2007-12-12 22:09:01 +01:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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2009-05-02 22:00:54 +02:00
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2009, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/**
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* \file tortls.c
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2005-06-11 07:31:17 +02:00
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* \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
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* TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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**/
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2005-06-11 07:31:17 +02:00
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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* are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
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* functions and variables.)
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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*/
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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2005-08-12 19:26:43 +02:00
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#include "orconfig.h"
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2007-05-01 00:42:50 +02:00
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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2007-11-05 19:15:47 +01:00
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#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
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2007-05-01 00:42:50 +02:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/tls1.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/bio.h>
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2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
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#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
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#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000l
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#error "We require openssl >= 0.9.7"
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#endif
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2007-05-01 00:42:50 +02:00
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2007-05-04 09:24:01 +02:00
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#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE /* to import prototypes from crypto.h */
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2007-05-01 00:42:50 +02:00
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2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "tortls.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "container.h"
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2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
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#include "ht.h"
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2004-04-03 06:05:12 +02:00
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#include <string.h>
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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2008-02-21 23:14:32 +01:00
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/* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake.
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*/
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#define V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
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#define V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
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2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
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2003-10-19 02:46:51 +02:00
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/* Copied from or.h */
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2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
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#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
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"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
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2003-10-19 02:46:51 +02:00
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
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2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
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#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60)
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2003-10-22 18:41:35 +02:00
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2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
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#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
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2006-10-07 18:25:28 +02:00
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/** Structure holding the TLS state for a single connection. */
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2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
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typedef struct tor_tls_context_t {
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2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
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int refcnt;
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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SSL_CTX *ctx;
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2007-11-05 19:15:50 +01:00
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X509 *my_cert;
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X509 *my_id_cert;
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2007-11-05 20:19:46 +01:00
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crypto_pk_env_t *key;
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2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
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} tor_tls_context_t;
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/** Holds a SSL object and its associated data. Members are only
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2004-05-10 12:27:54 +02:00
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* accessed from within tortls.c.
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2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
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*/
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2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
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struct tor_tls_t {
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2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
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HT_ENTRY(tor_tls_t) node;
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2009-03-09 07:20:15 +01:00
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tor_tls_context_t *context; /** A link to the context object for this tls. */
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2004-05-10 12:27:54 +02:00
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SSL *ssl; /**< An OpenSSL SSL object. */
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int socket; /**< The underlying file descriptor for this TLS connection. */
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2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
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char *address; /**< An address to log when describing this connectinon. */
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2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
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enum {
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TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN, TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE,
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2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
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TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED, TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
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2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
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} state : 3; /**< The current SSL state, depending on which operations have
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2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
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* completed successfully. */
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unsigned int isServer:1; /**< True iff this is a server-side connection */
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2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
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unsigned int wasV2Handshake:1; /**< True iff the original handshake for
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* this connection used the updated version
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* of the connection protocol (client sends
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* different cipher list, server sends only
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* one certificate). */
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2008-02-25 00:39:53 +01:00
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/** True iff we should call negotiated_callback when we're done reading. */
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unsigned int got_renegotiate:1;
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2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
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size_t wantwrite_n; /**< 0 normally, >0 if we returned wantwrite last
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* time. */
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2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
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/** Last values retrieved from BIO_number_read()/write(); see
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* tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes() for usage.
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*/
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2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
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unsigned long last_write_count;
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unsigned long last_read_count;
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2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
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/** If set, a callback to invoke whenever the client tries to renegotiate
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* the handshake. */
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2007-12-01 09:09:48 +01:00
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void (*negotiated_callback)(tor_tls_t *tls, void *arg);
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2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
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/** Argument to pass to negotiated_callback. */
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2007-12-01 09:09:48 +01:00
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void *callback_arg;
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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};
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2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
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#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
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/** An array of fake SSL_CIPHER objects that we use in order to trick OpenSSL
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* in client mode into advertising the ciphers we want. See
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2008-06-13 06:26:05 +02:00
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* rectify_client_ciphers() for details. */
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2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
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static SSL_CIPHER *CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES = NULL;
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/** A stack of SSL_CIPHER objects, some real, some fake.
