haveno-reto/seednode/torrc

## Configuration file for Haveno Seednode
##
## To start/reload/etc this instance, run "systemctl start tor" (or reload, or..).
## This instance will run as user debian-tor; its data directory is /var/lib/tor.
##
## This file is configured via:
## /usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc
##
## See 'man tor', for more options you can use in this file.

## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
# ### SocksPort flag: OnionTrafficOnly ###
## Tell the tor client to only connect to .onion addresses in response to SOCKS5 requests on this connection.
## This is equivalent to NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic.
# ### SocksPort flag: ExtendedErrors ###
## Return extended error code in the SOCKS reply. So far, the possible errors are:
# X'F0' Onion Service Descriptor Can Not be Found
# X'F1' Onion Service Descriptor Is Invalid
# X'F2' Onion Service Introduction Failed
# X'F3' Onion Service Rendezvous Failed
# X'F4' Onion Service Missing Client Authorization
# X'F5' Onion Service Wrong Client Authorization
# X'F6' Onion Service Invalid Address
# X'F7' Onion Service Introduction Timed Out
SocksPort 9050 OnionTrafficOnly ExtendedErrors

## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1
SocksPolicy accept6 [::1]
SocksPolicy reject *

## Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol
## — ones that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
## Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. (Default: 0)
#SafeSocks 1

## Tor will make a notice-level log entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating
## whether the request used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
## This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default: 0)
TestSocks 1

## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles (This is default)
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr

# Try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory.
AvoidDiskWrites 1

## TODO: This option has no effect. Bisq/Haveno is tor client &/or hidden service.  'man torrc':
## Relays and bridges only. When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated statistics on its
## role as hidden-service directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours.
## If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document. (Default: 1)
HiddenServiceStatistics 0

## NOTE: In order to use the ControlPort, the <user> must belong to the tor group.
##  sudo usermod -aG debian-tor <user>
##
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
##
## Compute the hash of a password with "tor --hash-password password".
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
CookieAuthentication 0       # (Default: 1)

## MetricsPort provides an interface to the underlying Tor relay metrics.
## Exposing publicly is dangerous, set a very strict access policy.
## Retrieve the metrics with:  curl http://127.0.0.1:9035/metrics
MetricsPort 127.0.0.1:9035
MetricsPortPolicy accept 127.0.0.1
MetricsPortPolicy accept [::1]

############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###

## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people. e.g.: 'sudo cat /var/lib/tor/haveno_seednode/hostname'
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
##
## If you plan to keep your service available for a long time, you might want to make a backup copy
## of the private_key file or complete folder /var/lib/tor/hidden_service somewhere.

#### Haveno seednode incoming anonymity connections ###
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/haveno_seednode
HiddenServicePort 2002 127.0.0.1:2002
HiddenServicePort 2002 [::1]:2002

## NOTE: HiddenService options are per onion service
## https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/dos/
##
## Rate limiting at the Introduction Points
## Intropoint protections prevents onion service DoS from becoming a DoS for the entire machine and its guard.
HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense 1
#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec 25       # (Default: 25)
#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec 200     # (Default: 200)

# Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You can’t have more than 20.
#HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3           # (Default: 3)

## https://tpo.pages.torproject.net/onion-services/ecosystem/technology/pow/#configuring-an-onion-service-with-the-pow-protection
## Proof of Work (PoW) before establishing Rendezvous Circuits
## The lower the queue and burst rates, the higher the puzzle effort tends to be for users.
HiddenServicePoWDefensesEnabled 1
HiddenServicePoWQueueRate 200          # (Default: 250)
HiddenServicePoWQueueBurst 1000        # (Default: 2500)

## Stream limits in the established Rendezvous Circuits
## The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous circuit. The max value allowed is 65535. (0 = unlimited)
HiddenServiceMaxStreams 25
#HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 1

#### Haveno seednode2 incoming anonymity connections ###
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/haveno_seednode2
HiddenServicePort 2003 127.0.0.1:2003
HiddenServicePort 2003 [::1]:2003

HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense 1
#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec 25       # (Default: 25)
#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec 200     # (Default: 200)
#HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3           # (Default: 3)

HiddenServicePoWDefensesEnabled 1
HiddenServicePoWQueueRate 200          # (Default: 250)
HiddenServicePoWQueueBurst 1000        # (Default: 2500)

HiddenServiceMaxStreams 25
#HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 1

#####################################################################

LongLivedPorts 2002,2003
## Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300