tor/src/or/buffers.c

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2006-02-09 06:46:49 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char buffers_c_id[] =
"$Id$";
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/**
* \file buffers.c
* \brief Implements a generic buffer interface. Buffers are
* fairly opaque string holders that can read to or flush from:
* memory, file descriptors, or TLS connections.
**/
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#include "or.h"
#define SENTINELS
#undef CHECK_AFTER_RESIZE
#undef PARANOIA
#undef NOINLINE
#ifdef SENTINELS
/* If SENTINELS is defined, check for attempts to write beyond the
* end/before the start of the buffer.
*/
#define START_MAGIC 0x70370370u
#define END_MAGIC 0xA0B0C0D0u
#define RAW_MEM(m) ((void*)(((char*)m)-4))
#define GUARDED_MEM(m) ((void*)(((char*)m)+4))
#define ALLOC_LEN(ln) ((ln)+8)
#define SET_GUARDS(m, ln) \
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do { set_uint32((m)-4,START_MAGIC); set_uint32((m)+ln,END_MAGIC); } while (0)
#else
#define RAW_MEM(m) (m)
#define GUARDED_MEM(m) (m)
#define ALLOC_LEN(ln) (ln)
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#define SET_GUARDS(m,ln) do {} while (0)
#endif
#ifdef PARANOIA
#define check() do { assert_buf_ok(buf); } while (0)
#else
#define check() do { } while (0)
#endif
#ifdef NOINLINE
#undef INLINE
#define INLINE
#endif
#define BUFFER_MAGIC 0xB0FFF312u
/** A resizeable buffer, optimized for reading and writing. */
struct buf_t {
uint32_t magic; /**< Magic cookie for debugging: Must be set to
* BUFFER_MAGIC */
char *mem; /**< Storage for data in the buffer */
char *cur; /**< The first byte used for storing data in the buffer. */
size_t highwater; /**< Largest observed datalen since last buf_shrink */
size_t len; /**< Maximum amount of data that <b>mem</b> can hold. */
size_t memsize; /**< DOCDOC */
size_t datalen; /**< Number of bytes currently in <b>mem</b>. */
};
uint64_t buf_total_used = 0;
uint64_t buf_total_alloc = 0;
/** Size, in bytes, for newly allocated buffers. Should be a power of 2. */
#define INITIAL_BUF_SIZE (4*1024)
/** Size, in bytes, for minimum 'shrink' size for buffers. Buffers may start
* out smaller than this, but they will never autoshrink to less
* than this size. */
#define MIN_LAZY_SHRINK_SIZE (4*1024)
static INLINE void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf);
/** If the contents of buf wrap around the end of the allocated space,
* malloc a new buf and copy the contents in starting at the
* beginning. This operation is relatively expensive, so it shouldn't
* be used e.g. for every single read or write.
*/
static void
buf_normalize(buf_t *buf)
{
check();
if (buf->cur + buf->datalen <= buf->mem+buf->len) {
return;
} else {
char *newmem, *oldmem;
size_t sz = (buf->mem+buf->len)-buf->cur;
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpected non-normalized buffer.");
newmem = GUARDED_MEM(tor_malloc(ALLOC_LEN(buf->memsize)));
SET_GUARDS(newmem, buf->memsize);
memcpy(newmem, buf->cur, sz);
memcpy(newmem+sz, buf->mem, buf->datalen-sz);
oldmem = RAW_MEM(buf->mem);
tor_free(oldmem); /* Can't use tor_free directly. */
buf->mem = buf->cur = newmem;
buf->len = buf->memsize;
check();
}
}
/** Return the point in the buffer where the next byte will get stored. */
static INLINE char *
_buf_end(buf_t *buf)
{
char *next = buf->cur + buf->datalen;
char *end = buf->mem + buf->len;
return (next < end) ? next : (next - buf->len);
}
/** If the pointer <b>cp</b> has passed beyond the end of the buffer, wrap it
* around. */
static INLINE char *
_wrap_ptr(buf_t *buf, char *cp)
{
return (cp >= buf->mem + buf->len) ? (cp - buf->len) : cp;
}
/** Return the offset of <b>cp</b> within the buffer. */
static INLINE int
_buf_offset(buf_t *buf, char *cp)
{
if (cp >= buf->cur)
return cp - buf->cur;
else
/* return (cp - buf->mem) + buf->mem+buf->len - buf->cur */
return cp + buf->len - buf->cur;
}
/** If the range of *<b>len</b> bytes starting at <b>at</b> wraps around the
* end of the buffer, then set *<b>len</b> to the number of bytes starting
* at <b>at</b>, and set *<b>more_len</b> to the number of bytes starting
* at <b>buf-&gt;mem</b>. Otherwise, set *<b>more_len</b> to 0.