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2008-06-13 06:26:05 +02:00
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* See rectify_client_ciphers() for details. */
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2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
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static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK = NULL;
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#endif
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2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
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/** Helper: compare tor_tls_t objects by its SSL. */
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static INLINE int
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tor_tls_entries_eq(const tor_tls_t *a, const tor_tls_t *b)
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{
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return a->ssl == b->ssl;
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}
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/** Helper: return a hash value for a tor_tls_t by its SSL. */
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static INLINE unsigned int
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tor_tls_entry_hash(const tor_tls_t *a)
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{
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#if SIZEOF_INT == SIZEOF_VOID_P
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2008-02-21 22:57:47 +01:00
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return ((unsigned int)(uintptr_t)a->ssl);
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2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
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#else
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return (unsigned int) ((((uint64_t)a->ssl)>>2) & UINT_MAX);
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#endif
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}
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/** Map from SSL* pointers to tor_tls_t objects using those pointers.
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*/
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static HT_HEAD(tlsmap, tor_tls_t) tlsmap_root = HT_INITIALIZER();
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HT_PROTOTYPE(tlsmap, tor_tls_t, node, tor_tls_entry_hash,
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tor_tls_entries_eq)
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HT_GENERATE(tlsmap, tor_tls_t, node, tor_tls_entry_hash,
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tor_tls_entries_eq, 0.6, malloc, realloc, free)
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/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
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* pointer. */
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static INLINE tor_tls_t *
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2008-02-06 21:00:47 +01:00
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tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
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2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
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{
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tor_tls_t search, *result;
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memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
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2008-02-06 21:00:47 +01:00
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search.ssl = (SSL*)ssl;
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2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
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result = HT_FIND(tlsmap, &tlsmap_root, &search);
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return result;
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}
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2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
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static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
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static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
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2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
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static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
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2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
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crypto_pk_env_t *rsa_sign,
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const char *cname,
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const char *cname_sign,
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unsigned int lifetime);
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2003-09-25 07:17:11 +02:00
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/** Global tls context. We keep it here because nobody else needs to
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2004-05-10 12:27:54 +02:00
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* touch it. */
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2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
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static tor_tls_context_t *global_tls_context = NULL;
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
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2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
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static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
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2003-09-08 08:22:19 +02:00
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2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
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/* Module-internal error codes. */
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2007-01-15 22:21:05 +01:00
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#define _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL (_MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL - 2)
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#define _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN (_MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL - 1)
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b>. Use
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* <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
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2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
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*/
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2003-09-15 20:18:37 +02:00
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static void
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2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
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tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, const char *doing)
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2003-09-15 20:18:37 +02:00
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{
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2008-02-21 22:57:47 +01:00
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unsigned long err;
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2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
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const char *msg, *lib, *func, *addr;
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addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
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2003-10-16 01:50:25 +02:00
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while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
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msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
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lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
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func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
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if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
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if (doing) {
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2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
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log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s)",
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doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
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msg, lib, func);
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2003-10-16 01:50:25 +02:00
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} else {
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2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
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log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s)",
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addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
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msg, lib, func);
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2003-10-16 01:50:25 +02:00
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}
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2003-09-15 20:18:37 +02:00
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}
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}
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2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
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2007-02-16 21:39:37 +01:00
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/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
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* code. */
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2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
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static int
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2007-01-15 22:21:05 +01:00
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tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
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{
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2008-12-30 05:16:49 +01:00
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#if defined(MS_WINDOWS)
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2007-01-15 22:21:05 +01:00
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switch (e) {
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2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
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case WSAECONNRESET: // most common
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
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case WSAETIMEDOUT:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
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case WSAENETUNREACH:
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case WSAEHOSTUNREACH:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
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case WSAECONNREFUSED:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
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default:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
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}
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2007-01-15 22:21:05 +01:00
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#else
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switch (e) {
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2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
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case ECONNRESET: // most common
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
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case ETIMEDOUT:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
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case EHOSTUNREACH:
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case ENETUNREACH:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
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case ECONNREFUSED:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
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default:
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return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
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}
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#endif
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}
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2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
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/** Given a TOR_TLS_* error code, return a string equivalent. */
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2007-11-07 17:37:08 +01:00
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const char *
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tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
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{
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if (err >= 0)
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return "[Not an error.]";
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switch (err) {
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC: return "misc error";
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO: return "unexpected close";
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED: return "connection refused";
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET: return "connection reset";
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE: return "host unreachable";
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT: return "connection timed out";
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case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: return "closed";
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case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: return "want to read";
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case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE: return "want to write";
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default: return "(unknown error code)";
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}
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}
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2003-09-16 22:53:09 +02:00
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#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
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#define CATCH_ZERO 2
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
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2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
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* SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
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* which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
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* If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL instead of
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* reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
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* _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN instead of reporting zero-return errors.
