2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file sandbox.c
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* \brief Code to enable sandboxing.
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**/
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2013-09-13 18:31:41 +02:00
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#include "orconfig.h"
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#ifndef _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE
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2013-08-14 23:09:07 +02:00
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/**
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* Temporarily required for O_LARGEFILE flag. Needs to be removed
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* with the libevent fix.
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*/
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2013-08-14 22:03:38 +02:00
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#define _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE
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2013-09-13 18:31:41 +02:00
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#endif
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2013-08-14 22:03:38 +02:00
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2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
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/** Malloc mprotect limit in bytes. */
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#define MALLOC_MP_LIM 1048576
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "sandbox.h"
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2014-03-28 07:10:19 +01:00
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#include "container.h"
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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#include "torlog.h"
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2013-07-18 17:11:47 +02:00
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#include "torint.h"
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2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
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#include "util.h"
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2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
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#include "tor_queue.h"
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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#define DEBUGGING_CLOSE
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#if defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP)
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2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
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#include <sys/types.h>
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2013-08-14 22:03:38 +02:00
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
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#include <sys/epoll.h>
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2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/futex.h>
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2013-07-23 09:49:56 +02:00
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#include <bits/signum.h>
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2013-08-14 22:03:38 +02:00
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#include <event2/event.h>
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2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
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2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
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#include <stdarg.h>
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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#include <seccomp.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
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#include <fcntl.h>
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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#include <time.h>
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2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
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#include <poll.h>
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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2014-04-10 21:44:52 +02:00
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#if defined(HAVE_EXECINFO_H) && defined(HAVE_BACKTRACE) && \
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defined(HAVE_BACKTRACE_SYMBOLS_FD) && defined(HAVE_SIGACTION)
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#define USE_BACKTRACE
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#define EXPOSE_CLEAN_BACKTRACE
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#include "backtrace.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_BACKTRACE
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#include <execinfo.h>
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#endif
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/**Determines if at least one sandbox is active.*/
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2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
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static int sandbox_active = 0;
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/** Holds the parameter list configuration for the sandbox.*/
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2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
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static sandbox_cfg_t *filter_dynamic = NULL;
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/** Holds a list of pre-recorded results from getaddrinfo().*/
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2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
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static sb_addr_info_t *sb_addr_info = NULL;
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2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
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2013-09-09 21:16:30 +02:00
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#undef SCMP_CMP
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#define SCMP_CMP(a,b,c) ((struct scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(c),0})
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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/** Variable used for storing all syscall numbers that will be allowed with the
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* stage 1 general Tor sandbox.
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*/
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2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
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static int filter_nopar_gen[] = {
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2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(access),
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(brk),
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2013-08-14 22:03:38 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime),
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(close),
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SCMP_SYS(clone),
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SCMP_SYS(epoll_create),
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SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait),
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SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
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SCMP_SYS(fstat),
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#ifdef __NR_fstat64
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SCMP_SYS(fstat64),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(getdents64),
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SCMP_SYS(getegid),
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#ifdef __NR_getegid32
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SCMP_SYS(getegid32),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(geteuid),
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#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
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SCMP_SYS(geteuid32),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(getgid),
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#ifdef __NR_getgid32
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SCMP_SYS(getgid32),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(getrlimit),
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SCMP_SYS(gettimeofday),
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SCMP_SYS(getuid),
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#ifdef __NR_getuid32
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SCMP_SYS(getuid32),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(lseek),
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#ifdef __NR__llseek
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SCMP_SYS(_llseek),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(mkdir),
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SCMP_SYS(mlockall),
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SCMP_SYS(mmap),
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SCMP_SYS(munmap),
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SCMP_SYS(read),
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SCMP_SYS(rt_sigreturn),
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2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(set_robust_list),
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2014-03-28 06:52:08 +01:00
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SCMP_SYS(_sysctl),
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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#ifdef __NR_sigreturn
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SCMP_SYS(sigreturn),
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#endif
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SCMP_SYS(stat),
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2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(uname),
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(write),
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2014-04-10 21:08:28 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(writev),
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
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SCMP_SYS(exit),
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2013-08-09 18:07:20 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(madvise),
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2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
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#ifdef __NR_stat64
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2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
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// getaddrinfo uses this..