*/
static INLINE void
_split_range(buf_t *buf, char *at, size_t *len,
size_t *more_len)
{
char *eos = at + *len;
check();
if (eos >= (buf->mem + buf->len)) {
*more_len = eos - (buf->mem + buf->len);
*len -= *more_len;
} else {
*more_len = 0;
}
}
/** Change a buffer's capacity. <b>new_capacity</b> must be \>=
* buf->datalen. */
static void
buf_resize(buf_t *buf, size_t new_capacity)
{
off_t offset;
#ifdef CHECK_AFTER_RESIZE
char *tmp, *tmp2;
#endif
tor_assert(buf->datalen <= new_capacity);
tor_assert(new_capacity);
#ifdef CHECK_AFTER_RESIZE
assert_buf_ok(buf);
tmp = tor_malloc(buf->datalen);
tmp2 = tor_malloc(buf->datalen);
peek_from_buf(tmp, buf->datalen, buf);
#endif
if (buf->len == new_capacity)
return;
offset = buf->cur - buf->mem;
if (offset + buf->datalen > new_capacity) {
/* We need to move stuff before we shrink. */
if (offset + buf->datalen > buf->len) {
/* We have:
*
* mem[0] ... mem[datalen-(len-offset)] (end of data)
* mem[offset] ... mem[len-1] (the start of the data)
*
* We're shrinking the buffer by (len-new_capacity) bytes, so we need
* to move the start portion back by that many bytes.
*/
memmove(buf->cur-(buf->len-new_capacity), buf->cur,
buf->len-offset);
offset -= (buf->len-new_capacity);
} else {
/* The data doesn't wrap around, but it does extend beyond the new
* buffer length:
* mem[offset] ... mem[offset+datalen-1] (the data)
*/
memmove(buf->mem, buf->cur, buf->datalen);
offset = 0;
}
}
/* XXX Some play code to throw away old buffers sometimes rather
* than constantly reallocing them; just in case this is our memory
* problem. It looks for now like it isn't, so disabled. -RD */
if (0 && new_capacity == MIN_LAZY_SHRINK_SIZE &&
!buf->datalen &&
buf->len >= 1<<16) {
/* don't realloc; free and malloc */
char *oldmem, *newmem = GUARDED_MEM(tor_malloc(ALLOC_LEN(new_capacity)));
SET_GUARDS(newmem, new_capacity);
oldmem = RAW_MEM(buf->mem);
tor_free(oldmem);
buf->mem = buf->cur = newmem;
} else {
buf->mem = GUARDED_MEM(tor_realloc(RAW_MEM(buf->mem),
ALLOC_LEN(new_capacity)));
SET_GUARDS(buf->mem, new_capacity);
buf->cur = buf->mem+offset;
}
buf_total_alloc += new_capacity;
buf_total_alloc -= buf->len;
if (offset + buf->datalen > buf->len) {
/* We need to move data now that we are done growing. The buffer
* now contains:
*
* mem[0] ... mem[datalen-(len-offset)] (end of data)
* mem[offset] ... mem[len-1] (the start of the data)
* mem[len]...mem[new_capacity] (empty space)
*
* We're growing by (new_capacity-len) bytes, so we need to move the
* end portion forward by that many bytes.
*/
memmove(buf->cur+(new_capacity-buf->len), buf->cur,
buf->len-offset);
buf->cur += new_capacity-buf->len;
}
buf->memsize = buf->len = new_capacity;
#ifdef CHECK_AFTER_RESIZE
assert_buf_ok(buf);
peek_from_buf(tmp2, buf->datalen, buf);
if (memcmp(tmp, tmp2, buf->datalen)) {
tor_assert(0);
}
tor_free(tmp);
tor_free(tmp2);
#endif
}
/** If the buffer is not large enough to hold <b>capacity</b> bytes, resize
* it so that it can. (The new size will be a power of 2 times the old
* size.)
*/
static INLINE int
buf_ensure_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity)
{
size_t new_len, min_len;
if (buf->len >= capacity) /* Don't grow if we're already big enough. */
return 0;
if (capacity > MAX_BUF_SIZE) /* Don't grow past the maximum. */
return -1;
/* Find the smallest new_len equal to (2**X) for some X; such that
* new_len is at least capacity, and at least 2*buf->len.
*/
min_len = buf->len*2;
new_len = 16;
while (new_len < min_len)
new_len *= 2;
while (new_len < capacity)
new_len *= 2;
/* Resize the buffer. */
log_debug(LD_MM,"Growing buffer from %d to %d bytes.",
(int)buf->len, (int)new_len);
buf_resize(buf,new_len);
return 0;
}
/** Resize buf so it won't hold extra memory that we haven't been
* using lately (that is, since the last time we called buf_shrink).
* Try to shrink the buf until it is the largest factor of two that
* can contain <b>buf</b>-&gt;highwater, but never smaller than
* MIN_LAZY_SHRINK_SIZE.