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*
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2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
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* If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
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* current action as <b>doing</b>.
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2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
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*/
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2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
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static int
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2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
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tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
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2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
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|
|
const char *doing, int severity)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (err) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
|
2003-09-16 22:53:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
return _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL;
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (r == 0) {
|
2005-10-18 23:58:19 +02:00
|
|
|
log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s", doing);
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
log(severity, LD_NET,
|
|
|
|
"TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s)",
|
2004-05-02 22:18:21 +02:00
|
|
|
doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e));
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, doing);
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return tor_error;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
|
2003-09-16 22:53:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
return _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN;
|
2008-02-21 17:11:58 +01:00
|
|
|
log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s", doing);
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, doing);
|
2008-02-21 17:11:58 +01:00
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, doing);
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2005-06-21 03:07:32 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_library_init();
|
2003-09-15 21:38:52 +02:00
|
|
|
SSL_load_error_strings();
|
2005-06-20 20:56:35 +02:00
|
|
|
crypto_global_init(-1);
|
2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
|
|
|
tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-16 21:39:37 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Free all global TLS structures. */
|
2005-02-11 02:41:19 +01:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_free_all(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (global_tls_context) {
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_decref(global_tls_context);
|
2005-02-11 02:41:19 +01:00
|
|
|
global_tls_context = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-03-27 16:05:28 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!HT_EMPTY(&tlsmap_root)) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_MM, "Still have entries in the tlsmap at shutdown.");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
HT_CLEAR(tlsmap, &tlsmap_root);
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
|
|
|
|
if (CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES)
|
|
|
|
tor_free(CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES);
|
|
|
|
if (CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK)
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-02-11 02:41:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We
|
|
|
|
* don't validate them until later.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-30 03:09:52 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
(void) preverify_ok;
|
|
|
|
(void) x509_ctx;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-09 04:11:10 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
static X509_NAME *
|
|
|
|
tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int nid;
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
|
|
if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
return name;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
|
|
|
|
* signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>. The commonName of the
|
|
|
|
* certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
|
|
|
|
* <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b> seconds
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* starting from now. Return a certificate on success, NULL on
|
|
|
|
* failure.
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
static X509 *
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa_sign,
|
|
|
|
const char *cname,
|
|
|
|
const char *cname_sign,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cert_lifetime)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
time_t start_time, end_time;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
X509 *x509 = NULL;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_init();
|
|
|
|
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
start_time = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(rsa);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(cname);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(rsa_sign);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(cname_sign);
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(sign_pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa_sign,1)))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,0)))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), (long)start_time)))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha1()))
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-15 21:38:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
2003-11-18 07:52:25 +01:00
|
|
|
if (x509) {
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
2003-11-18 07:52:25 +01:00
|
|
|
x509 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
done:
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "generating certificate");
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (sign_pkey)
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (pkey)
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (name)
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name);
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (name_issuer)
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
|
2003-09-25 07:17:11 +02:00
|
|
|
return x509;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
/** List of ciphers that servers should select from.*/
|
|
|
|
#define SERVER_CIPHER_LIST \
|
|
|
|
(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" \
|
|
|
|
TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" \
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA)
|
|
|
|
/* Note: for setting up your own private testing network with link crypto
|
|
|
|
* disabled, set the cipher lists to your cipher list to
|
|
|
|
* SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA. If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
|
|
|
|
* with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
|
|
|
|
#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
|
|
|
|
#define XCIPHER(id, name)
|
|
|
|
/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
|
|
|
|
* our openssl doesn't know about. */
|
|
|
|
static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
|
|
|
|
#include "./ciphers.inc"
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
#undef CIPHER
|
|
|
|
#undef XCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Holds a cipher that we want to advertise, and its 2-byte ID. */
|
|
|
|
typedef struct cipher_info_t { unsigned id; const char *name; } cipher_info_t;
|
|
|
|
/** A list of all the ciphers that clients should advertise, including items
|
|
|
|
* that openssl might not know about. */
|
|
|
|
static const cipher_info_t CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[] = {
|
|
|
|
#define CIPHER(id, name) { id, name },
|
|
|
|
#define XCIPHER(id, name) { id, #name },
|
|
|
|
#include "./ciphers.inc"
|
|
|
|
#undef CIPHER
|
|
|
|
#undef XCIPHER