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SCMP_SYS(stat64),
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2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
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#endif
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2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
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2013-09-12 14:38:14 +02:00
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/*
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* These socket syscalls are not required on x86_64 and not supported with
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* some libseccomp versions (eg: 1.0.1)
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*/
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#if defined(__i386)
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SCMP_SYS(recv),
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SCMP_SYS(send),
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#endif
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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// socket syscalls
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SCMP_SYS(bind),
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SCMP_SYS(connect),
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SCMP_SYS(getsockname),
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SCMP_SYS(recvmsg),
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2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(recvfrom),
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(sendto),
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2013-08-21 18:01:01 +02:00
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SCMP_SYS(unlink)
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2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
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};
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Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
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/* These macros help avoid the error where the number of filters we add on a
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* single rule don't match the arg_cnt param. */
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#define seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx,act,call) \
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seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),0)
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#define seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx,act,call,f1) \
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seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),1,(f1))
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#define seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx,act,call,f1,f2) \
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seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),2,(f1),(f2))
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#define seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx,act,call,f1,f2,f3) \
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seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),3,(f1),(f2),(f3))
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#define seccomp_rule_add_4(ctx,act,call,f1,f2,f3,f4) \
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seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),4,(f1),(f2),(f3),(f4))
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/**
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* Function responsible for setting up the rt_sigaction syscall for
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* the seccomp filter sandbox.
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*/
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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static int
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2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
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sb_rt_sigaction(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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{
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2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
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unsigned i;
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int rc;
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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int param[] = { SIGINT, SIGTERM, SIGPIPE, SIGUSR1, SIGUSR2, SIGHUP, SIGCHLD,
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#ifdef SIGXFSZ
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SIGXFSZ
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#endif
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};
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2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
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(void) filter;
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(param); i++) {
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Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
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rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigaction),
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param[i]));
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2013-07-30 22:43:42 +02:00
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if (rc)
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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break;
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}
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return rc;
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}
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/**
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* Function responsible for setting up the execve syscall for
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* the seccomp filter sandbox.
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*/
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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static int
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2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
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sb_execve(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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{
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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int rc;
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2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
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sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
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2013-07-18 17:11:47 +02:00
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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// for each dynamic parameter filters
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2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
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for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
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2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
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smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
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2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
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if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
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== SCMP_SYS(execve)) {
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Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
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rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(execve),
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2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
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SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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if (rc != 0) {
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2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
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log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add execve syscall, received "
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"libseccomp error %d", rc);
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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return rc;
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}
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}
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}
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2013-07-18 17:11:47 +02:00
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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return 0;
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}
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/**
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* Function responsible for setting up the time syscall for
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* the seccomp filter sandbox.
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*/
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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static int
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2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
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sb_time(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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{
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2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
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(void) filter;
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Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
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return seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(time),
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2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
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SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
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}
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2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
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/**
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* Function responsible for setting up the accept4 syscall for
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* the seccomp filter sandbox.