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*/
void
buf_shrink(buf_t *buf)
{
size_t new_len;
new_len = buf->len;
while (buf->highwater < (new_len>>2) && new_len > MIN_LAZY_SHRINK_SIZE*2)
new_len >>= 1;
buf->highwater = buf->datalen;
if (new_len == buf->len)
return;
log_debug(LD_MM,"Shrinking buffer from %d to %d bytes.",
(int)buf->len, (int)new_len);
buf_resize(buf, new_len);
}
/** Remove the first <b>n</b> bytes from buf. */
static INLINE void
buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n)
{
tor_assert(buf->datalen >= n);
buf->datalen -= n;
buf_total_used -= n;
if (buf->datalen) {
buf->cur = _wrap_ptr(buf, buf->cur+n);
} else {
buf->cur = buf->mem;
}
check();
}
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/** Make sure that the memory in buf ends with a zero byte. */
static INLINE int
buf_nul_terminate(buf_t *buf)
{
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if (buf_ensure_capacity(buf,buf->datalen+1)<0)
return -1;
*_buf_end(buf) = '\0';
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return 0;
}
/** Create and return a new buf with capacity <b>size</b>. */
buf_t *
buf_new_with_capacity(size_t size)
{
buf_t *buf;
buf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(buf_t));
buf->magic = BUFFER_MAGIC;
buf->cur = buf->mem = GUARDED_MEM(tor_malloc(ALLOC_LEN(size)));
SET_GUARDS(buf->mem, size);
buf->len = buf->memsize = size;
buf_total_alloc += size;
assert_buf_ok(buf);
return buf;
}
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/** Allocate and return a new buffer with default capacity. */
buf_t *
buf_new(void)
{
return buf_new_with_capacity(INITIAL_BUF_SIZE);
}
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/** Remove all data from <b>buf</b>. */
void
buf_clear(buf_t *buf)
{
buf_total_used -= buf->datalen;
buf->datalen = 0;
buf->cur = buf->mem;
buf->len = buf->memsize;
}
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/** Return the number of bytes stored in <b>buf</b> */
size_t
buf_datalen(const buf_t *buf)
{
return buf->datalen;
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}
/** Return the maximum bytes that can be stored in <b>buf</b> before buf
* needs to resize. */
size_t
buf_capacity(const buf_t *buf)
{
return buf->len;
}
/** For testing only: Return a pointer to the raw memory stored in
* <b>buf</b>. */
const char *
_buf_peek_raw_buffer(const buf_t *buf)
{
return buf->cur;
}
/** Release storage held by <b>buf</b>. */
void
buf_free(buf_t *buf)
{
char *oldmem;
assert_buf_ok(buf);
buf->magic = 0xDEADBEEF;
oldmem = RAW_MEM(buf->mem);
tor_free(oldmem);
buf_total_alloc -= buf->len;
buf_total_used -= buf->datalen;
tor_free(buf);
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}
/** Helper for read_to_buf(): read no more than at_most bytes from
* socket s into buffer buf, starting at the position pos. (Does not
* check for overflow.) Set *reached_eof to true on EOF. Return
* number of bytes read on success, 0 if the read would block, -1 on
* failure.
*/
static INLINE int
read_to_buf_impl(int s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf,
char *pos, int *reached_eof)
{
int read_result;
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"reading at most %d bytes.",at_most);
read_result = recv(s, pos, at_most, 0);
if (read_result < 0) {
int e = tor_socket_errno(s);
if (!ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e)) { /* it's a real error */
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
if (e == WSAENOBUFS)
log_warn(LD_NET,"recv() failed: WSAENOBUFS. Not enough ram?");
#endif
return -1;
}
return 0; /* would block. */
} else if (read_result == 0) {
log_debug(LD_NET,"Encountered eof");
*reached_eof = 1;
return 0;
} else { /* we read some bytes */
buf->datalen += read_result;
buf_total_used += read_result;
if (buf->datalen > buf->highwater)
buf->highwater = buf->datalen;
log_debug(LD_NET,"Read %d bytes. %d on inbuf.",read_result,
(int)buf->datalen);
return read_result;
}
}
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/** Read from socket <b>s</b>, writing onto end of <b>buf</b>. Read at most
* <b>at_most</b> bytes, resizing the buffer as necessary. If recv()
* returns 0, set *<b>reached_eof</b> to 1 and return 0. Return -1 on error;
* else return the number of bytes read. Return 0 if recv() would
* block.
