tor/src/or/router.c

817 lines
26 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright 2004 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
#include "or.h"
/**
* \file router.c
* \brief OR functionality, including key maintenance, generating
2004-05-05 02:30:43 +02:00
* and uploading server descriptors, retrying OR connections.
**/
2004-05-05 02:30:43 +02:00
extern long stats_n_seconds_uptime;
/** Exposed for test.c. */ void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len);
/************************************************************/
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/*****
* Key management: ORs only.
*****/
/** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /* When was onionkey last changed? */
static crypto_pk_env_t *onionkey=NULL;
static crypto_pk_env_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
static crypto_pk_env_t *identitykey=NULL;
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** Replace the current onion key with <b>k</b>. Does not affect lastonionkey;
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* to update onionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
*/
void set_onion_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) {
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
onionkey = k;
onionkey_set_at = time(NULL);
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
}
/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* loaded or generated. */
crypto_pk_env_t *get_onion_key(void) {
tor_assert(onionkey);
return onionkey;
}
/** Return the onion key that was current before the most recent onion
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* key rotation. If no rotation has been performed since this process
* started, return NULL.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *get_previous_onion_key(void) {
return lastonionkey;
}
void dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_env_t **key, crypto_pk_env_t **last)
{
tor_assert(key);
tor_assert(last);
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
*key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onionkey);
if (lastonionkey)
2004-06-05 03:56:54 +02:00
*last = crypto_pk_dup_key(lastonionkey);
else
*last = NULL;
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
}
/** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
* the process launched.
*/
time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void) {
return onionkey_set_at;
}
/** Set the current identity key to k.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
void set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) {
identitykey = k;
}
/** Returns the current identity key; requires that the identity key has been
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* set.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *get_identity_key(void) {
tor_assert(identitykey);
return identitykey;
}
/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
* a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function,
* the OR should:
* - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
* pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
* - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
*/
void rotate_onion_key(void)
{
char fname[512];
char fname_prev[512];
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey;
tor_snprintf(fname,sizeof(fname),
"%s/keys/secret_onion_key",get_data_directory());
tor_snprintf(fname_prev,sizeof(fname_prev),
"%s/keys/secret_onion_key.old",get_data_directory());
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Error creating crypto environment.");
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Couldn't write generated key to %s.", fname);
goto error;
}
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
if (lastonionkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey);
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Rotating onion key");
lastonionkey = onionkey;
set_onion_key(prkey);
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
return;
error:
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
}
/** The latest calculated bandwidth usage for our node. */
static int bw_capacity = 0;
/** Tuck <b>bw</b> away so we can produce it when somebody
* calls router_get_bandwidth_capacity() below.
*/
void router_set_bandwidth_capacity(int bw) {
bw_capacity = bw;
}
/** Return the value we tucked away above, or zero by default. */
int router_get_bandwidth_capacity(void) {
return bw_capacity;
}
/* Read an RSA secret key key from a file that was once named fname_old,
* but is now named fname_new. Rename the file from old to new as needed.
*/
static crypto_pk_env_t *
init_key_from_file_name_changed(const char *fname_old,
const char *fname_new)
{
if (file_status(fname_new) == FN_FILE || file_status(fname_old) != FN_FILE)
/* The new filename is there, or both are, or neither is. */
return init_key_from_file(fname_new);
/* The old filename exists, and the new one doesn't. Rename and load. */
if (rename(fname_old, fname_new) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Couldn't rename %s to %s: %s", fname_old, fname_new,
strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
return init_key_from_file(fname_new);
}
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist,
* create a new RSA key and save it in <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created
* key, or NULL on error.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey = NULL;
FILE *file = NULL;
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Error creating crypto environment.");
goto error;
}
switch(file_status(fname)) {
case FN_DIR:
case FN_ERROR:
log(LOG_ERR, "Can't read key from %s", fname);
goto error;
case FN_NOENT:
log(LOG_INFO, "No key found in %s; generating fresh key.", fname);
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Generated key seems invalid");
goto error;
}
log(LOG_INFO, "Generated key seems valid");
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Couldn't write generated key to %s.", fname);
goto error;
}
return prkey;
case FN_FILE:
if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Error loading private key.");
goto error;
}
return prkey;
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
error:
if (prkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
if (file)
fclose(file);
return NULL;
}
/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* On OPs, this only initializes the tls context.