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*/
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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static int
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2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
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sb_accept4(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
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2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
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{
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2013-08-26 19:06:46 +02:00
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int rc = 0;
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2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
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(void)filter;
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2013-08-26 19:06:46 +02:00
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#ifdef __i386__
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Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socketcall),
|
2013-08-26 20:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 18));
|
2013-08-26 19:06:46 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(accept4),
|
2013-08-26 20:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_CLOEXEC));
|
2013-08-26 19:06:46 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(accept4),
|
2014-03-28 06:52:08 +01:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK));
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-26 19:06:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the mmap2 syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_mmap2(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2014-01-06 10:27:58 +01:00
|
|
|
(void)filter;
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE));
|
2013-07-30 22:43:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2013-07-18 17:11:47 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-08-09 18:07:20 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_NONE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_NORESERVE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS));
|
2013-07-30 22:43:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ,MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_STACK));
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS));
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the open syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
|
|
|
|
== SCMP_SYS(open)) {
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open),
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received "
|
|
|
|
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-18 17:11:47 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(-1), SCMP_SYS(open),
|
2013-08-20 12:10:07 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC));
|
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received libseccomp "
|
|
|
|
"error %d", rc);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the rename syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sb_rename(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
|
|
|
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
|
|
|
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 &&
|
|
|
|
param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(rename)) {
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rename),
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
|
2014-04-16 18:50:24 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value2));
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add rename syscall, received "
|
|
|
|
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the openat syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_openat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
|
|
|
|
== SCMP_SYS(openat)) {
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat),
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY|
|
|
|
|
O_CLOEXEC));
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add openat syscall, received "
|
|
|
|
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the socket syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_socket(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __i386__
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket));
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket),
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_FILE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_IP));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket),
|
2013-08-14 23:23:51 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_INET),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_TCP));
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket),
|
2014-01-06 10:27:58 +01:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_INET),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_TCP));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket),
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_INET),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_IP));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket),
|
2013-08-14 23:23:51 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_NETLINK),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_RAW),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the socketpair syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sb_socketpair(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __i386__
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socketpair));
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socketpair),
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_FILE),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the setsockopt syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_setsockopt(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __i386__
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt));
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt),
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOL_SOCKET),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SO_REUSEADDR));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-02 21:47:48 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef IP_TRANSPARENT
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt),
|
2014-02-02 21:47:48 +01:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOL_IP),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IP_TRANSPARENT));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the getsockopt syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sb_getsockopt(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __i386__
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(getsockopt));
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(getsockopt),
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOL_SOCKET),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SO_ERROR));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_fcntl64
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the fcntl64 syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_fcntl64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2014-01-06 10:27:58 +01:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64),
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64),
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETFL),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFD));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETFD),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, FD_CLOEXEC));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 22:52:54 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the epoll_ctl syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: basically allows everything but will keep for now..
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_epoll_ctl(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl),
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, EPOLL_CTL_ADD));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl),
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, EPOLL_CTL_MOD));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl),
|
2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, EPOLL_CTL_DEL));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the fcntl64 syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: if multiple filters need to be added, the PR_SECCOMP parameter needs
|
|
|
|
* to be whitelisted in this function.
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_prctl(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl),
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_DUMPABLE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the fcntl64 syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: does not NEED to be here.. currently only occurs before filter; will
|
|
|
|
* keep just in case for the future.
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_mprotect(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_NONE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the rt_sigprocmask syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_rt_sigprocmask(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask),
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SIG_UNBLOCK));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SIG_SETMASK));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the flock syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: does not need to be here, occurs before filter is applied.
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_flock(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(flock),
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(flock),
|
2013-08-21 12:38:00 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, LOCK_UN));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the futex syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_futex(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
// can remove
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(futex),
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ,
|
|
|
|
FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET_PRIVATE|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(futex),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(futex),
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the mremap syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: so far only occurs before filter is applied.
