Resetting the timer after shutdown was initiated would keep
a reference to the object inside ASIO, which would keep the
connection alive until the timer timed out
The problem actually exists in two parts:
1. When sending chunks over a connection, if the queue size is
greater than N, the seed is predictable across every monero node.
>"If rand() is used before any calls to srand(), rand() behaves as if
it was seeded with srand(1). Each time rand() is seeded with the same seed, it
must produce the same sequence of values."
2. The CID speaks for itself: "'rand' should not be used for security-related
applications, because linear congruential algorithms are too easy to break."
*But* this is an area of contention.
One could argue that a CSPRNG is warranted in order to fully mitigate any
potential timing attacks based on crafting chunk responses. Others could argue
that the existing LCG, or even an MTG, would suffice (if properly seeded). As a
compromise, I've used an MTG with a full bit space. This should give a healthy
balance of security and speed without relying on the existing crypto library
(which I'm told might break on some systems since epee is not (shouldn't be)
dependent upon the existing crypto library).
new cli options (RPC ones also apply to wallet):
--p2p-bind-ipv6-address (default = "::")
--p2p-bind-port-ipv6 (default same as ipv4 port for given nettype)
--rpc-bind-ipv6-address (default = "::1")
--p2p-use-ipv6 (default false)
--rpc-use-ipv6 (default false)
--p2p-require-ipv4 (default true, if ipv4 bind fails and this is
true, will not continue even if ipv6 bind
successful)
--rpc-require-ipv4 (default true, description as above)
ipv6 addresses are to be specified as "[xx:xx:xx::xx:xx]:port" except
in the cases of the cli args for bind address. For those the square
braces can be omitted.
When closing connections due to exiting, the IO service is
already gone, so the data exchange needed for a gracious SSL
shutdown cannot happen. We just close the socket in that case.
Specifying SSL certificates for peer verification does an exact match,
making it a not-so-obvious alias for the fingerprints option. This
changes the checks to OpenSSL which loads concatenated certificate(s)
from a single file and does a certificate-authority (chain of trust)
check instead. There is no drop in security - a compromised exact match
fingerprint has the same worse case failure. There is increased security
in allowing separate long-term CA key and short-term SSL server keys.
This also removes loading of the system-default CA files if a custom
CA file or certificate fingerprint is specified.
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
- Support for ".onion" in --add-exclusive-node and --add-peer
- Add --anonymizing-proxy for outbound Tor connections
- Add --anonymous-inbounds for inbound Tor connections
- Support for sharing ".onion" addresses over Tor connections
- Support for broadcasting transactions received over RPC exclusively
over Tor (else broadcast over public IP when Tor not enabled).
The blockchain prunes seven eighths of prunable tx data.
This saves about two thirds of the blockchain size, while
keeping the node useful as a sync source for an eighth
of the blockchain.
No other data is currently pruned.
There are three ways to prune a blockchain:
- run monerod with --prune-blockchain
- run "prune_blockchain" in the monerod console
- run the monero-blockchain-prune utility
The first two will prune in place. Due to how LMDB works, this
will not reduce the blockchain size on disk. Instead, it will
mark parts of the file as free, so that future data will use
that free space, causing the file to not grow until free space
grows scarce.
The third way will create a second database, a pruned copy of
the original one. Since this is a new file, this one will be
smaller than the original one.
Once the database is pruned, it will stay pruned as it syncs.
That is, there is no need to use --prune-blockchain again, etc.
a connection's timeout is halved for every extra connection
from the same host.
Also keep track of when we don't need to use a connection
anymore, so we can close it and free the resource for another
connection.
Also use the longer timeout for non routable local addresses.
In file included from src/cryptonote_basic/hardfork.cpp:33:
In file included from src/blockchain_db/blockchain_db.h:42:
In file included from src/cryptonote_basic/hardfork.h:31:
contrib/epee/include/syncobj.h:37:10: fatal error: 'boost/thread/v2/thread.hpp' file not found
#include <boost/thread/v2/thread.hpp>
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from src/rpc/daemon_handler.cpp:29:
In file included from src/rpc/daemon_handler.h:36:
In file included from src/p2p/net_node.h:41:
In file included from contrib/epee/include/net/levin_server_cp2.h:32:
In file included from contrib/epee/include/net/abstract_tcp_server2.h:324:
contrib/epee/include/net/abstract_tcp_server2.inl:44:10: fatal error: 'boost/thread/v2/thread.hpp' file not found
#include <boost/thread/v2/thread.hpp> // TODO
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
contrib/epee/include/math_helper.h: In member function 'bool epee::math_helper::average<val, default_base>::set_base()':
contrib/epee/include/syncobj.h:227:56: error: 'sleep_for' is not a member of 'boost::this_thread'
#define CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(x) {boost::this_thread::sleep_for(boost::chrono::milliseconds(epee::debug::g_test_dbg_lock_sleep()));} epee::critical_region_t<decltype(x)> critical_region_var(x)
^
contrib/epee/include/syncobj.h:227:56: note: in definition of macro 'CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL'
#define CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(x) {boost::this_thread::sleep_for(boost::chrono::milliseconds(epee::debug::g_test_dbg_lock_sleep()));} epee::critical_region_t<decltype(x)> critical_region_var(x)
^~~~~~~~~
contrib/epee/include/syncobj.h:227:56: note: suggested alternative: 'sleep'
#define CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(x) {boost::this_thread::sleep_for(boost::chrono::milliseconds(epee::debug::g_test_dbg_lock_sleep()));} epee::critical_region_t<decltype(x)> critical_region_var(x)
^
contrib/epee/include/syncobj.h:227:56: note: in definition of macro 'CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL'
#define CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(x) {boost::this_thread::sleep_for(boost::chrono::milliseconds(epee::debug::g_test_dbg_lock_sleep()));} epee::critical_region_t<decltype(x)> critical_region_var(x)
^~~~~~~~~
