Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails, or files, you should pick an option here.
**VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication. VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits) and VeraCrypt has also been [audited seperately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
!!! attention
When encrypting with VeraCrypt, the user has the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest users **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and should stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
Some of the Cryptomator Crypto Libraries have been [audited](https://cryptomator.org/open-source/) by [Cure53](https://cryptomator.org/audits/2017-11-27%20crypto%20cure53.pdf). The scope of those libraries included [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). It did not include [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift) which is now used on iOS.
**Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
Modern operating systems include [disk encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will utilize a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
**BitLocker** is the default full volume encryption that comes with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise, and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must partitions formatted with formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated [TPM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module) (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
1. Open Windows [PowerShell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PowerShell). Start "PowerShell"
2. Check to see partition table format:
```
powershell Get-Disk 0 | findstr GPT && echo This is a GPT system disk!
```
3. Check TPM version. The value returned must be "3 True". The spec must be 1.2 or above.
**FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
!!! note
We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to utilizing iCloud FileVault recovery. As well, FileVault should be enabled **after** a complete macOS installation as more pseudorandom number generator ([PRNG](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/random-number-generation-seca0c73a75b/web)) [entropy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(computing)) will be available.
We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
**Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
**Kryptor** is a free and open source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, user friendly alternative to GPG.
**Tomb** is an is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
[OpenPGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
!!! attention
When encrypting with PGP, the user has the option to configure different options in their `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
??? tip "Future default"
When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/).
**GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
**GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that assist PGP users on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
**GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](/email-clients/#apple-mail) and macOS. GPGTools GmbH costs $24€ yearly for their support plan and includes a 30-day trial.
We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
**OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](/email-clients/#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](/email-clients/#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
