2006-02-09 06:46:49 +01:00
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|
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/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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2007-12-12 22:09:01 +01:00
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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2012-06-05 02:58:17 +02:00
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */
|
Implemented link padding and receiver token buckets
Each socket reads at most 'bandwidth' bytes per second sustained, but
can handle bursts of up to 10*bandwidth bytes.
Cells are now sent out at evenly-spaced intervals, with padding sent
out otherwise. Set Linkpadding=0 in the rc file to send cells as soon
as they're available (and to never send padding cells).
Added license/copyrights statements at the top of most files.
router->min and router->max have been merged into a single 'bandwidth'
value. We should make the routerinfo_t reflect this (want to do that,
Mat?)
As the bandwidth increases, and we want to stop sleeping more and more
frequently to send a single cell, cpu usage goes up. At 128kB/s we're
pretty much calling poll with a timeout of 1ms or even 0ms. The current
code takes a timeout of 0-9ms and makes it 10ms. prepare_for_poll()
handles everything that should have happened in the past, so as long as
our buffers don't get too full in that 10ms, we're ok.
Speaking of too full, if you run three servers at 100kB/s with -l debug,
it spends too much time printing debugging messages to be able to keep
up with the cells. The outbuf ultimately fills up and it kills that
connection. If you run with -l err, it works fine up through 500kB/s and
probably beyond. Down the road we'll want to teach it to recognize when
an outbuf is getting full, and back off.
svn:r50
2002-07-16 03:12:15 +02:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
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2004-05-10 04:36:04 +02:00
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/**
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* \file onion.c
|
2012-12-05 03:27:07 +01:00
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* \brief Functions to queue create cells, handle onionskin
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* parsing and creation, and wrap the various onionskin types.
|
2004-05-10 04:36:04 +02:00
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**/
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2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
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#include "or.h"
|
2010-07-22 09:46:23 +02:00
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#include "circuitlist.h"
|
2010-07-22 10:22:51 +02:00
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#include "config.h"
|
2010-07-23 20:38:25 +02:00
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#include "onion.h"
|
2012-12-05 03:27:07 +01:00
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#include "onion_fast.h"
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#include "onion_ntor.h"
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#include "onion_tap.h"
|
2010-07-23 22:57:20 +02:00
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#include "rephist.h"
|
2012-12-05 03:27:07 +01:00
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#include "router.h"
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2002-06-27 00:45:49 +02:00
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|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
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|
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/** Type for a linked list of circuits that are waiting for a free CPU worker
|
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* to process a waiting onion handshake. */
|
2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
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typedef struct onion_queue_t {
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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or_circuit_t *circ;
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
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char *onionskin;
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2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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time_t when_added;
|
2003-09-16 22:57:09 +02:00
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struct onion_queue_t *next;
|
2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
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} onion_queue_t;
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2003-09-16 22:57:09 +02:00
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2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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/** 5 seconds on the onion queue til we just send back a destroy */
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#define ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF 5
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|
2007-02-24 08:50:38 +01:00
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/** First and last elements in the linked list of circuits waiting for CPU
|
2012-06-05 01:51:00 +02:00
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* workers, or NULL if the list is empty.
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* @{ */
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2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
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static onion_queue_t *ol_list=NULL;
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static onion_queue_t *ol_tail=NULL;
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2012-06-05 01:51:00 +02:00
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/**@}*/
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2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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/** Length of ol_list */
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2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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static int ol_length=0;
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2012-12-05 03:27:07 +01:00
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/* XXXX Check lengths vs MAX_ONIONSKIN_{CHALLENGE,REPLY}_LEN */
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2004-05-10 04:36:04 +02:00
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/** Add <b>circ</b> to the end of ol_list and return 0, except
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* if ol_list is too long, in which case do nothing and return -1.