*/
int
read_to_buf(int s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof)
{
int r;
char *next;
size_t at_start;
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/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
tor_assert(reached_eof);
tor_assert(s>=0);
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if (buf_ensure_capacity(buf,buf->datalen+at_most))
return -1;
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if (at_most + buf->datalen > buf->len)
at_most = buf->len - buf->datalen; /* take the min of the two */
if (at_most == 0)
return 0; /* we shouldn't read anything */
next = _buf_end(buf);
_split_range(buf, next, &at_most, &at_start);
r = read_to_buf_impl(s, at_most, buf, next, reached_eof);
check();
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r < at_most) {
return r; /* Either error, eof, block, or no more to read. */
}
if (at_start) {
int r2;
tor_assert(_buf_end(buf) == buf->mem);
r2 = read_to_buf_impl(s, at_start, buf, buf->mem, reached_eof);
check();
if (r2 < 0) {
return r2;
} else {
r += r2;
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}
}
return r;
}
/** Helper for read_to_buf_tls(): read no more than <b>at_most</b>
* bytes from the TLS connection <b>tls</b> into buffer <b>buf</b>,
* starting at the position <b>next</b>. (Does not check for overflow.)
* Return number of bytes read on success, 0 if the read would block,
* -1 on failure.
*/
static INLINE int
read_to_buf_tls_impl(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, char *next)
{
int r;
log_debug(LD_NET,"before: %d on buf, %d pending, at_most %d.",
(int)buf_datalen(buf), (int)tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls),
(int)at_most);
r = tor_tls_read(tls, next, at_most);
if (r<0)
return r;
buf->datalen += r;
buf_total_used += r;
if (buf->datalen > buf->highwater)
buf->highwater = buf->datalen;
log_debug(LD_NET,"Read %d bytes. %d on inbuf; %d pending",r,
(int)buf->datalen,(int)tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls));
return r;
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}
/** As read_to_buf, but reads from a TLS connection.
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*
* Using TLS on OR connections complicates matters in two ways.
*
* First, a TLS stream has its own read buffer independent of the
* connection's read buffer. (TLS needs to read an entire frame from
* the network before it can decrypt any data. Thus, trying to read 1
* byte from TLS can require that several KB be read from the network
* and decrypted. The extra data is stored in TLS's decrypt buffer.)
* Because the data hasn't been read by Tor (it's still inside the TLS),
* this means that sometimes a connection "has stuff to read" even when
* poll() didn't return POLLIN. The tor_tls_get_pending_bytes function is
* used in connection.c to detect TLS objects with non-empty internal
* buffers and read from them again.
*
* Second, the TLS stream's events do not correspond directly to network
* events: sometimes, before a TLS stream can read, the network must be
* ready to write -- or vice versa.
*/
int
read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf)
{
int r;
char *next;
size_t at_start;
tor_assert(tls);
assert_buf_ok(buf);
log_debug(LD_NET,"start: %d on buf, %d pending, at_most %d.",
(int)buf_datalen(buf), (int)tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls),
(int)at_most);
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if (buf_ensure_capacity(buf, at_most+buf->datalen))
return TOR_TLS_ERROR;
if (at_most + buf->datalen > buf->len)
at_most = buf->len - buf->datalen;
if (at_most == 0)
return 0;
next = _buf_end(buf);
_split_range(buf, next, &at_most, &at_start);
r = read_to_buf_tls_impl(tls, at_most, buf, next);
check();
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r < at_most)
return r; /* Either error, eof, block, or no more to read. */
if (at_start) {
int r2;
tor_assert(_buf_end(buf) == buf->mem);
r2 = read_to_buf_tls_impl(tls, at_start, buf, buf->mem);
check();
if (r2 < 0)
return r2;
else
r += r2;
}
return r;
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}
/** Helper for flush_buf(): try to write <b>sz</b> bytes from buffer
* <b>buf</b> onto socket <b>s</b>. On success, deduct the bytes written
* from *<b>buf_flushlen</b>.
* Return the number of bytes written on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static INLINE int
flush_buf_impl(int s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen)
{
int write_result;
write_result = send(s, buf->cur, sz, 0);
if (write_result < 0) {
int e = tor_socket_errno(s);
if (!ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e)) { /* it's a real error */
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
if (e == WSAENOBUFS)
log_warn(LD_NET,"write() failed: WSAENOBUFS. Not enough ram?");
#endif
return -1;
}
log_debug(LD_NET,"write() would block, returning.");
return 0;
} else {
*buf_flushlen -= write_result;
buf_remove_from_front(buf, write_result);
return write_result;
}
}
/** Write data from <b>buf</b> to the socket <b>s</b>. Write at most
* <b>sz</b> bytes, decrement *<b>buf_flushlen</b> by
* the number of bytes actually written, and remove the written bytes
* from the buffer. Return the number of bytes written on success,
* -1 on failure. Return 0 if write() would block.