*/
int init_keys(void) {
char keydir[512];
char keydir2[512];
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+3];
char *cp;
const char *tmp, *mydesc, *datadir;
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey;
char digest[20];
or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!key_lock)
2004-06-05 03:56:54 +02:00
key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
/* OP's don't need persistant keys; just make up an identity and
* initialize the TLS context. */
if (!server_mode(options)) {
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env()))
return -1;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey))
return -1;
set_identity_key(prkey);
/* XXX NM: do we have a convention for what client's Nickname is?
* No. Let me propose one: */
if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), 1,
options->Nickname ? options->Nickname : "client",
MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error creating TLS context for OP.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Make sure DataDirectory exists, and is private. */
datadir = get_data_directory();
tor_assert(datadir);
if (strlen(datadir) > (512-128)) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "DataDirectory is too long.");
return -1;
}
if (check_private_dir(datadir, 1)) {
return -1;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Check the key directory. */
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/keys", datadir);
if (check_private_dir(keydir, 1)) {
return -1;
}
cp = keydir + strlen(keydir); /* End of string. */
/* 1. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/keys/identity.key",datadir);
tor_snprintf(keydir2,sizeof(keydir2),"%s/keys/secret_id_key",datadir);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Reading/making identity key %s...",keydir2);
prkey = init_key_from_file_name_changed(keydir,keydir2);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_identity_key(prkey);
/* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/keys/onion.key",datadir);
tor_snprintf(keydir2,sizeof(keydir2),"%s/keys/secret_onion_key",datadir);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Reading/making onion key %s...",keydir2);
prkey = init_key_from_file_name_changed(keydir,keydir2);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_onion_key(prkey);
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/keys/secret_onion_key.old",datadir);
if (file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir);
if (prkey)
lastonionkey = prkey;
}
/* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), 1, options->Nickname,
MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error initializing TLS context");
return -1;
}
/* 4. Dump router descriptor to 'router.desc' */
/* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
tmp = mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
if (!mydesc) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error initializing descriptor.");
return -1;
}
if(authdir_mode(options)) {
/* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, get_identity_key())) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error adding own fingerprint to approved set");
return -1;
}
if (dirserv_add_descriptor(&tmp) != 1) {
log(LOG_ERR, "Unable to add own descriptor to directory.");
return -1;
}
}
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/router.desc", datadir);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Dumping descriptor to %s...",keydir);
if (write_str_to_file(keydir, mydesc,0)) {
return -1;
}
/* 5. Dump fingerprint to 'fingerprint' */
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/fingerprint", datadir);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Dumping fingerprint to %s...",keydir);
tor_assert(strlen(options->Nickname) <= MAX_NICKNAME_LEN);
strlcpy(fingerprint, options->Nickname, sizeof(fingerprint));
strlcat(fingerprint, " ", sizeof(fingerprint));
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_identity_key(),
fingerprint+strlen(fingerprint), 1)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error computing fingerprint");
return -1;
}
strlcat(fingerprint, "\n", sizeof(fingerprint));
if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint, 0))
return -1;
if(!authdir_mode(options))
return 0;
/* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/approved-routers", datadir);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Loading approved fingerprints from %s...",keydir);
if(dirserv_parse_fingerprint_file(keydir) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error loading fingerprints");
return -1;
}
/* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest);
if (!router_digest_is_trusted_dir(digest)) {
add_trusted_dir_server(options->Address, (uint16_t)options->DirPort, digest);
}
/* 7. [authdirserver only] load old directory, if it's there */
tor_snprintf(keydir,sizeof(keydir),"%s/cached-directory", datadir);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Loading cached directory from %s...",keydir);