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** The length of CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST and CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES. */
|
|
|
|
static const int N_CLIENT_CIPHERS =
|
|
|
|
sizeof(CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST)/sizeof(CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[0]);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
|
|
|
|
#undef CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST
|
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST (TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" \
|
|
|
|
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA)
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
|
|
|
|
* references. */
|
2007-11-05 19:15:50 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
|
2007-11-05 19:15:50 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
|
|
|
|
X509_free(ctx->my_cert);
|
|
|
|
X509_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
|
2007-11-05 20:19:46 +01:00
|
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(ctx->key);
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
++ctx->refcnt;
|
2007-11-05 19:15:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-07 08:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
|
|
|
|
* <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
|
|
|
|
* certificate, and <b>nickname</b> set to the nickname to use.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2004-05-01 22:46:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
|
2004-07-22 00:11:11 +02:00
|
|
|
* it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
|
|
|
|
* the new SSL context.
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2003-09-08 08:22:19 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa = NULL;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL;
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_init();
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
|
|
|
|
nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
|
2003-09-12 01:26:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-07 08:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Generate short-term RSA key. */
|
|
|
|
if (!(rsa = crypto_new_pk_env()))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* Create certificate signed by identity key. */
|
|
|
|
cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
|
|
|
|
key_lifetime);
|
|
|
|
/* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
|
|
|
|
idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
|
|
|
|
IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
|
|
|
|
if (!cert || !idcert) {
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-25 07:17:11 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
result->refcnt = 1;
|
2007-11-05 19:15:50 +01:00
|
|
|
result->my_cert = X509_dup(cert);
|
|
|
|
result->my_id_cert = X509_dup(idcert);
|
2007-11-05 20:19:46 +01:00
|
|
|
result->key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
|
2007-11-05 19:15:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef EVERYONE_HAS_AES
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1 */
|
|
|
|
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Tell OpenSSL to use SSL3 or TLS1 but not SSL2. */
|
|
|
|
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
|
2004-07-22 06:53:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
|
2008-07-10 23:02:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-10 20:31:33 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
|
|
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-05-29 16:39:56 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data
|
|
|
|
* we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */
|
|
|
|
if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
|
|
|
|
result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
|
2008-05-19 20:13:00 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
|
|
|
|
cert=NULL;
|
2007-10-22 02:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if (idcert) {
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(s);
|
2008-01-10 18:54:24 +01:00
|
|
|
X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
|
2008-01-07 17:50:31 +01:00
|
|
|
X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
|
|
|
|
idcert = NULL;
|
2007-10-22 02:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(rsa);
|
|
|
|
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,1)))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
pkey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2008-09-05 23:19:53 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = crypto_dh_new();
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, _crypto_dh_env_get_dh(dh));
|
|
|
|
crypto_dh_free(dh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
|
|
|
|
always_accept_verify_cb);
|
|
|
|
/* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
|
2003-10-23 16:20:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Free the old context if one exists. */
|
|
|
|
if (global_tls_context) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is safe even if there are open connections: OpenSSL does
|
|
|
|
* reference counting with SSL and SSL_CTX objects. */
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_decref(global_tls_context);
|
2003-10-23 16:20:51 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-08 08:22:19 +02:00
|
|
|
global_tls_context = result;
|
2004-12-07 07:48:02 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rsa)
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(nickname);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(nn2);
|
2003-09-08 08:22:19 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "creating TLS context");
|
2008-02-08 22:13:12 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(nickname);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(nn2);
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (pkey)
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rsa)
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (result)
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_decref(result);
|
2004-05-18 17:35:21 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(cert);
|
|
|
|
if (idcert)
|
2004-12-07 08:48:16 +01:00
|
|
|
X509_free(idcert);
|
2003-09-11 23:12:39 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
|
2008-03-24 19:37:52 +01:00
|
|
|
* a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
* handshake. */
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, const char *address)
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session;
|
|
|
|
/* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is
|
|
|
|
* a cipher list. */
|
2008-02-24 01:35:20 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!session->ciphers) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
|
|
|
|
* dealing with an updated Tor. */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i);
|
|
|
|
const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
|
2007-12-03 18:59:32 +01:00
|
|
|
strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
|
|
|
|
strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX should be ld_debug */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
// return 1;
|
|
|
|
goto dump_list;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
dump_list:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i);
|
|
|
|
const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'",
|
2008-03-24 19:37:52 +01:00
|
|
|
address, s);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(s);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(elts);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
|
|
|
|
* changes state. We use this:
|
|
|
|
* <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
|
|
|
|
* do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
|
|
|
|
* <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_t *tls;
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
(void) val;
|
|
|
|
if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (tls) {
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */
|
|
|
|
if (tls->negotiated_callback)
|
|
|
|
tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now check the cipher list. */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl, ADDR(tls))) {
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/*XXXX_TLS keep this from happening more than once! */
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us.