*/
int
flush_buf(int s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen)
{
int r;
size_t flushed = 0;
size_t flushlen0, flushlen1;
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/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
tor_assert(buf_flushlen);
tor_assert(s>=0);
tor_assert(*buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen);
tor_assert(sz <= *buf_flushlen);
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if (sz == 0) /* nothing to flush */
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return 0;
flushlen0 = sz;
_split_range(buf, buf->cur, &flushlen0, &flushlen1);
r = flush_buf_impl(s, buf, flushlen0, buf_flushlen);
check();
log_debug(LD_NET,"%d: flushed %d bytes, %d ready to flush, %d remain.",
s,r,(int)*buf_flushlen,(int)buf->datalen);
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r < flushlen0)
return r; /* Error, or can't flush any more now. */
flushed = r;
if (flushlen1) {
tor_assert(buf->cur == buf->mem);
r = flush_buf_impl(s, buf, flushlen1, buf_flushlen);
check();
log_debug(LD_NET,"%d: flushed %d bytes, %d ready to flush, %d remain.",
s,r,(int)*buf_flushlen,(int)buf->datalen);
if (r<0)
return r;
flushed += r;
}
return flushed;
}
/** Helper for flush_buf_tls(): try to write <b>sz</b> bytes from buffer
* <b>buf</b> onto TLS object <b>tls</b>. On success, deduct the bytes
* written from *<b>buf_flushlen</b>.
* Return the number of bytes written on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static INLINE int
flush_buf_tls_impl(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen)
{
int r;
r = tor_tls_write(tls, buf->cur, sz);
if (r < 0) {
return r;
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}
*buf_flushlen -= r;
buf_remove_from_front(buf, r);
log_debug(LD_NET,"flushed %d bytes, %d ready to flush, %d remain.",
r,(int)*buf_flushlen,(int)buf->datalen);
return r;
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}
/** As flush_buf(), but writes data to a TLS connection.
*/
int
flush_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen)
{
int r;
size_t flushed=0;
size_t flushlen0, flushlen1;
/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(buf_flushlen);
tor_assert(*buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen);
tor_assert(sz <= *buf_flushlen);
/* we want to let tls write even if flushlen is zero, because it might
* have a partial record pending */
check_no_tls_errors();
flushlen0 = sz;
_split_range(buf, buf->cur, &flushlen0, &flushlen1);
r = flush_buf_tls_impl(tls, buf, flushlen0, buf_flushlen);
check();
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r < flushlen0)
return r; /* Error, or can't flush any more now. */
flushed = r;
if (flushlen1) {
tor_assert(buf->cur == buf->mem);
r = flush_buf_tls_impl(tls, buf, flushlen1, buf_flushlen);
check();
if (r<0)
return r;
flushed += r;
}
return flushed;
}
/** Append <b>string_len</b> bytes from <b>string</b> to the end of
* <b>buf</b>.
*
* Return the new length of the buffer on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf)
{
char *next;
size_t len2;
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/* append string to buf (growing as needed, return -1 if "too big")
* return total number of bytes on the buf
*/
tor_assert(string);
/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
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if (buf_ensure_capacity(buf, buf->datalen+string_len)) {
log_warn(LD_MM, "buflen too small, can't hold %d bytes.",
(int)(buf->datalen+string_len));
return -1;
2003-12-14 09:15:41 +01:00
}
next = _buf_end(buf);
_split_range(buf, next, &string_len, &len2);
memcpy(next, string, string_len);
buf->datalen += string_len;
buf_total_used += string_len;
if (len2) {
tor_assert(_buf_end(buf) == buf->mem);
memcpy(buf->mem, string+string_len, len2);
buf->datalen += len2;
buf_total_used += len2;
}
if (buf->datalen > buf->highwater)
buf->highwater = buf->datalen;
log_debug(LD_NET,"added %d bytes to buf (now %d total).",
(int)string_len, (int)buf->datalen);
check();
return buf->datalen;
}
/** Helper: copy the first <b>string_len</b> bytes from <b>buf</b>
* onto <b>string</b>.
*/
static INLINE void
peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf)
{
size_t len2;
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/* There must be string_len bytes in buf; write them onto string,
* then memmove buf back (that is, remove them from buf).
*
* Return the number of bytes still on the buffer. */
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tor_assert(string);
/* make sure we don't ask for too much */
tor_assert(string_len <= buf->datalen);
/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
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_split_range(buf, buf->cur, &string_len, &len2);
memcpy(string, buf->cur, string_len);
if (len2) {
memcpy(string+string_len,buf->mem,len2);
}
}
/** Remove <b>string_len</b> bytes from the front of <b>buf</b>, and store
* them into <b>string</b>. Return the new buffer size. <b>string_len</b>
* must be \<= the number of bytes on the buffer.
*/
int
fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf)
{
/* There must be string_len bytes in buf; write them onto string,
* then memmove buf back (that is, remove them from buf).
*
* Return the number of bytes still on the buffer. */
check();
peek_from_buf(string, string_len, buf);
buf_remove_from_front(buf, string_len);
check();
return buf->datalen;
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}
/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on <b>buf</b>, of the
* form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain nuls.)
* If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in
* the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and
* all headers are present, then:
*
* - strdup headers into <b>*headers_out</b>, and nul-terminate it.
* - memdup body into <b>*body_out</b>, and nul-terminate it.
