
|
|
|
|
#define TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL 300
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** This function is called once a second. Its job is to make sure
|
|
|
|
* all services we offer have enough circuits available. Some
|
|
|
|
* services just want enough circuits for current tasks, whereas
|
|
|
|
* others want a minimum set of idle circuits hanging around.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now) {
|
|
|
|
static long time_to_new_circuit = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* launch a new circ for any pending streams that need one */
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make sure any hidden services have enough intro points */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (has_fetched_directory)
|
2004-08-18 08:47:01 +02:00
|
|
|
rend_services_introduce();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (time_to_new_circuit < now) {
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(1);
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
time_to_new_circuit = now + get_options()->NewCircuitPeriod;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (proxy_mode(get_options()))
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
addressmap_clean(now);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits();
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
#if 0 /* disable for now, until predict-and-launch-new can cull leftovers */
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_youngest_clean_open(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
if (get_options()->RunTesting &&
|
|
|
|
circ &&
|
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_created + TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL < now) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Creating a new testing circuit.");
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_identity(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_predict_and_launch_new();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** If the stream <b>conn</b> is a member of any of the linked
|
|
|
|
* lists of <b>circ</b>, then remove it from the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, connection_t *conn) {
|
|
|
|
connection_t *prevconn;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-11 03:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->cpath_layer = NULL; /* make sure we don't keep a stale pointer */
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn == circ->p_streams) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->p_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn == circ->n_streams) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn == circ->resolving_streams) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->resolving_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (prevconn = circ->p_streams;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
|
|
;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (prevconn = circ->n_streams;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
|
|
;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (prevconn = circ->resolving_streams;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
|
|
;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_ERR,"edge conn not in circuit's list?");
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0); /* should never get here */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Notify the global circuit list that <b>conn</b> is about to be
|
|
|
|
* removed and then freed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If it's an OR conn, then mark-for-close all the circuits that use
|
|
|
|
* that conn.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If it's an edge conn, then detach it from its circ, so we don't
|
|
|
|
* try to reference it later.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void circuit_about_to_close_connection(connection_t *conn) {
|
|
|
|
/* currently, we assume it's too late to flush conn's buf here.
|
|
|
|
* down the road, maybe we'll consider that eof doesn't mean can't-write
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (conn->type) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CONN_TYPE_OR:
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Inform any pending (not attached) circs that they should give up. */
|
|
|
|
circuit_n_conn_done(conn, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now close all the attached circuits on it. */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
while ((circ = circuit_get_by_conn(conn))) {
|
|
|
|
if (circ->n_conn == conn) /* it's closing in front of us */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_conn = NULL;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ->p_conn == conn) /* it's closing behind us */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->p_conn = NULL;
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case CONN_TYPE_AP:
|
|
|
|
case CONN_TYPE_EXIT:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* It's an edge conn. Need to remove it from the linked list of
|
|
|
|
* conn's for this circuit. Confirm that 'end' relay command has
|
|
|
|
* been sent. But don't kill the circuit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_by_conn(conn);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circ, conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end switch */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Find each circuit that has been dirty for too long, and has
|
|
|
|
* no streams on it: mark it for close.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* If the circuit has been dirty for too long, and there are no streams
|
|
|
|
* on it, mark it for close.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness < now &&
|
|
|
|
CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
!circ->p_streams /* nothing attached */ ) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Closing n_circ_id %d (dirty %d secs ago, purp %d)",circ->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
(int)(now - circ->timestamp_dirty), circ->purpose);
|
|
|
|
/* (only general and purpose_c circs can get dirty) */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!circ->n_streams);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
} else if (!circ->timestamp_dirty && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
|
|
|
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
#define CIRCUIT_UNUSED_CIRC_TIMEOUT 3600 /* an hour */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_created + CIRCUIT_UNUSED_CIRC_TIMEOUT < now) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Closing circuit that has been unused for %d seconds.",
|
|
|
|
(int)(now - circ->timestamp_created));
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/** A testing circuit has completed. Take whatever stats we want. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
circuit_testing_opened(circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
/* For now, we only use testing circuits to see if our ORPort is
|
2005-03-15 02:44:46 +01:00
|
|
|
reachable. But we remember reachability in onionskin_answer(),
|
|
|
|
so there's no need to record anything here. Just close the circ. */
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** A testing circuit has failed to build. Take whatever stats we want. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
circuit_testing_failed(circuit_t *circ, int at_last_hop) {
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!at_last_hop)
|
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_identity(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, me->identity_digest, 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
2005-03-15 02:44:46 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Our testing circuit (to see if your ORPort is reachable) has failed. I'll try again later.");