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_mremap(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mremap),
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MREMAP_MAYMOVE));
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the poll syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_poll(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) filter;
|
2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(poll),
|
2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 10));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_stat64
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up the stat64 syscall for
|
|
|
|
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sb_stat64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
|
|
|
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && (param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(open)
|
|
|
|
|| param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(stat64))) {
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(stat64),
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received "
|
|
|
|
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Array of function pointers responsible for filtering different syscalls at
|
|
|
|
* a parameter level.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = {
|
|
|
|
sb_rt_sigaction,
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_rt_sigprocmask,
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_execve,
|
|
|
|
sb_time,
|
|
|
|
sb_accept4,
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_mmap2,
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_open,
|
2013-07-30 22:20:08 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_openat,
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
sb_rename,
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_fcntl64
|
2013-07-30 23:27:14 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_fcntl64,
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-07-31 10:35:25 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_epoll_ctl,
|
|
|
|
sb_prctl,
|
|
|
|
sb_mprotect,
|
|
|
|
sb_flock,
|
|
|
|
sb_futex,
|
2013-07-31 11:05:10 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_mremap,
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_poll,
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_stat64
|
2013-08-14 23:23:51 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_stat64,
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-08-14 23:23:51 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sb_socket,
|
2013-08-16 00:43:09 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_setsockopt,
|
|
|
|
sb_getsockopt,
|
|
|
|
sb_socketpair
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
const char *
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_intern_string(const char *str)
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (str == NULL)
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-24 16:15:57 +02:00
|
|
|
for (elem = filter_dynamic; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (param->prot) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(str, (char*)(param->value))) {
|
|
|
|
return (char*)param->value;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (param->value2 && !strcmp(str, (char*)param->value2)) {
|
|
|
|
return (char*)param->value2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-24 16:15:57 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:48:56 +02:00
|
|
|
if (sandbox_active)
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "No interned sandbox parameter found for %s", str);
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
return str;
|
2013-07-18 17:11:47 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
/** DOCDOC */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
prot_strings_helper(strmap_t *locations,
|
|
|
|
char **pr_mem_next_p,
|
|
|
|
size_t *pr_mem_left_p,
|
|
|
|
intptr_t *value_p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *param_val;
|
|
|
|
size_t param_size;
|
|
|
|
void *location;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*value_p == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
param_val = (char*) *value_p;
|
|
|
|
param_size = strlen(param_val) + 1;
|
|
|
|
location = strmap_get(locations, param_val);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (location) {
|
|
|
|
// We already interned this string.
|
|
|
|
tor_free(param_val);
|
|
|
|
*value_p = (intptr_t) location;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (*pr_mem_left_p >= param_size) {
|
|
|
|
// copy to protected
|
|
|
|
location = *pr_mem_next_p;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(location, param_val, param_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// re-point el parameter to protected
|
|
|
|
tor_free(param_val);
|
|
|
|
*value_p = (intptr_t) location;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strmap_set(locations, location, location); /* good real estate advice */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// move next available protected memory
|
|
|
|
*pr_mem_next_p += param_size;
|
|
|
|
*pr_mem_left_p -= param_size;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) insufficient protected memory!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Protects all the strings in the sandbox's parameter list configuration. It
|
|
|
|
* works by calculating the total amount of memory required by the parameter
|
|
|
|
* list, allocating the memory using mmap, and protecting it from writes with
|
|
|
|
* mprotect().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
prot_strings(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
|
2013-08-29 15:53:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2013-09-06 11:26:50 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t pr_mem_size = 0, pr_mem_left = 0;
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
char *pr_mem_next = NULL, *pr_mem_base;
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *el = NULL;
|
2014-03-28 07:10:19 +01:00
|
|
|
strmap_t *locations = NULL;
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-28 07:10:19 +01:00
|
|
|
// get total number of bytes required to mmap. (Overestimate.)
|
2013-08-29 15:53:12 +02:00
|
|
|
for (el = cfg; el != NULL; el = el->next) {
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
pr_mem_size += strlen((char*) el->param->value) + 1;
|
2014-04-16 18:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (el->param->value2)
|
|
|
|
pr_mem_size += strlen((char*) el->param->value2) + 1;
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
|
|
|
// allocate protected memory with MALLOC_MP_LIM canary
|
|
|
|
pr_mem_base = (char*) mmap(NULL, MALLOC_MP_LIM + pr_mem_size,
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (pr_mem_base == MAP_FAILED) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed allocate protected memory! mmap: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
|
|
|
pr_mem_next = pr_mem_base + MALLOC_MP_LIM;
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
pr_mem_left = pr_mem_size;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-28 07:10:19 +01:00
|
|
|
locations = strmap_new();
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
// change el value pointer to protected
|
|
|
|
for (el = cfg; el != NULL; el = el->next) {
|
2014-04-16 18:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (prot_strings_helper(locations, &pr_mem_next, &pr_mem_left,
|
|
|
|
&el->param->value) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -2;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (prot_strings_helper(locations, &pr_mem_next, &pr_mem_left,
|
|
|
|
&el->param->value2) < 0) {
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = -2;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-04-16 18:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
el->param->prot = 1;
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// protecting from writes
|
2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
|
|
|
if (mprotect(pr_mem_base, MALLOC_MP_LIM + pr_mem_size, PROT_READ)) {
|
2013-08-29 15:51:05 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to protect memory! mprotect: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
ret = -3;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Setting sandbox restrictions so the string memory cannot be tampered with
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
// no mremap of the protected base address
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL, SCMP_SYS(mremap),
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base));
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mremap protected memory filter fail!");
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// no munmap of the protected base address
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL, SCMP_SYS(munmap),
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base));
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) munmap protected memory filter fail!");
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allow mprotect with PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE because openssl uses it, but
|
|
|
|
* never over the memory region used by the protected strings.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE was originally fully allowed in sb_mprotect(), but
|
|
|
|
* had to be removed due to limitation of libseccomp regarding intervals.