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*/
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2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
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int
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
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onion_pending_add(or_circuit_t *circ, char *onionskin)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
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{
|
2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
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onion_queue_t *tmp;
|
2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
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tmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(onion_queue_t));
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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tmp->circ = circ;
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
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tmp->onionskin = onionskin;
|
2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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tmp->when_added = now;
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
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|
if (!ol_tail) {
|
2004-04-25 22:37:37 +02:00
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|
tor_assert(!ol_list);
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|
tor_assert(!ol_length);
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
ol_list = tmp;
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|
ol_tail = tmp;
|
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ol_length++;
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|
return 0;
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}
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|
2004-04-25 22:37:37 +02:00
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|
tor_assert(ol_list);
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tor_assert(!ol_tail->next);
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
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|
if (ol_length >= get_options()->MaxOnionsPending) {
|
2009-10-27 06:49:43 +01:00
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|
#define WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL (60)
|
2010-08-18 21:55:49 +02:00
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|
static ratelim_t last_warned =
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|
|
RATELIM_INIT(WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL);
|
|
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|
char *m;
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|
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, approx_time()))) {
|
2009-10-27 06:49:43 +01:00
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|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
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"Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit "
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|
"creation requests! Please consider using the "
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"MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more "
|
2010-08-18 21:55:49 +02:00
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|
"restricted exit policy.%s",m);
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|
tor_free(m);
|
2009-10-27 06:49:43 +01:00
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|
}
|
2004-09-29 08:52:36 +02:00
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|
tor_free(tmp);
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
return -1;
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}
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ol_length++;
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ol_tail->next = tmp;
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ol_tail = tmp;
|
2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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|
while ((int)(now - ol_list->when_added) >= ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF) {
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|
/* cull elderly requests. */
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circ = ol_list->circ;
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onion_pending_remove(ol_list->circ);
|
2006-02-13 10:37:53 +01:00
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log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
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|
"Circuit create request is too old; canceling due to overload.");
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
2005-02-20 10:27:48 +01:00
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|
}
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
return 0;
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|
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}
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|
2004-05-10 04:36:04 +02:00
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/** Remove the first item from ol_list and return it, or return
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* NULL if the list is empty.
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*/
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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|
or_circuit_t *
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
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onion_next_task(char **onionskin_out)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
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{
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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or_circuit_t *circ;
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (!ol_list)
|
2003-08-21 01:05:22 +02:00
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return NULL; /* no onions pending, we're done */
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
2004-04-25 22:37:37 +02:00
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tor_assert(ol_list->circ);
|
2012-09-03 06:13:25 +02:00
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tor_assert(ol_list->circ->p_chan); /* make sure it's still valid */
|
2004-04-25 22:37:37 +02:00
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|
tor_assert(ol_length > 0);
|
2003-09-14 10:17:14 +02:00
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circ = ol_list->circ;
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
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|
*onionskin_out = ol_list->onionskin;
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|
ol_list->onionskin = NULL; /* prevent free. */
|
2003-09-14 10:17:14 +02:00
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|
onion_pending_remove(ol_list->circ);
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return circ;
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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}
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|
2004-05-10 04:36:04 +02:00
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/** Go through ol_list, find the onion_queue_t element which points to
|
|
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|
* circ, remove and free that element. Leave circ itself alone.
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
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void
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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onion_pending_remove(or_circuit_t *circ)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
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{
|
2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
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onion_queue_t *tmpo, *victim;
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (!ol_list)
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
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return; /* nothing here. */
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|
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|
/* first check to see if it's the first entry */
|
|
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|
tmpo = ol_list;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tmpo->circ == circ) {
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
|
|
|
/* it's the first one. remove it from the list. */
|
|
|
|
ol_list = tmpo->next;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!ol_list)
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
|
|
|
ol_tail = NULL;
|
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|
|
ol_length--;
|
|
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|