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** The circuit <b>circ</b> has just become open. Take the next
|
|
|
|
* step: for rendezvous circuits, we pass circ to the appropriate
|
|
|
|
* function in rendclient or rendservice. For general circuits, we
|
|
|
|
* call connection_ap_attach_pending, which looks for pending streams
|
|
|
|
* that could use circ.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void circuit_has_opened(circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
|
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (circ->purpose) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
2005-01-19 18:13:11 +01:00
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
|
/* Tell any AP connections that have been waiting for a new
|
|
|
|
* circuit that one is ready. */
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, waiting for introductions */
|
|
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, connecting to rend point */
|
|
|
|
rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
|
|
circuit_testing_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_ERR,"unhandled purpose %d",circ->purpose);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*~ Called whenever a circuit could not be successfully built.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void circuit_build_failed(circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should examine circ and see if it failed because of
|
|
|
|
* the last hop or an earlier hop. then use this info below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int failed_at_last_hop = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If the last hop isn't open, and the second-to-last is, we failed
|
|
|
|
* at the last hop. */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath &&
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->prev->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->prev->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
|
|
failed_at_last_hop = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (circ->purpose) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
|
if (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
|
|
/* If we never built the circuit, note it as a failure. */
|
|
|
|
/* Note that we can't just check circ->cpath here, because if
|
|
|
|
* circuit-building failed immediately, it won't be set yet. */
|
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
|
|
circuit_testing_failed(circ, failed_at_last_hop);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, waiting for introductions */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* no need to care here, because bob will rebuild intro
|
|
|
|
* points periodically. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
/* at Alice, connecting to intro point */
|
|
|
|
/* Don't increment failure count, since Bob may have picked
|
|
|
|
* the introduction point maliciously */
|
|
|
|
/* Alice will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if
|
|
|
|
* the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* at Alice, waiting for Bob */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Alice will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if
|
|
|
|
* the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, connecting to rend point */
|
|
|
|
/* Don't increment failure count, since Alice may have picked
|
|
|
|
* the rendezvous point maliciously */
|
2005-03-19 05:38:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Couldn't connect to Alice's chosen rend point %s (%s hop failed).",
|
|
|
|
failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last",
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circ);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Other cases are impossible, since this function is only called with
|
|
|
|
* unbuilt circuits. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Number of consecutive failures so far; should only be touched by
|
|
|
|
* circuit_launch_new and circuit_*_failure_count.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int n_circuit_failures = 0;
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
static int did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Don't retry launching a new circuit if we try this many times with no
|
|
|
|
* success. */
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES 5
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *
|
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_identity(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_digest,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-07-13 03:25:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!has_fetched_directory) {
|
2004-12-01 04:48:14 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Haven't fetched directory yet; canceling circuit launch.");
|
2004-07-13 03:25:39 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
|
|
|
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING) {
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */
|
|
|
|
if ((circ = circuit_get_clean_open(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, need_uptime,
|
|
|
|
need_capacity, internal))) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d",
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, purpose);
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose = purpose;
|
|
|
|
/* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building
|
|
|
|
* will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
|
|
|
|
* began. */
|
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_created = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
switch (purpose) {
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* it's ready right now */
|
|
|
|
/* XXX should we call control_event_circuit_status() here? */
|
|
|
|
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
|
/* it's ready right now */
|
|
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* need to add a new hop */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(exit_digest);
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_append_new_hop(circ, NULL, exit_digest) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bug: unexpected purpose %d when cannibalizing a general circ.",
|
|
|
|
purpose);
|
2005-02-01 01:37:16 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_FRAGILE
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return circ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (did_circs_fail_last_period &&
|
|
|
|
n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* too many failed circs in a row. don't try. */
|
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_INFO,"%d failures so far, not trying.",n_circuit_failures);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* try a circ. if it fails, circuit_mark_for_close will increment n_circuit_failures */
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
return circuit_establish_circuit(purpose, exit_digest,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Launch a new circuit and return a pointer to it. Return NULL if you failed. */
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *
|
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_nickname(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_nickname,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *digest = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (exit_nickname) {
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *r = router_get_by_nickname(exit_nickname);
|
|
|
|
if (!r) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "No such OR as '%s'", exit_nickname);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
digest = r->identity_digest;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
return circuit_launch_by_identity(purpose, digest,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Record another failure at opening a general circuit. When we have
|
|
|
|