|
2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* There is a restriction on how much you can mprotect with R|W up to the
|
|
|
|
* size of the canary.
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_LT, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base),
|
2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_LE, MALLOC_MP_LIM),
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE));
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mprotect protected memory filter fail (LT)!");
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
|
2013-09-12 12:43:06 +02:00
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_GT, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base + pr_mem_size +
|
|
|
|
MALLOC_MP_LIM),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_LE, MALLOC_MP_LIM),
|
|
|
|
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE));
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mprotect protected memory filter fail (GT)!");
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2014-03-28 07:10:19 +01:00
|
|
|
strmap_free(locations, NULL);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Auxiliary function used in order to allocate a sandbox_cfg_t element and set
|
|
|
|
* it's values according the the parameter list. All elements are initialised
|
|
|
|
* with the 'prot' field set to false, as the pointer is not protected at this
|
|
|
|
* point.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
static sandbox_cfg_t*
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
new_element2(int syscall, intptr_t value, intptr_t value2)
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
smp_param_t *param = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sandbox_cfg_t));
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
param = elem->param = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(smp_param_t));
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
param->syscall = syscall;
|
|
|
|
param->value = value;
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
param->value2 = value2;
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
param->prot = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return elem;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
static sandbox_cfg_t*
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
new_element(int syscall, intptr_t value)
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return new_element2(syscall, value, 0);
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __NR_stat64
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat64)
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
elem = new_element(SCMP_stat, (intptr_t)(void*) file);
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!elem) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elem->next = *cfg;
|
|
|
|
*cfg = elem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *fn = NULL;
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
va_list ap;
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
va_start(ap, cfg);
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-29 15:53:12 +02:00
|
|
|
while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) {
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(cfg, fn);
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
2013-09-09 20:55:47 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array fail");
|
2013-08-12 20:14:43 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
va_end(ap);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-25 12:25:20 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
|
2013-07-25 12:25:20 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-29 15:30:39 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(open), (intptr_t)(void *) file);
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!elem) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elem->next = *cfg;
|
|
|
|
*cfg = elem;
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_rename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file1, char *file2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
elem = new_element2(SCMP_SYS(rename),
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
(intptr_t)(void *) file1,
|
|
|
|
(intptr_t)(void *) file2);
|
2014-03-28 08:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!elem) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elem->next = *cfg;
|
|
|
|
*cfg = elem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *fn = NULL;
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
va_list ap;
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
va_start(ap, cfg);
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-29 15:53:12 +02:00
|
|
|
while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) {
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(cfg, fn);
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array fail");
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
va_end(ap);
|
2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
|
2013-07-30 18:09:28 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(openat), (intptr_t)(void *) file);
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!elem) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
elem->next = *cfg;
|
|
|
|
*cfg = elem;
|
2013-07-24 16:15:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *fn = NULL;
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
va_list ap;
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
va_start(ap, cfg);
