tor/src/or/rendclient.c

456 lines
15 KiB
C
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2005-04-01 22:15:56 +02:00
/* Copyright 2004-2005 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char rendclient_c_id[] = "$Id$";
/**
* \file rendclient.c
* \brief Client code to access location-hidden services.
**/
#include "or.h"
/** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point:
* send the introduction request. */
void
rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(circuit_t *circ)
{
tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"introcirc is open");
connection_ap_attach_pending();
}
/** Send the establish-rendezvous cell along a rendezvous circuit. if
* it fails, mark the circ for close and return -1. else return 0.
*/
2004-05-12 22:58:27 +02:00
static int
rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(circuit_t *circ)
{
tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Sending an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
if (crypto_rand(circ->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't get random cookie");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
if (connection_edge_send_command(NULL,circ,
RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS,
circ->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN,
circ->cpath->prev)<0) {
/* circ is already marked for close */
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't send ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Called when we're trying to connect an ap conn; sends an INTRODUCE1 cell
* down introcirc if possible.
*/
int
rend_client_send_introduction(circuit_t *introcirc, circuit_t *rendcirc)
{
size_t payload_len;
int r;
char payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char tmp[1+(MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN];
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
crypt_path_t *cpath;
tor_assert(introcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(rendcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_query, rendcirc->rend_query));
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_query, &entry) < 1) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
safe_str(introcirc->rend_query));
goto err;
}
/* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of bob's pk */
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(entry->parsed->pk, payload)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't hash public key.");
goto err;
}
/* Initialize the pending_final_cpath and start the DH handshake. */
cpath = rendcirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
if (!cpath) {
cpath = rendcirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new())) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't allocate DH");
goto err;
}
if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't generate g^x");
goto err;
}
}
/* write the remaining items into tmp */
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
#if 0
tmp[0] = 1; /* version 1 of the cell format */
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
/* nul pads */
strncpy(tmp+1, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit_name, (MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1));
memcpy(tmp+1+MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
#else
strncpy(tmp, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit_name, (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)); /* nul pads */
memcpy(tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
#endif
if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state,
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
#if 0
tmp+1+MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
#else
tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
#endif
DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't extract g^x");
goto err;
}
/*XXX maybe give crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt a max_len arg,
* to avoid buffer overflows? */
r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(entry->parsed->pk, payload+DIGEST_LEN, tmp,
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
#if 0
1+MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN,
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
#else
MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN,
#endif
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
if (r<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
goto err;
}
tor_assert(DIGEST_LEN + r <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); /* we overran something */
payload_len = DIGEST_LEN + r;
if (connection_edge_send_command(NULL, introcirc,
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1,
payload, payload_len,
introcirc->cpath->prev)<0) {
/* introcirc is already marked for close. leave rendcirc alone. */
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't send INTRODUCE1 cell");
return -1;
}
/* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
introcirc->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT;
return 0;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(introcirc);
circuit_mark_for_close(rendcirc);
return -1;
}
/** Called when a rendezvous circuit is open; sends a establish
* rendezvous circuit as appropriate. */
void
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circuit_t *circ)
{
tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"rendcirc is open");
/* generate a rendezvous cookie, store it in circ */
if (rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(circ) < 0) {
return;
}
}
/** Called when get an ACK or a NAK for a REND_INTRODUCE1 cell.
*/
int
rend_client_introduction_acked(circuit_t *circ,
const char *request, size_t request_len)
{
char *nickname;
circuit_t *rendcirc;
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Received REND_INTRODUCE_ACK on unexpected circuit %d",
circ->n_circ_id);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
if (request_len == 0) {
/* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */
/* Locate the rend circ which is waiting to hear about this ack,
* and tell it.
*/
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Received ack. Telling rend circ...");
rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(
circ->rend_query, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
rendcirc->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED;
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
} else {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor.");
}
/* close the circuit: we won't need it anymore. */
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED;
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
} else {
/* It's a NAK; the introduction point didn't relay our request. */
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
/* Remove this intro point from the set of viable introduction
* points. If any remain, extend to a new one and try again.
* If none remain, refetch the service descriptor.
*/
if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
circ->rend_query) > 0) {
/* There are introduction points left. re-extend the circuit to
* another intro point and try again. */
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
routerinfo_t *r;
nickname = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_query);
tor_assert(nickname);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Got nack for %s from %s, extending to %s.",
safe_str(circ->rend_query),
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, nickname);
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
if (!(r = router_get_by_nickname(nickname))) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Advertised intro point '%s' for %s is not known. Closing.",
nickname, safe_str(circ->rend_query));
tor_free(nickname);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Chose new intro point %s for %s (circ %d)",
nickname, safe_str(circ->rend_query), circ->n_circ_id);
tor_free(nickname);
return circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, r);
}
}
return 0;
}
/** If we are not currently fetching a rendezvous service descriptor
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
* for the service ID <b>query</b>, start a directory connection to fetch a
* new one.