cp = read_file_to_str(keydir,0);
if(!cp) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Cached directory %s not present. Ok.",keydir);
} else {
tor_strstrip(cp,"\r"); /* XXXX Workaround for win32 read_file_to_str bug. */
if(dirserv_load_from_directory_string(cp) < 0){
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Cached directory %s is corrupt", keydir);
tor_free(cp);
return -1;
}
tor_free(cp);
}
/* success */
return 0;
}
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/*
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* Clique maintenance
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
*/
/** OR only: if in clique mode, try to open connections to all of the
* other ORs we know about. Otherwise, open connections to those we
* think are in clique mode.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
void router_retry_connections(void) {
int i;
routerinfo_t *router;
routerlist_t *rl;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(server_mode(options));
router_get_routerlist(&rl);
if (!rl) return;
for (i=0;i < smartlist_len(rl->routers);i++) {
router = smartlist_get(rl->routers, i);
if(router_is_me(router))
continue;
if(!clique_mode(options) && !router_is_clique_mode(router))
continue;
if(!connection_get_by_identity_digest(router->identity_digest,
CONN_TYPE_OR)) {
/* not in the list */
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"connecting to OR %s:%u.",router->address,router->or_port);
connection_or_connect(router->addr, router->or_port, router->identity_digest);
}
}
}
int router_is_clique_mode(routerinfo_t *router) {
if(router_digest_is_trusted_dir(router->identity_digest))
return 1;
return 0;
}
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/*
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* OR descriptor generation.
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
*/
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/** My routerinfo. */
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
/** String representation of my descriptor, signed by me. */
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
static char descriptor[8192];
/** OR only: try to upload our signed descriptor to all the directory servers
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* we know about.
*/
void router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(void) {
const char *s;
s = router_get_my_descriptor();
if (!s) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
return;
}
2004-05-13 01:48:57 +02:00
directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR, s, strlen(s));
}
#define DEFAULT_EXIT_POLICY "reject 0.0.0.0/8,reject 169.254.0.0/16,reject 127.0.0.0/8,reject 192.168.0.0/16,reject 10.0.0.0/8,reject 172.16.0.0/12,accept *:20-22,accept *:53,accept *:79-81,accept *:110,accept *:143,accept *:443,accept *:873,accept *:993,accept *:995,reject *:4661-4662,reject *:1214,reject *:6346,accept *:1024-65535,reject *:*"
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** Set the exit policy on <b>router</b> to match the exit policy in the
* current configuration file. If the exit policy doesn't have a catch-all
* rule, then append the default exit policy as well.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
static void router_add_exit_policy_from_config(routerinfo_t *router) {
struct exit_policy_t *ep;
struct config_line_t default_policy;
config_parse_exit_policy(get_options()->ExitPolicy, &router->exit_policy);
for (ep = router->exit_policy; ep; ep = ep->next) {
if (ep->msk == 0 && ep->prt_min <= 1 && ep->prt_max >= 65535) {
/* if exitpolicy includes a *:* line, then we're done. */
return;
}
}
/* Else, append the default exitpolicy. */
default_policy.key = NULL;
default_policy.value = (char*)DEFAULT_EXIT_POLICY;
default_policy.next = NULL;
config_parse_exit_policy(&default_policy, &router->exit_policy);
}
/** OR only: Return false if my exit policy says to allow connection to
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* conn. Else return true.
*/
int router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(desc_routerinfo);
/* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
'maybe' below. */
if (!conn->addr)
return -1;
return router_compare_addr_to_exit_policy(conn->addr, conn->port,
desc_routerinfo->exit_policy);
}
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** Return true iff <b>router</b> has the same nickname as this OR. (For an
* OP, always returns false.)
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
int router_is_me(routerinfo_t *router)
{
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
tor_assert(router);
if(!me || memcmp(me->identity_digest, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
routerinfo_t *router_get_my_routerinfo(void)
{
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
return NULL;
if (!desc_routerinfo) {
if (router_rebuild_descriptor())
return NULL;
}
return desc_routerinfo;
}
/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* one if necessary. Return NULL on error.