* too many, we'll stop trying for the remainder of this minute.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void) {
|
|
|
|
++n_circuit_failures;
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"n_circuit_failures now %d.",n_circuit_failures);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Reset the failure count for opening general circuits. This means
|
|
|
|
* we will try MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES times more (if necessary) before
|
|
|
|
* stopping again.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
void circuit_reset_failure_count(int timeout) {
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (timeout && n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES)
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
did_circs_fail_last_period = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
n_circuit_failures = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Find an open circ that we're happy with: return 1. If there isn't
|
|
|
|
* one, and there isn't one on the way, launch one and return 0. If it
|
|
|
|
* will never work, return -1.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Write the found or in-progress or launched circ into *circp.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(connection_t *conn,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
|
|
circuit_t **circp) {
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
2004-06-17 20:13:09 +02:00
|
|
|
int is_resolve;
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circp);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
2004-06-17 20:13:09 +02:00
|
|
|
is_resolve = conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 1, desired_circuit_purpose);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*circp = circ;
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* we're happy */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-07 16:57:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!has_fetched_directory) {
|
|
|
|
if (!connection_get_by_type(CONN_TYPE_DIR)) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Application request when we're believed to be offline. Optimistically trying again.");
|
|
|
|
directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_DIR, NULL, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* the stream will be dealt with when has_fetched_directory becomes
|
|
|
|
* 1, or when all directory attempts fail and directory_all_unreachable()
|
|
|
|
* kills it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
need_uptime = smartlist_string_num_isin(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
|
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-17 20:13:09 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Do we need to check exit policy? */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!is_resolve && !connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) {
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t addr = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in))
|
|
|
|
addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router_exit_policy_all_routers_reject(addr, conn->socks_request->port,
|
|
|
|
need_uptime)) {
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"No Tor server exists that allows exit to %s:%d. Rejecting.",
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->address, conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* is one already on the way? */
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 0, desired_circuit_purpose);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
char *exitname=NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t new_circ_purpose;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
int is_internal;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* need to pick an intro point */
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
try_an_intro_point:
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
exitname = rend_client_get_random_intro(conn->rend_query);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!exitname) {
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"No intro points for '%s': refetching service descriptor.",
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->rend_query);
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
|
|
|
|
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!router_get_by_nickname(exitname)) {
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Advertised intro point '%s' is not recognized for '%s'. Skipping over.",
|
|
|
|
exitname, conn->rend_query);
|
|
|
|
rend_client_remove_intro_point(exitname, conn->rend_query);
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(exitname);
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
goto try_an_intro_point;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Chose %s as intro point for %s.", exitname, conn->rend_query);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
/* If we have specified a particular exit node for our
|
|
|
|
* connection, then be sure to open a circuit to that exit node.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-11-30 03:26:41 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
|
|
exitname = tor_strdup(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
2004-11-30 03:26:41 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!router_get_by_nickname(exitname)) {
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. Closing.", exitname);
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(exitname);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
is_internal = (new_circ_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || is_resolve);
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_launch_by_nickname(new_circ_purpose, exitname, need_uptime,
|
|
|
|
1, is_internal);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(exitname);
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
|
|
|
/* help predict this next time */
|
|
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_hidserv(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
|
|
/* write the service_id into circ */
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(circ->rend_query, conn->rend_query, sizeof(circ->rend_query));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"No safe circuit (purpose %d) ready for edge connection; delaying.",
|
|
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose);
|
|
|
|
*circp = circ;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Attach the AP stream <b>apconn</b> to circ's linked list of
|
|
|
|
* p_streams. Also set apconn's cpath_layer to the last hop in
|
|
|
|
* circ's cpath.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void link_apconn_to_circ(connection_t *apconn, circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
/* add it into the linked list of streams on this circuit */
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"attaching new conn to circ. n_circ_id %d.", circ->n_circ_id);
|
2004-12-04 03:51:11 +01:00
|
|
|
apconn->timestamp_lastread = time(NULL); /* reset it, so we can measure circ timeouts */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
apconn->next_stream = circ->p_streams;
|
|
|
|
/* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */
|
|
|
|
circ->p_streams = apconn;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
|
apconn->cpath_layer = circ->cpath->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
/** If an exit wasn't specifically chosen, save the history for future
|
|
|
|
* use */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
consider_recording_trackhost(connection_t *conn, circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
int found_needle = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *str;
|
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
char *new_address;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Search the addressmap for this conn's destination. */