*/
void
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(const char *query)
{
if (connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_DIR, 0, query)) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Would fetch a new renddesc here (for %s), but one is already in progress.", safe_str(query));
} else {
/* not one already; initiate a dir rend desc lookup */
directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC, query, 1);
}
}
/** remove failed_intro from ent. if ent now has no intro points, or
* service is unrecognized, then launch a new renddesc fetch.
*
* Return -1 if error, 0 if no intro points remain or service
* unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain.
*/
int
rend_client_remove_intro_point(char *failed_intro, const char *query)
{
int i, r;
rend_cache_entry_t *ent;
connection_t *conn;
r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, &ent);
if (r<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Malformed service ID '%s'", safe_str(query));
return -1;
}
if (r==0) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Unknown service %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
safe_str(query));
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(query);
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i < ent->parsed->n_intro_points; ++i) {
if (!strcasecmp(ent->parsed->intro_points[i], failed_intro)) {
tor_free(ent->parsed->intro_points[i]);
ent->parsed->intro_points[i] =
ent->parsed->intro_points[--ent->parsed->n_intro_points];
break;
}
}
if (!ent->parsed->n_intro_points) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
safe_str(query));
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(query);
/* move all pending streams back to renddesc_wait */
while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, query))) {
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
}
return 0;
}
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"%d options left for %s.",
ent->parsed->n_intro_points, safe_str(query));
return 1;
}
/** Called when we receive a RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell; changes the state of
* the circuit to C_REND_READY.
*/
int
rend_client_rendezvous_acked(circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len)
{
/* we just got an ack for our establish-rendezvous. switch purposes. */
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Got a rendezvous ack when we weren't expecting one. Closing circ.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Got rendezvous ack. This circuit is now ready for rendezvous.");
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY;
return 0;
}
/** Bob sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */
int
rend_client_receive_rendezvous(circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len)
{
crypt_path_t *hop;
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
if ((circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)
|| !circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Got rendezvous2 cell from Bob, but not expecting it. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
if (request_len != DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Incorrect length (%d) on RENDEZVOUS2 cell.",(int)request_len);
goto err;
}
/* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from bob. Finish the dh handshake...*/
tor_assert(circ->build_state);
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state);
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, request, DH_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't complete DH handshake");
goto err;
}
/* ... and set up cpath. */
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys+DIGEST_LEN, 0)<0)
goto err;
/* Check whether the digest is right... */
if (memcmp(keys, request+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Incorrect digest of key material");
goto err;
}
crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state);
hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
/* All is well. Extend the circuit. */
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED;
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
/* set the windows to default. these are the windows
* that alice thinks bob has.
*/
hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
onion_append_to_cpath(&circ->cpath, hop);
circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */
return 0;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
/** Find all the apconns in state AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT that
* are waiting on query. If there's a working cache entry here
* with at least one intro point, move them to the next state;
* else fail them.
*/
void
rend_client_desc_here(char *query)
{
connection_t *conn;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
time_t now = time(NULL);
while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT, query))) {
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, &entry) == 1 &&
entry->parsed->n_intro_points > 0) {
/* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a
* valid entry from before which we should reuse */
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Rend desc is usable. Launching circuits.");
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
/* restart their timeout values, so they get a fair shake at
* connecting to the hidden service. */
conn->timestamp_created = now;
conn->timestamp_lastread = now;
conn->timestamp_lastwritten = now;
if (connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) < 0) {
/* it will never work */
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"attaching to a rend circ failed. Closing conn.");
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
}
tor_assert(conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT); /* avoid loop */
} else { /* 404, or fetch didn't get that far */
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Closing stream for '%s.onion': hidden service is unavailable (try again later).", safe_str(query));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
}
}
}
/** strdup a nickname for a random introduction
* point of query. return NULL if error.
*/
char *
rend_client_get_random_intro(char *query)
{
int i;
smartlist_t *sl;
char *choice;
char *nickname;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, &entry) < 1) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
safe_str(query));
return NULL;
}
sl = smartlist_create();
/* add the intro point nicknames */
for (i=0;i<entry->parsed->n_intro_points;i++)
smartlist_add(sl,entry->parsed->intro_points[i]);
choice = smartlist_choose(sl);
if (!choice) {
smartlist_free(sl);
return NULL;
}
nickname = tor_strdup(choice);
smartlist_free(sl);
return nickname;
}