|
|
|
|
* Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
|
|
|
|
/* Don't send a hello request. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tls) {
|
|
|
|
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Replace *<b>ciphers</b> with a new list of SSL ciphersuites: specifically,
|
2008-06-13 06:26:05 +02:00
|
|
|
* a list designed to mimic a common web browser. Some of the ciphers in the
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
* list won't actually be implemented by OpenSSL: that's okay so long as the
|
|
|
|
* server doesn't select them, and the server won't select anything besides
|
|
|
|
* what's in SERVER_CIPHER_LIST.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [If the server <b>does</b> select a bogus cipher, we won't crash or
|
|
|
|
* anything; we'll just fail later when we try to look up the cipher in
|
|
|
|
* ssl->cipher_list_by_id.]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rectify_client_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **ciphers)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
|
|
|
|
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK)) {
|
|
|
|
/* We need to set CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK to an array of the ciphers
|
|
|
|
* we want.*/
|
|
|
|
int i = 0, j = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First, create a dummy SSL_CIPHER for every cipher. */
|
|
|
|
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES =
|
|
|
|
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)*N_CLIENT_CIPHERS);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ++i) {
|
|
|
|
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].id = CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id | (3<<24);
|
|
|
|
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name = CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].name;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "List was: %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST);
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(*ciphers); ++j) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(*ciphers, j);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "Cipher %d: %lx %s", j, cipher->id, cipher->name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Then copy as many ciphers as we can from the good list, inserting
|
|
|
|
* dummies as needed. */
|
|
|
|
j=0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(*ciphers))
|
|
|
|
cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(*ciphers, j);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher && ((cipher->id >> 24) & 0xff) != 3) {
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "Skipping v2 cipher %s", cipher->name);
|
|
|
|
++j;
|
|
|
|
} else if (cipher &&
|
|
|
|
(cipher->id & 0xffff) == CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id) {
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "Found cipher %s", cipher->name);
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, cipher);
|
|
|
|
++j;
|
|
|
|
++i;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "Inserting fake %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name);
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, &CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i]);
|
|
|
|
++i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*ciphers);
|
|
|
|
*ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(*ciphers);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
(void)ciphers;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
|
|
|
|
* determine whether it is functioning as a server.