* - Then remove them from <b>buf</b>, and return 1.
*
* - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf.
* - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1.
* (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len,
* _even if_ we're planning to discard them.)
* - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the
* content has arrived.
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*
* Else, change nothing and return 0.
*/
int
fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
int force_complete)
{
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char *headers, *body, *p;
size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen;
/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
buf_normalize(buf);
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if (buf_nul_terminate(buf)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Couldn't nul-terminate buffer");
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return -1;
}
headers = buf->cur;
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body = strstr(headers,"\r\n\r\n");
if (!body) {
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet.");
return 0;
}
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body += 4; /* Skip the the CRLFCRLF */
headerlen = body-headers; /* includes the CRLFCRLF */
bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen;
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen);
if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) {
log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
(int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1);
return -1;
}
if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) {
log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
(int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1);
return -1;
}
#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
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p = strstr(headers, CONTENT_LENGTH);
if (p) {
int i;
i = atoi(p+strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH));
if (i < 0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is less than zero; it looks like "
"someone is trying to crash us.");
return -1;
}
contentlen = i;
/* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen);
if (bodylen < contentlen) {
if (!force_complete) {
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet.");
return 0; /* not all there yet */
}
}
if (bodylen > contentlen) {
bodylen = contentlen;
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen);
}
}
/* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */
if (headers_out) {
*headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1);
memcpy(*headers_out,buf->cur,headerlen);
(*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* null terminate it */
}
if (body_out) {
tor_assert(body_used);
*body_used = bodylen;
*body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1);
memcpy(*body_out,buf->cur+headerlen,bodylen);
(*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* null terminate it */
}
buf_remove_from_front(buf, headerlen+bodylen);
return 1;
}
/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on <b>buf</b>, of one
* of the forms
* - socks4: "socksheader username\\0"
* - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0"
* - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods"
* - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..."
* If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in
* MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf,
* assign to <b>req</b>, and return 1.
*
* If it's invalid or too big, return -1.
*
* Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0.
*
* If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into <b>req->reply</b>
* and set <b>req->replylen</b>, else leave <b>req->replylen</b> alone.
*
* If <b>log_sockstype</b> is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether
* the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not.
*
* If <b>safe_socks</b> is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols.
*
* If returning 0 or -1, <b>req->address</b> and <b>req->port</b> are
* undefined.
*/
int
fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req,
int log_sockstype, int safe_socks)
{
unsigned char len;
char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
uint32_t destip;
enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a;
char *next, *startaddr;
struct in_addr in;
/* If the user connects with socks4 or the wrong variant of socks5,
* then log a warning to let him know that it might be unwise. */
static int have_warned_about_unsafe_socks = 0;
if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */
return 0;
buf_normalize(buf);
switch (*(buf->cur)) { /* which version of socks? */
case 5: /* socks5 */
if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */
unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(buf->cur+1);
tor_assert(!req->socks_version);
if (buf->datalen < 2u+nummethods)
return 0;
if (!nummethods || !memchr(buf->cur+2, 0, nummethods)) {
log_warn(LD_APP,
"socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth'. "
"Rejecting.");
req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */
req->reply[0] = 5;
req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */
return -1;
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}
buf_remove_from_front(buf,2+nummethods); /* remove packet from buf */
req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */
req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */
req->reply[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0");
return 0;
}
/* we know the method; read in the request */
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request");
if (buf->datalen < 8) /* basic info plus >=2 for addr plus 2 for port */
return 0; /* not yet */
req->command = (unsigned char) *(buf->cur+1);
if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
/* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. */
log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.",
req->command);
return -1;
}
switch (*(buf->cur+3)) { /* address type */
case 1: /* IPv4 address */
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type");
if (buf->datalen < 10) /* ip/port there? */
return 0; /* not yet */
destip = ntohl(*(uint32_t*)(buf->cur+4));
in.s_addr = htonl(destip);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_APP,
"socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. "
"Rejecting.",
(int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN);
return -1;
}
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strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address));
req->port = ntohs(*(uint16_t*)(buf->cur+8));
buf_remove_from_front(buf, 10);
if (!address_is_in_virtual_range(req->address) &&