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-29 15:53:12 +02:00
|
|
|
while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) {
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(cfg, fn);
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array fail");
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
va_end(ap);
|
2013-07-24 16:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com)
|
2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 18:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(execve), (intptr_t)(void *) com);
|
2013-09-02 12:54:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!elem) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elem->next = *cfg;
|
|
|
|
*cfg = elem;
|
2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *fn = NULL;
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
va_list ap;
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
va_start(ap, cfg);
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-29 15:53:12 +02:00
|
|
|
while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) {
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(cfg, fn);
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
2013-08-29 14:42:30 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array failed");
|
2013-08-10 17:04:48 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
va_end(ap);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_getaddrinfo(const char *name, const char *servname,
|
|
|
|
const struct addrinfo *hints,
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo **res)
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_addr_info_t *el;
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (servname != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
*res = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
for (el = sb_addr_info; el; el = el->next) {
|
2013-09-02 10:45:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(el->name, name)) {
|
2013-09-17 04:34:42 +02:00
|
|
|
*res = tor_malloc(sizeof(struct addrinfo));
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(*res, el->info, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
|
2013-09-17 04:34:42 +02:00
|
|
|
/* XXXX What if there are multiple items in the list? */
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!sandbox_active) {
|
2013-09-06 11:39:56 +02:00
|
|
|
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, hints, res)) {
|
2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) getaddrinfo failed!");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// getting here means something went wrong
|
2013-09-02 11:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to get address %s!", name);
|
2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
|
|
|
if (*res) {
|
2013-09-06 11:29:15 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(*res);
|
2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
|
|
|
res = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_add_addrinfo(const char* name)
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo hints;
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
sb_addr_info_t *el = NULL;
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-17 04:34:42 +02:00
|
|
|
el = tor_malloc(sizeof(sb_addr_info_t));
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &(el->info));
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to getaddrinfo");
|
|
|
|
ret = -2;
|
2013-09-17 04:38:02 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(el);
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-02 11:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
el->name = tor_strdup(name);
|
2013-09-02 10:44:04 +02:00
|
|
|
el->next = sb_addr_info;
|
|
|
|
sb_addr_info = el;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2013-08-19 12:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for going through the parameter syscall filters and
|
|
|
|
* call each function pointer in the list.
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
add_param_filter(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-30 20:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
// function pointer
|
2013-08-05 13:17:46 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(filter_func); i++) {
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((filter_func[i])(ctx, cfg)) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall %d, received libseccomp "
|
|
|
|
"error %d", i, rc);
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible of loading the libseccomp syscall filters which do not
|
|
|
|
* have parameter filtering.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
add_noparam_filter(scmp_filter_ctx ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-09 21:14:50 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// add general filters
|
2013-08-07 12:13:12 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(filter_nopar_gen); i++) {
|
Introduce arg-counting macros to wrap seccomp_rule_add()
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
2014-04-16 18:59:33 +02:00
|
|
|
rc = seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, filter_nopar_gen[i]);
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
2013-09-09 21:37:45 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall index %d (NR=%d), "
|
|
|
|
"received libseccomp error %d", i, filter_nopar_gen[i], rc);
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible for setting up and enabling a global syscall filter.
|
|
|
|
* The function is a prototype developed for stage 1 of sandboxing Tor.