*/
const char *router_get_my_descriptor(void) {
if (!desc_routerinfo) {
if (router_rebuild_descriptor())
return NULL;
}
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"my desc is '%s'",descriptor);
return descriptor;
}
/** Rebuild a fresh routerinfo and signed server descriptor for this
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* OR. Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int router_rebuild_descriptor(void) {
routerinfo_t *ri;
uint32_t addr;
char platform[256];
struct in_addr in;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
if(resolve_my_address(options->Address, &addr) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
return -1;
}
ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
in.s_addr = htonl(addr);
ri->address = tor_strdup(inet_ntoa(in));
ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
ri->addr = addr;
ri->or_port = options->ORPort;
ri->socks_port = options->SocksPort;
ri->dir_port = options->DirPort;
ri->published_on = time(NULL);
ri->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_onion_key()); /* must invoke from main thread */
ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_identity_key());
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey, ri->identity_digest)<0) {
routerinfo_free(ri);
return -1;
}
get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
ri->bandwidthrate = options->BandwidthRateBytes;
ri->bandwidthburst = options->BandwidthBurstBytes;
ri->bandwidthcapacity = router_get_bandwidth_capacity();
router_add_exit_policy_from_config(ri);
if(desc_routerinfo) /* inherit values */
ri->is_verified = desc_routerinfo->is_verified;
if (options->MyFamily) {
ri->declared_family = smartlist_create();
smartlist_split_string(ri->declared_family, options->MyFamily, ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
}
if (desc_routerinfo)
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
desc_routerinfo = ri;
if (router_dump_router_to_string(descriptor, 8192, ri, get_identity_key())<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't dump router to string.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
* string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* currently running on.
*/
void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
{
tor_snprintf(platform, len-1, "Tor %s on %s",
VERSION, get_uname());
platform[len-1] = '\0';
return;
}
/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
* refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
* near the end of maxlen?
*/
#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
* with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and write the
* result into <b>s</b>, using at most <b>maxlen</b> bytes. Return -1 on
* failure, and the number of bytes used on success.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
int router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, routerinfo_t *router,
crypto_pk_env_t *ident_key) {
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
char *onion_pkey; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
char *identity_pkey; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
char digest[20];
char signature[128];
char published[32];
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
struct in_addr in;
size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
size_t written;
int result=0;
struct exit_policy_t *tmpe;
char *bandwidth_usage;
char *family_line;
#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
2003-12-17 22:09:31 +01:00
char *s_tmp, *s_dup;
const char *cp;
routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
#endif
2003-12-17 22:09:31 +01:00
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't match router's public key!");
return -1;
}
/* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "Error computing fingerprint");
return -1;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* PEM-encode the onion key */
if(crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->onion_pkey,
&onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
return -1;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* PEM-encode the identity key key */
if(crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
&identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
tor_free(onion_pkey);
return -1;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Encode the publication time. */
format_iso_time(published, router->published_on);
2003-12-17 22:09:31 +01:00
/* How busy have we been? */
bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
size_t n;
char *s = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family, " ", 0, &n);
n += strlen("opt family ") + 2; /* 1 for \n, 1 for \0. */
family_line = tor_malloc(n);
tor_snprintf(family_line, n, "opt family %s\n", s);
tor_free(s);
} else {
family_line = tor_strdup("");
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
result = tor_snprintf(s, maxlen,
"router %s %s %d %d %d\n"