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_t *
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-09-19 22:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
BIO *bio = NULL;
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
|
2006-09-19 22:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(global_tls_context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
|
2006-06-07 08:21:11 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(global_tls_context->ctx))) {
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "generating TLS context");
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(result);
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
|
|
|
|
/* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
|
2008-12-18 16:00:09 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(fake_hostname);
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
|
|
|
|
isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "setting ciphers");
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_free(result->ssl);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(result);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!isServer)
|
|
|
|
rectify_client_ciphers(&result->ssl->cipher_list);
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
result->socket = sock;
|
2006-09-19 22:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
|
|
if (! bio) {
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "opening BIO");
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_free(result->ssl);
|
2006-09-19 22:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(result);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
HT_INSERT(tlsmap, &tlsmap_root, result);
|
2006-09-19 22:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_incref(global_tls_context);
|
|
|
|
result->context = global_tls_context;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
|
|
result->isServer = isServer;
|
2003-10-18 10:00:19 +02:00
|
|
|
result->wantwrite_n = 0;
|
2008-03-11 19:22:49 +01:00
|
|
|
result->last_write_count = BIO_number_written(bio);
|
|
|
|
result->last_read_count = BIO_number_read(bio);
|
|
|
|
if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
|
|
|
|
result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
|
|
|
|
if (isServer) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Not expected to get called. */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "generating TLS context");
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Make future log messages about <b>tls</b> display the address
|
|
|
|
* <b>address</b>.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(tls->address);
|
|
|
|
tls->address = tor_strdup(address);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
|
|
|
|
* next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not
|
|
|
|
* invoke this function untile <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-12-01 09:09:48 +01:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
|
|
|
|
void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
|
|
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
|
|
|
|
tls->callback_arg = arg;
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
|
|
|
|
if (cb) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-12-01 09:09:48 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-31 09:46:38 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
|
|
|
|
* received it (server). */
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
2005-03-31 09:46:38 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
return tls->isServer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
* underlying file descriptor.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_t *removed;
|
2005-02-28 03:52:51 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls && tls->ssl);
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
removed = HT_REMOVE(tlsmap, &tlsmap_root, tls);
|
|
|
|
if (!removed) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Freeing a TLS that was not in the ssl->tls map.");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
SSL_free(tls->ssl);
|
2005-02-28 03:52:51 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->ssl = NULL;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:48 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
|
2007-11-05 19:15:52 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->context)
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(tls->address);
|
2005-02-28 03:52:51 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(tls);
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to <b>len</b>
|
|
|
|
* characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>. On success, returns the
|
|
|
|
* number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
* TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_read(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r, err;
|
2004-10-17 00:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
|
2008-02-21 22:57:47 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
|
|
|
|
r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
if (r > 0) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
|
|
|
|
/* Renegotiation happened! */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
|
2007-12-01 09:09:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->negotiated_callback)
|
|
|
|
tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
|
2008-02-06 22:53:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return r;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-10-17 18:21:42 +02:00
|
|
|
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG);
|
2008-02-21 17:11:58 +01:00
|
|
|
if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
|
2006-02-13 09:01:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
|
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
|
2006-02-13 09:01:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to <b>n</b>
|
|
|
|
* characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>. On success, returns the
|
|
|
|
* number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
* TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2007-01-30 23:19:41 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r, err;
|
2004-10-17 00:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
|
2008-02-21 22:57:47 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
if (n == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
|
2003-10-18 10:00:19 +02:00
|
|
|
/* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
|
2006-02-13 09:01:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
|
|
|
|
(int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
|
2003-10-18 10:00:19 +02:00
|
|
|
n = tls->wantwrite_n;
|
|
|
|
tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-21 22:57:47 +01:00
|
|
|
r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
|
2003-09-27 00:27:24 +02:00
|
|
|
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO);
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return r;
|
2003-10-18 10:00:19 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-10-19 02:39:48 +02:00
|
|
|
if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
|
2003-10-18 10:00:19 +02:00
|
|
|
tls->wantwrite_n = n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
* TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
|
2003-09-11 22:10:39 +02:00
|
|
|
* or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
2004-10-17 00:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
|
2005-04-23 22:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
check_no_tls_errors();
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (tls->isServer) {
|
|
|
|
r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-27 00:27:24 +02:00
|
|
|
r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO);
|
2005-04-23 22:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN,
|
2006-07-04 17:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
"handshaking");
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
|
2005-04-23 22:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->isServer) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
|
2008-03-11 18:21:44 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
/* There doesn't seem to be a clear OpenSSL API to clear mode flags. */
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->ssl->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl, ADDR(tls))) {
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
/* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
* we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
|
|
|
|
* was buggy. Fixing that. */
|
|
|
|
if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
|
|
|
|
" get set. Fixing that.");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
|
2008-02-12 05:43:25 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting "
|
2008-02-12 05:50:53 +01:00
|
|
|
"for renegotiation.");
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
|
|
|
|
/* If we got no ID cert, we're a v2 handshake. */
|
2008-02-05 20:40:26 +01:00
|
|
|
X509 *cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
int n_certs = sk_X509_num(chain);
|
|
|
|
if (n_certs > 1 || (n_certs == 1 && cert != sk_X509_value(chain, 0)))
|
|
|
|
tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2008-02-12 05:43:25 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_NET, "Server sent back a single certificate; looks like "
|
|
|
|
"a v2 handshake on %p.", tls);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
|
2008-01-06 04:16:11 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-21 23:09:42 +01:00
|
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(cert);
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-06-13 00:39:13 +02:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "re-setting ciphers");
|
|
|
|
r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-04-26 18:52:47 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Client only: Renegotiate a TLS session. When finished, returns
|
|
|
|
* TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or
|
|
|
|
* TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
/* We could do server-initiated renegotiation too, but that would be tricky.
