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DivestOS's internet permission (#674)

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_data/operating-systems/android/3_divestos.yml
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DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file, along with bundled [F-Droid](https://www.f-droid.org) as the app store. It also includes [UnifedNlp](https://github.com/microg/UnifiedNlp) for network location and some hardening with [Mulch Webview](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch). DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables security features in [defconfig](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L698).
DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file, and [F-Droid](https://www.f-droid.org) as the app store. It also includes [UnifedNlp](https://github.com/microg/UnifiedNlp) for network location and some hardening with [Mulch Webview](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch). DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables security features in [defconfig](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L698).
DivestOS also inherits LineageOS's [iptables](https://reddit.com/comments/c4a6f7) network access feature. You can deny network access to an individual application by pressing and holding on the app's icon (App info → Data and Network → Uncheck "Network Access").
DivestOS 16.0 and 17.1 has GrapheneOS's [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc). There are plans to port this to DivestOS 18.1.
DivestOS 16.0, 17.1, and 18.1 implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission toggle. DivestOS 16.0 and 17.1 also has GrapheneOS's [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc). There are plans to port this to DivestOS 18.1.
#### Notes
DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) varies across the devices it supports. For Pixel phones, we still recommend using GrapheneOS or CalyxOS. For other supported devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
Like CalyxOS's firewall, the network access toggle can also leak in [some](https://gitlab.com/LineageOS/issues/android/-/issues/3228) situations.
Not all of the supported devices have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), and some perform it better than others.
website: 'https://divestos.org'

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collections/_evergreen/android.md
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### INTERNET permission vs packet filtering
[Packet filter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) based solutions such [Datura Firewall](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details), [LineageOS](https://gitlab.com/LineageOS/issues/android/-/issues/3228) (DivestOS), AFWall+ and NetGuard, are not ideal as they can leak and don't prevent an app from proxying a network request through another app using an [intent](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters).
[Packet filter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) based solutions such [Datura Firewall](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details), [LineageOS](https://gitlab.com/LineageOS/issues/android/-/issues/3228), AFWall+ and NetGuard, are not ideal as they can leak and don't prevent an app from proxying a network request through another app using an [intent](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters).
Android has a built-in [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission. This is enforced by the operating system. On AOSP and most of its derivatives, it is treated as an install time permission. GrapheneOS changes it to [runtime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runtime_(program_lifecycle_phase)) permission, meaning that it can be revoked to deny internet access to a specific app.