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
install_syscall_filter(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_TRAP);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to initialise libseccomp context");
|
|
|
|
rc = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-10 13:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
// protectign sandbox parameter strings
|
|
|
|
if ((rc = prot_strings(ctx, cfg))) {
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
// add parameter filters
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((rc = add_param_filter(ctx, cfg))) {
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG, "(Sandbox) failed to add param filters!");
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-18 17:03:10 +02:00
|
|
|
// adding filters with no parameters
|
|
|
|
if ((rc = add_noparam_filter(ctx))) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG, "(Sandbox) failed to add param filters!");
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
|
|
|
// loading the seccomp2 filter
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((rc = seccomp_load(ctx))) {
|
2013-09-03 15:37:12 +02:00
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG, "(Sandbox) failed to load!");
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// marking the sandbox as active
|
|
|
|
sandbox_active = 1;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
seccomp_release(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (rc < 0 ? -rc : rc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-10 21:44:52 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_BACKTRACE
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_DEPTH 256
|
|
|
|
static void *syscall_cb_buf[MAX_DEPTH];
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function called when a SIGSYS is caught by the application. It notifies the
|
|
|
|
* user that an error has occurred and either terminates or allows the
|
|
|
|
* application to continue execution, based on the DEBUGGING_CLOSE symbol.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sigsys_debugging(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *) (void_context);
|
2013-11-18 17:00:16 +01:00
|
|
|
char number[32];
|
|
|
|
int syscall;
|
2014-04-10 21:44:52 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_BACKTRACE
|
|
|
|
int depth;
|
|
|
|
int n_fds, i;
|
|
|
|
const int *fds = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
(void) nr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-13 15:07:10 +01:00
|
|
|
syscall = (int) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-04-10 21:44:52 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_BACKTRACE
|
|
|
|
depth = backtrace(syscall_cb_buf, MAX_DEPTH);
|
|
|
|
/* Clean up the top stack frame so we get the real function
|
|
|
|
* name for the most recently failing function. */
|
|
|
|
clean_backtrace(syscall_cb_buf, depth, ctx);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-18 17:00:16 +01:00
|
|
|
format_dec_number_sigsafe(syscall, number, sizeof(number));
|
|
|
|
tor_log_err_sigsafe("(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall ",
|
|
|
|
number,
|
|
|
|
")\n",
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-04-10 21:44:52 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_BACKTRACE
|
|
|
|
n_fds = tor_log_get_sigsafe_err_fds(&fds);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < n_fds; ++i)
|
|
|
|
backtrace_symbols_fd(syscall_cb_buf, depth, fds[i]);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(DEBUGGING_CLOSE)
|
|
|
|
_exit(1);
|
|
|
|
#endif // DEBUGGING_CLOSE
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function that adds a handler for SIGSYS, which is the signal thrown
|
|
|
|
* when the application is issuing a syscall which is not allowed. The
|
|
|
|
* main purpose of this function is to help with debugging by identifying
|
|
|
|
* filtered syscalls.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
install_sigsys_debugging(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sigaction act;
|
|
|
|
sigset_t mask;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
|
|
|
|
sigemptyset(&mask);
|
|
|
|
sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
act.sa_sigaction = &sigsys_debugging;
|
|
|
|
act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
|
|
|
|
if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) Failed to register SIGSYS signal handler");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) Failed call to sigprocmask()");
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-06 20:41:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Function responsible of registering the sandbox_cfg_t list of parameter
|
|
|
|
* syscall filters to the existing parameter list. This is used for incipient
|
|
|
|
* multiple-sandbox support.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-21 16:57:15 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
register_cfg(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (filter_dynamic == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
filter_dynamic = cfg;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
for (elem = filter_dynamic; elem->next != NULL; elem = elem->next)
|
|
|
|
;
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elem->next = cfg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Initialises the syscall sandbox filter for any linux architecture, taking
|
|
|
|
* into account various available features for different linux flavours.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
initialise_libseccomp_sandbox(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (install_sigsys_debugging())
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if (install_syscall_filter(cfg))
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-05 14:40:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if (register_cfg(cfg))
|
|
|
|
return -3;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_t*
|
2013-08-28 19:01:52 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_new(void)
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_init(sandbox_cfg_t *cfg)
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP)
|
2013-07-25 13:08:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return initialise_libseccomp_sandbox(cfg);
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#elif defined(_WIN32)
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Windows sandboxing is not implemented. The feature is "
|
|
|
|
"currently disabled.");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#elif defined(TARGET_OS_MAC)
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Mac OSX sandboxing is not implemented. The feature is "
|
|
|
|
"currently disabled");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
2013-06-17 12:07:14 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Sandboxing is not implemented for your platform. The "
|
|
|
|
"feature is currently disabled");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-14 08:49:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifndef USE_LIBSECCOMP
|
|
|
|
int
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)cfg; (void)file;
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)cfg; (void)file;
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)cfg; (void)com;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-04-11 09:04:16 +02:00
|
|
|
(void)cfg; (void)file;
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)cfg;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-04-11 09:06:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sandbox_cfg_allow_rename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file1, char *file2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)cfg; (void)file1; (void)file2;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-09 21:59:41 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-09-09 22:00:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|