!have_warned_about_unsafe_socks) {
log_warn(LD_APP,
"Your application (using socks5 on port %d) is giving "
"Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves "
"themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A "
"(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, "
"please see http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", req->port,
safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : "");
// have_warned_about_unsafe_socks = 1; // (for now, warn every time)
if (safe_socks)
return -1;
}
return 1;
case 3: /* fqdn */
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type");
len = (unsigned char)*(buf->cur+4);
if (buf->datalen < 7u+len) /* addr/port there? */
return 0; /* not yet */
if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_APP,
"socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in "
"%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN);
return -1;
}
memcpy(req->address,buf->cur+5,len);
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req->address[len] = 0;
req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf->cur+5+len));
buf_remove_from_front(buf, 5+len+2);
if (!tor_strisprint(req->address) || strchr(req->address,'\"')) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Your application (using socks5 on port %d) gave Tor "
"a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
req->port, escaped(req->address));
return -1;
}
if (log_sockstype)
log_notice(LD_APP,
"Your application (using socks5 on port %d) gave "
"Tor a hostname, which means Tor will do the DNS resolve "
"for you. This is good.", req->port);
return 1;
default: /* unsupported */
log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.",
*(buf->cur+3));
return -1;
}
tor_assert(0);
case 4: /* socks4 */
/* http://archive.socks.permeo.com/protocol/socks4.protocol */
/* http://archive.socks.permeo.com/protocol/socks4a.protocol */
req->socks_version = 4;
if (buf->datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) /* basic info available? */
return 0; /* not yet */
req->command = (unsigned char) *(buf->cur+1);
if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
/* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. */
log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.",
req->command);
return -1;
}
req->port = ntohs(*(uint16_t*)(buf->cur+2));
destip = ntohl(*(uint32_t*)(buf->mem+4));
if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting.");
return -1;
}
if (destip >> 8) {
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x.");
in.s_addr = htonl(destip);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.",
(int)strlen(tmpbuf));
return -1;
}
log_debug(LD_APP,
"socks4: successfully read destip (%s)", safe_str(tmpbuf));
socks4_prot = socks4;
}
next = memchr(buf->cur+SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN, 0,
buf->datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN);
if (!next) {
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet.");
return 0;
}
tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen);
startaddr = NULL;
if (socks4_prot != socks4a &&
!address_is_in_virtual_range(tmpbuf) &&
!have_warned_about_unsafe_socks) {
log_warn(LD_APP,
"Your application (using socks4 on port %d) is giving Tor "
"only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves "
"themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A "
"(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, "
"please see http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", req->port,
safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : "");
// have_warned_about_unsafe_socks = 1; // (for now, warn every time)
if (safe_socks)
return -1;
}
2004-12-22 11:04:50 +01:00
if (socks4_prot == socks4a) {
if (next+1 == buf->cur+buf->datalen) {
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet.");
2004-12-22 11:04:50 +01:00
return 0;
}
startaddr = next+1;
next = memchr(startaddr, 0, buf->cur+buf->datalen-startaddr);
if (!next) {
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet.");
return 0;
}
if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting.");
return -1;
}
tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen);
if (log_sockstype)
log_notice(LD_APP,
"Your application (using socks4a on port %d) gave "
"Tor a hostname, which means Tor will do the DNS resolve "
"for you. This is good.", req->port);
}
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success.");
strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf,
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sizeof(req->address));
if (!tor_strisprint(req->address) || strchr(req->address,'\"')) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Your application (using socks4 on port %d) gave Tor "
"a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
req->port, escaped(req->address));
return -1;
}
/* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */
buf_remove_from_front(buf, next-buf->cur+1);
return 1;
case 'G': /* get */
case 'H': /* head */
case 'P': /* put/post */
case 'C': /* connect */
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strlcpy(req->reply,
"HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n"
"Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n"
"<html>\n"
"<head>\n"
"<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n"
"</head>\n"
"<body>\n"
"<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n"
"<p>\n"
"It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as an HTTP proxy."
"\n"
"This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n"
"Please configure your client accordingly.\n"
"</p>\n"
"<p>\n"
"See <a href=\"http://tor.eff.org/documentation.html\">"
"http://tor.eff.org/documentation.html</a> for more information.\n"
"<!-- Plus this comment, to make the body response more than 512 bytes, so "
" IE will be willing to display it. Comment comment comment comment "
" comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment.-->\n"
"</p>\n"
"</body>\n"
"</html>\n"
2004-10-27 08:48:16 +02:00
, MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN);
req->replylen = strlen(req->reply)+1;
/* fall through */
default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */
log_warn(LD_APP,
"Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)",
*(buf->cur));
return -1;
}
}
/** If there is a complete version 0 control message waiting on buf, then store
* its contents into *<b>type_out</b>, store its body's length into
* *<b>len_out</b>, allocate and store a string for its body into
* *<b>body_out</b>, and return 1. (body_out will always be NUL-terminated,
* even if the control message body doesn't end with NUL.)
*
* If there is not a complete control message waiting, return 0.
*
* Return -1 on error; return -2 on "seems to be control protocol v1."