victim = tmpo;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* we need to hunt through the rest of the list */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
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|
for ( ;tmpo->next && tmpo->next->circ != circ; tmpo=tmpo->next) ;
|
|
|
|
if (!tmpo->next) {
|
2006-02-13 10:37:53 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
|
"circ (p_circ_id %d) not in list, probably at cpuworker.",
|
|
|
|
circ->p_circ_id);
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
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|
/* now we know tmpo->next->circ == circ */
|
|
|
|
victim = tmpo->next;
|
|
|
|
tmpo->next = victim->next;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ol_tail == victim)
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
|
|
|
ol_tail = tmpo;
|
|
|
|
ol_length--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now victim points to the element that needs to be removed */
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(victim->onionskin);
|
2004-09-29 08:52:36 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(victim);
|
2002-11-27 05:08:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-11 02:26:47 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Remove all circuits from the pending list. Called from tor_free_all. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
clear_pending_onions(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
while (ol_list) {
|
2005-07-22 23:12:10 +02:00
|
|
|
onion_queue_t *victim = ol_list;
|
2005-02-11 02:26:47 +01:00
|
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|
ol_list = victim->next;
|
2008-02-06 00:20:49 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(victim->onionskin);
|
2005-02-11 02:26:47 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(victim);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ol_list = ol_tail = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ol_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-09 21:03:31 +02:00
|
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|
2012-12-05 03:27:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* ============================================================ */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Fill in a server_onion_keys_t object at <b>keys</b> with all of the keys
|
|
|
|
* and other info we might need to do onion handshakes. (We make a copy of
|
|
|
|
* our keys for each cpuworker to avoid race conditions with the main thread,
|
|
|
|
* and to avoid locking) */
|
|
|
|
void
|
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|
|
setup_server_onion_keys(server_onion_keys_t *keys)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memset(keys, 0, sizeof(server_onion_keys_t));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(keys->my_identity, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
dup_onion_keys(&keys->onion_key, &keys->last_onion_key);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
keys->curve25519_key_map = construct_ntor_key_map();
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Release all storage held in <b>keys</b>, but do not free <b>keys</b>
|
|
|
|
* itself (as it's likely to be stack-allocated.) */
|
|
|
|
void
|
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|
|
release_server_onion_keys(server_onion_keys_t *keys)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! keys)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_pk_free(keys->onion_key);
|
|
|
|
crypto_pk_free(keys->last_onion_key);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
ntor_key_map_free(keys->curve25519_key_map);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
memset(keys, 0, sizeof(server_onion_keys_t));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Release whatever storage is held in <b>state</b>, depending on its
|
|
|
|
* type, and clear its pointer. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (state->tag) {
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
|
|
|
|
crypto_dh_free(state->u.tap);
|
|
|
|
state->u.tap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
|
|
|
|
fast_handshake_state_free(state->u.fast);
|
|
|
|
state->u.fast = NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
|
|
|
|
ntor_handshake_state_free(state->u.ntor);
|
|
|
|
state->u.ntor = NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d",
|
|
|
|
(int)state->tag);
|
|
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Perform the first step of a circuit-creation handshake of type <b>type</b>
|
|
|
|
* (one of ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_*): generate the initial "onion skin" in
|
|
|
|
* <b>onion_skin_out</b>, and store any state information in <b>state_out</b>.
|
|
|
|
* Return -1 on failure, and the length of the onionskin on acceptance.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
onion_skin_create(int type,
|
|
|
|
const extend_info_t *node,
|
|
|
|
onion_handshake_state_t *state_out,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *onion_skin_out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
|
|
|
|
if (!node->onion_key)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_TAP_create(node->onion_key,
|
|
|
|
&state_out->u.tap,
|
|
|
|
(char*)onion_skin_out) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
|
|
|
|
if (fast_onionskin_create(&state_out->u.fast, onion_skin_out) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = CREATE_FAST_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->curve25519_onion_key.public_key,
|
|
|
|
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest,
|
|
|
|
&node->curve25519_onion_key,
|
|
|
|
&state_out->u.ntor,
|
|
|
|
onion_skin_out) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
|
|
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
|
r = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (r > 0)
|
|
|
|
state_out->tag = (uint16_t) type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Perform the second (server-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
|
|
|
|
* type <b>type</b>, responding to the client request in <b>onion_skin</b>
|
|
|
|
* using the keys in <b>keys</b>. On success, write our response into
|
|
|
|
* <b>reply_out</b>, generate <b>keys_out_len</b> bytes worth of key material
|
|
|
|
* in <b>keys_out_len</b>, and return the length of the reply. On failure,
|
|
|
|
* return -1. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *onion_skin,
|
|
|
|
const server_onion_keys_t *keys,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *reply_out,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake((const char*)onion_skin,
|
|
|
|
keys->onion_key, keys->last_onion_key,
|
|
|
|
(char*)reply_out,
|
|
|
|
(char*)keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
|
|
|
|
if (fast_server_handshake(onion_skin, reply_out, keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
r = CREATED_FAST_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_ntor_server_handshake(onion_skin, keys->curve25519_key_map,
|
|
|
|
keys->my_identity,
|
|
|
|
reply_out, keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
r = NTOR_REPLY_LEN;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
|
|
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX we should generate the rendezvous nonce stuff too. Some notes
|
|
|
|
* below */
|
|
|
|
// memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
|
|
|
|
* type <b>type</b>, using our state in <b>handshake_state</b> and the
|
|
|
|
* server's response in <b>reply</b> On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b>
|
|
|
|
* bytes worth of key material in <b>keys_out_len</b>, set
|
|
|
|
* <b>rend_authenticator_out</b> to the "KH" field that can be used to
|
|
|
|
* establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure,
|
|
|
|
* return -1. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
|
|
|
|
const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *reply,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (handshake_state->tag != type)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.tap,
|
|
|
|
(const char*)reply,
|
|
|
|
(char *)keys_out, keys_out_len) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
|
|
|
|
if (fast_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.fast, reply,
|
|
|
|
keys_out, keys_out_len) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *keys_tmp = tor_malloc(keys_tmp_len);
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_ntor_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.ntor,
|
|
|
|
reply,
|
|
|
|
keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
tor_free(keys_tmp);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, keys_tmp + keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, keys_tmp_len);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(keys_tmp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
|
|
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|