|
|
|
|
* Instead of "SSL_renegotiate, then SSL_do_handshake until done" */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!tls->isServer);
|
|
|
|
if (tls->state != TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
|
|
|
|
int r = SSL_renegotiate(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (r <= 0) {
|
2008-03-18 15:53:41 +01:00
|
|
|
return tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "renegotiating", LOG_WARN);
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = SSL_do_handshake(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (r == 1) {
|
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2008-03-18 15:53:41 +01:00
|
|
|
return tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "renegotiating handshake", LOG_INFO);
|
2007-12-01 09:09:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
* TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
|
|
|
|
* or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int r, err;
|
|
|
|
char buf[128];
|
2004-10-17 00:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
|
|
|
|
/* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
|
|
|
|
* we read until the other side has closed too.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
do {
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
} while (r>0);
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
|
|
|
|
LOG_INFO);
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
|
|
|
|
/* fall through... */
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (r == 1) {
|
|
|
|
/* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
|
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
|
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
|
|
|
|
LOG_INFO);
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
if (err == _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL) {
|
|
|
|
/* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
|
|
|
|
/* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
|
|
|
|
* isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't
|
|
|
|
* happened before, then go back to the start of the function
|
|
|
|
* and try to read.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
|
|
|
|
tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
|
2005-10-18 23:58:19 +02:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_WARN, LD_NET,
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
"TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
|
2007-01-15 22:13:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
|
|
|
|
/* fall through ... */
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-11 23:38:57 +02:00
|
|
|
} /* end loop */
|
2003-09-04 18:05:08 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-08 08:22:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509 *cert;
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, "getting peer certificate");
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cert)
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
X509_free(cert);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-16 21:39:37 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
|
2005-09-30 03:09:52 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
log_cert_lifetime(X509 *cert, const char *problem)
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BIO *bio = NULL;
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
|
2004-07-23 01:06:28 +02:00
|
|
|
char mytime[33];
|
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2005-02-22 08:03:03 +01:00
|
|
|
struct tm tm;
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (problem)
|
2006-02-13 09:01:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
|
"Certificate %s: is your system clock set incorrectly?",
|
|
|
|
problem);
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
|
2006-02-13 09:01:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore(cert)))) {
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "printing certificate lifetime");
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
|
|
|
|
s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-31 20:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)BIO_reset(bio);
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter(cert)))) {
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "printing certificate lifetime");
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
|
|
|
|
s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-22 08:03:03 +01:00
|
|
|
strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
|
2004-07-23 01:06:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-02-13 09:01:59 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
|
"(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
|
|
|
|
s1,s2,mytime);
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Not expected to get invoked */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "getting certificate lifetime");
|
2004-07-21 19:59:24 +02:00
|
|
|
if (bio)
|
|
|
|
BIO_free(bio);
|
|
|
|
if (s1)
|
|
|
|
tor_free(s1);
|
|
|
|
if (s2)
|
|
|
|
tor_free(s2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-12 21:20:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
|
|
|
|
* certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
|
|
|
|
* *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively. Log all messages at level
|
|
|
|
* <b>severity</b>.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
|
|
|
|
* freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
|
|
|
|
X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out)
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
int num_in_chain, i;
|
|
|
|
*cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
*cert_out = cert;
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2004-07-22 00:11:11 +02:00
|
|
|
num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
|
|
|
|
/* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
|
|
|
|
* 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
|
|
|
|
* cert and the id_cert.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (num_in_chain < 1) {
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
|
"Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
|
2004-07-22 00:11:11 +02:00
|
|
|
num_in_chain);
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-07-22 00:11:11 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
|
|
if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
*id_cert_out = id_cert;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
|
2008-02-12 21:20:52 +01:00
|
|
|
* certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
* *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
|
|
|
|
* 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2008-02-12 21:20:52 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
|
2007-11-06 19:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
|
|
int r = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*identity_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
|
|
|
|
if (!cert)
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!id_cert) {
|
2005-10-18 23:58:19 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
|
2005-10-18 23:58:19 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, severity,"verifying certificate");