|
|
|
|
/* If he's not in the address map.. */
|
|
|
|
if (!options->TrackHostExits ||
|
|
|
|
addressmap_already_mapped(conn->socks_request->address))
|
|
|
|
return; /* nothing to track, or already mapped */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->TrackHostExits, const char *, cp, {
|
|
|
|
if (cp[0] == '.') { /* match end */
|
|
|
|
/* XXX strstr is probably really bad here */
|
|
|
|
if ((str = strstr(conn->socks_request->address, &cp[1]))) {
|
|
|
|
if (str == conn->socks_request->address
|
|
|
|
|| strcmp(str, &cp[1]) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
found_needle = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(cp, conn->socks_request->address) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
found_needle = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!found_needle)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add this exit/hostname pair to the addressmap. */
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(conn->socks_request->address) + 1 /* '.' */ +
|
|
|
|
strlen(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name) + 1 /* '.' */ +
|
|
|
|
strlen("exit") + 1 /* '\0' */;
|
|
|
|
new_address = tor_malloc(len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(new_address, len, "%s.%s.exit",
|
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addressmap_register(conn->socks_request->address, new_address,
|
|
|
|
time(NULL) + options->TrackHostExitsExpire);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-17 13:38:37 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Attempt to attach the connection <b>conn</b> to <b>circ</b>, and
|
|
|
|
* send a begin or resolve cell as appropriate. Return values for
|
|
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit. */
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(connection_t *conn,
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT ||
|
|
|
|
conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!circ->timestamp_dirty)
|
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
|
|
|
|
consider_recording_trackhost(conn, circ);
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn, circ);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(conn, circ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Try to find a safe live circuit for CONN_TYPE_AP connection conn. If
|
|
|
|
* we don't find one: if conn cannot be handled by any known nodes,
|
|
|
|
* warn and return -1 (conn needs to die);
|
|
|
|
* else launch new circuit (if necessary) and return 0.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, associate conn with a safe live circuit, do the
|
|
|
|
* right next step, and return 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(connection_t *conn) {
|
|
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
int conn_age;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conn_age = time(NULL) - conn->timestamp_created;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn_age > CONN_AP_MAX_ATTACH_DELAY) {
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Giving up on unattached conn (%d sec old).", conn_age);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) { /* we're a general conn */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-30 09:39:14 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
2004-12-07 06:33:55 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!router) {
|
2004-11-30 09:39:14 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. Closing.",
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. Closing.",
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* find the circuit that we should use, if there is one. */
|
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, &circ);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 1)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Attaching apconn to circ %d (stream %d sec old).",
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
|
|
/* here, print the circ's path. so people can figure out which circs are sucking. */
|
|
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,circ);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We have found a suitable circuit for our conn. Hurray. */
|
|
|
|
return connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(conn, circ);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else { /* we're a rendezvous conn */
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *rendcirc=NULL, *introcirc=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!conn->cpath_layer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* start by finding a rendezvous circuit for us */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED, &rendcirc);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval > 0) {
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(rendcirc);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* one is already established, attach */
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"rend joined circ %d already here. attaching. (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
|
|
rendcirc->n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Mark rendezvous circuits as 'newly dirty' every time you use
|
|
|
|
* them, since the process of rebuilding a rendezvous circ is so
|
|
|
|
* expensive. There is a tradeoffs between linkability and
|
|
|
|
* feasibility, at this point.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rendcirc->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, rendcirc);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn, rendcirc) < 0)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0; /* already marked, let them fade away */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rendcirc && rendcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"pending-join circ %d already here, with intro ack. Stalling. (stream %d sec old)", rendcirc->n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* it's on its way. find an intro circ. */
|
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, &introcirc);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval > 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* one has already sent the intro. keep waiting. */
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(introcirc);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Intro circ %d present and awaiting ack (rend %d). Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
introcirc->n_circ_id, rendcirc ? rendcirc->n_circ_id : 0, conn_age);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* now rendcirc and introcirc are each either undefined or not finished */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rendcirc && introcirc && rendcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"ready rend circ %d already here (no intro-ack yet on intro %d). (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
|
|
rendcirc->n_circ_id, introcirc->n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(introcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (introcirc->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"found open intro circ %d (rend %d); sending introduction. (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
|
|
introcirc->n_circ_id, rendcirc->n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rend_client_send_introduction(introcirc, rendcirc) < 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rendcirc->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
introcirc->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(rendcirc);
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(introcirc);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Intro (%d) and rend (%d) circs are not both ready. Stalling conn. (%d sec old)",
|
|
|
|
introcirc ? introcirc->n_circ_id : 0,
|
|
|
|
rendcirc ? rendcirc->n_circ_id : 0, conn_age);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|