"platform %s\n"
"published %s\n"
"opt fingerprint %s\n"
"opt uptime %ld\n"
"bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
"onion-key\n%s"
"signing-key\n%s%s%s",
router->nickname,
router->address,
router->or_port,
router->socks_port,
router->dir_port,
router->platform,
published,
fingerprint,
stats_n_seconds_uptime,
(int) router->bandwidthrate,
(int) router->bandwidthburst,
(int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
family_line, bandwidth_usage);
tor_free(family_line);
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
tor_free(onion_pkey);
tor_free(identity_pkey);
2004-08-07 04:59:46 +02:00
tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
if(result < 0 || (size_t)result >= maxlen) {
/* apparently different glibcs do different things on tor_snprintf error.. so check both */
return -1;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* From now on, we use 'written' to remember the current length of 's'. */
written = result;
if (get_options()->ContactInfo && strlen(get_options()->ContactInfo)) {
result = tor_snprintf(s+written,maxlen-written, "opt contact %s\n",
get_options()->ContactInfo);
if (result<0 || result+written > maxlen)
return -1;
written += result;
}
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
for(tmpe=router->exit_policy; tmpe; tmpe=tmpe->next) {
in.s_addr = htonl(tmpe->addr);
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Write: "accept 1.2.3.4" */
result = tor_snprintf(s+written, maxlen-written, "%s %s",
tmpe->policy_type == EXIT_POLICY_ACCEPT ? "accept" : "reject",
tmpe->msk == 0 ? "*" : inet_ntoa(in));
if(result < 0 || result+written > maxlen) {
/* apparently different glibcs do different things on tor_snprintf error.. so check both */
return -1;
}
written += result;
if (tmpe->msk != 0xFFFFFFFFu && tmpe->msk != 0) {
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Write "/255.255.0.0" */
in.s_addr = htonl(tmpe->msk);
result = tor_snprintf(s+written, maxlen-written, "/%s", inet_ntoa(in));
if (result<0 || result+written > maxlen)
return -1;
written += result;
}
if (tmpe->prt_min <= 1 && tmpe->prt_max == 65535) {
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* There is no port set; write ":*" */
if (written > maxlen-4)
return -1;
strlcat(s+written, ":*\n", maxlen-written);
written += 3;
} else if (tmpe->prt_min == tmpe->prt_max) {
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* There is only one port; write ":80". */
result = tor_snprintf(s+written, maxlen-written, ":%d\n", tmpe->prt_min);
if (result<0 || result+written > maxlen)
return -1;
written += result;
} else {
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* There is a range of ports; write ":79-80". */
result = tor_snprintf(s+written, maxlen-written, ":%d-%d\n", tmpe->prt_min,
tmpe->prt_max);
if (result<0 || result+written > maxlen)
return -1;
written += result;
}
if (tmpe->msk == 0 && tmpe->prt_min <= 1 && tmpe->prt_max == 65535)
/* This was a catch-all rule, so future rules are irrelevant. */
break;
} /* end for */
if (written > maxlen-256) /* Not enough room for signature. */
return -1;
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
/* Sign the directory */
strlcat(s+written, "router-signature\n", maxlen-written);
written += strlen(s+written);
s[written] = '\0';
if (router_get_router_hash(s, digest) < 0)
return -1;
if (crypto_pk_private_sign(ident_key, signature, digest, 20) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Error signing digest");
return -1;
}
strlcat(s+written, "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n", maxlen-written);
written += strlen(s+written);
if (base64_encode(s+written, maxlen-written, signature, 128) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't base64-encode signature");
return -1;
}
written += strlen(s+written);
strlcat(s+written, "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n", maxlen-written);
written += strlen(s+written);
2003-12-17 22:09:31 +01:00
if (written > maxlen-2)
return -1;
/* include a last '\n' */
s[written] = '\n';
s[written+1] = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
cp = s_tmp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL);
if (!ri_tmp) {
2003-12-17 22:09:31 +01:00
log_fn(LOG_ERR, "We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse: <<%s>>",
s);
return -1;
}
tor_free(s_dup);
routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
#endif
return written+1;
}
int is_legal_nickname(const char *s)
{
size_t len;
tor_assert(s);
len = strlen(s);
return len > 0 && len <= MAX_NICKNAME_LEN &&
strspn(s,LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS)==len;
}
int is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(const char *s)
{
size_t len;
tor_assert(s);
if (*s!='$')
return is_legal_nickname(s);
len = strlen(s);
return len == HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1 && strspn(s+1,HEX_CHARACTERS)==len-1;
}
/*
Local Variables:
mode:c
indent-tabs-mode:nil
c-basic-offset:2
End:
*/