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2003-10-18 08:48:46 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa)
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
*identity_key = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
r = 0;
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(cert);
|
2004-04-25 00:17:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (id_pkey)
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
|
2004-04-26 04:33:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-18 17:35:21 +02:00
|
|
|
/* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
|
|
|
|
* acts unexpectedly. */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
|
2004-04-26 04:33:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-10 02:47:39 +02:00
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-14 04:58:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-14 23:07:48 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is
|
|
|
|
* expired or not-yet-valid, give or take <b>tolerance</b>
|
|
|
|
* seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int tolerance)
|
2004-11-14 23:07:48 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
time_t now, t;
|
|
|
|
X509 *cert;
|
|
|
|
int r = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t = now + tolerance;
|
|
|
|
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(cert), &t) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_cert_lifetime(cert, "not yet valid");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t = now - tolerance;
|
|
|
|
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(cert), &t) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_cert_lifetime(cert, "already expired");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(cert);
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Not expected to get invoked */
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, "checking certificate lifetime");
|
2004-11-14 23:07:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-10 05:53:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2003-12-17 22:14:13 +01:00
|
|
|
int
|
2005-10-06 06:33:40 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
2003-09-27 22:07:40 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-04-25 21:59:38 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(tls);
|
2003-09-27 22:07:40 +02:00
|
|
|
return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
|
2006-12-13 23:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-04-27 01:19:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-12-13 23:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
|
|
|
|
* return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */
|
|
|
|
size_t
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return tls->wantwrite_n;
|
2003-09-27 22:07:40 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-13 02:19:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
|
2008-03-08 02:11:52 +01:00
|
|
|
* respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
* function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
|
2004-01-13 02:19:02 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-03-11 19:22:49 +01:00
|
|
|
BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned long r, w;
|
|
|
|
r = BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
|
2008-03-11 19:22:49 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately,
|
|
|
|
* sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
|
|
|
|
* which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note
|
|
|
|
* that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
|
|
|
|
* buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could
|
|
|
|
* save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
|
|
|
|
* that would be tempting fate. */
|
|
|
|
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
|
|
|
|
wbio = tmpbio;
|
|
|
|
w = BIO_number_written(wbio);
|
2007-01-09 01:57:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2007-01-09 01:50:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
|
|
|
|
* If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
* we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
|
|
|
|
* this function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
|
|
|
|
*n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
|
2008-03-11 19:22:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
|
|
|
|
"r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
|
|
|
|
r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-12-29 04:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tls->last_read_count = r;
|
|
|
|
tls->last_write_count = w;
|
2004-01-13 02:19:02 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-04-06 05:44:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-23 16:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
|
2006-07-04 17:52:22 +02:00
|
|
|
* errors, log an error message. */
|
2005-09-30 03:09:52 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
_check_no_tls_errors(const char *fname, int line)
|
2004-04-27 01:00:07 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2005-10-25 09:05:03 +02:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
|
|
|
|
tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
|
2008-02-19 23:27:44 +01:00
|
|
|
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, NULL);
|
2004-04-27 01:00:07 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-09 21:03:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-12 21:20:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
|
2008-02-21 10:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
* TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
|
2007-10-30 22:46:02 +01:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-08 05:41:34 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls->isServer) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
|
|
|
|
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
|
|
|
|
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-10-30 22:46:02 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-10-31 21:48:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-17 23:58:20 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
|
|
|
|
* Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
|
|
|
|
* buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
|
|
|
|
* Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
|
|
|
|
* buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used. */
|
2008-04-10 17:12:24 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
|
|
|
|
int *rbuf_capacity, int *rbuf_bytes,
|
|
|
|
int *wbuf_capacity, int *wbuf_bytes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-05-06 01:57:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
|
|
|
|
*rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*rbuf_capacity = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
|
|
|
|
*wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*wbuf_capacity = 0;
|
2008-04-10 17:12:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
|
|
|
|
*wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-04-29 21:51:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|