*/
int
fetch_from_buf_control0(buf_t *buf, uint32_t *len_out, uint16_t *type_out,
char **body_out, int check_for_v1)
{
uint32_t msglen;
uint16_t type;
char tmp[4];
tor_assert(buf);
tor_assert(len_out);
tor_assert(type_out);
tor_assert(body_out);
*len_out = 0;
*body_out = NULL;
if (buf->datalen < 4)
return 0;
peek_from_buf(tmp, 4, buf);
msglen = ntohs(get_uint16(tmp));
type = ntohs(get_uint16(tmp+2));
if (type > 255 && check_for_v1)
return -2;
if (buf->datalen < 4 + (unsigned)msglen)
return 0;
*len_out = msglen;
*type_out = type;
buf_remove_from_front(buf, 4);
if (msglen) {
*body_out = tor_malloc(msglen+1);
fetch_from_buf(*body_out, msglen, buf);
(*body_out)[msglen] = '\0';
}
return 1;
}
/** Helper: return a pointer to the first instance of <b>c</b> in the
* <b>len</b>characters after <b>start</b> on <b>buf</b>. Return NULL if the
* character isn't found. */
static char *
find_char_on_buf(buf_t *buf, char *start, size_t len, char c)
{
size_t len_rest;
char *cp;
_split_range(buf, start, &len, &len_rest);
cp = memchr(buf->cur, c, len);
if (cp || !len_rest)
return cp;
return memchr(buf->mem, c, len_rest);
}
/** Helper: return a pointer to the first CRLF after cp on <b>buf</b>. Return
* NULL if no CRLF is found. */
static char *
find_crlf_on_buf(buf_t *buf, char *cp)
{
char *next;
while (1) {
size_t remaining = buf->datalen - _buf_offset(buf,cp);
cp = find_char_on_buf(buf, cp, remaining, '\r');
if (!cp)
return NULL;
next = _wrap_ptr(buf, cp+1);
if (next == _buf_end(buf))
return NULL;
if (*next == '\n')
return cp;
cp = next;
}
}
/** Try to read a single CRLF-terminated line from <b>buf</b>, and write it,
* NUL-terminated, into the *<b>data_len</b> byte buffer at <b>data_out</b>.
* Set *<b>data_len</b> to the number of bytes in the line, not counting the
* terminating NUL. Return 1 if we read a whole line, return 0 if we don't
* have a whole line yet, and return -1 if we we need to grow the buffer.
*/
int
fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len)
{
char *eol;
size_t sz;
/* Look for a CRLF. */
if (!(eol = find_crlf_on_buf(buf, buf->cur))) {
return 0;
}
sz = _buf_offset(buf, eol);
if (sz+3 > *data_len) {
*data_len = sz+3;
return -1;
}
fetch_from_buf(data_out, sz+2, buf);
data_out[sz+2] = '\0';
*data_len = sz+2;
return 1;
}
/** DOCDOC */
int
write_to_buf_zlib(buf_t *buf, tor_zlib_state_t *state,
const char *data, size_t data_len,
int done)
{
char *next;
size_t old_avail, avail;
2006-06-18 11:03:48 +02:00
int over = 0;
while (!over) {
buf_ensure_capacity(buf, buf->datalen + 1024);
next = _buf_end(buf);
if (next < buf->cur)
old_avail = avail = buf->cur - next;
else
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old_avail = avail = (buf->mem + buf->len) - next;
switch (tor_zlib_process(state, &next, &avail, &data, &data_len, done)) {
case TOR_ZLIB_DONE:
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over = 1;
break;
case TOR_ZLIB_ERR:
return -1;
case TOR_ZLIB_OK:
if (data_len == 0)
2006-06-18 11:03:48 +02:00
over = 1;
break;
case TOR_ZLIB_BUF_FULL:
if (avail && buf->len >= 1024 + buf->datalen) {
/* Zlib says we need more room (ZLIB_BUF_FULL), and we're not about
* to wrap around (avail != 0), and resizing won't actually make us
* un-full: we're at the end of the buffer, and zlib refuses to
* append more here, but there's a pile of free space at the start
* of the buffer (about 1K). So chop a few characters off the
* end of the buffer. This feels silly; anybody got a better hack?
*
* (We don't just want to expand the buffer nevertheless. Consider a
* 1/3 full buffer with a single byte free at the end. zlib will
* often refuse to append to that, and so we want to use the
* beginning, not double the buffer to be just 1/6 full.)
*/
tor_assert(next >= buf->cur);
buf->len -= avail;
}
break;
}
buf->datalen += old_avail - avail;
if (buf->datalen > buf->highwater)
buf->highwater = buf->datalen;
buf_total_used += old_avail - avail;
}
return 0;
}
/** Log an error and exit if <b>buf</b> is corrupted.
*/
void
assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf)
{
tor_assert(buf);
tor_assert(buf->magic == BUFFER_MAGIC);
tor_assert(buf->mem);
tor_assert(buf->highwater <= buf->len);
tor_assert(buf->datalen <= buf->highwater);
#ifdef SENTINELS
{
uint32_t u32 = get_uint32(buf->mem - 4);
tor_assert(u32 == START_MAGIC);
u32 = get_uint32(buf->mem + buf->memsize);
tor_assert(u32 == END_MAGIC);
}
#endif
}