In this post we are going to see why Privacy is not enough for Anonymous Use, and what can be done about it.
Let’s say that Bob is using an open-source browser to access an open-source decentralized platform with next to no surveillance. His privacy is further strengthened by an HTTPS connection (nowadays a default), which does not permit middlemen to see what one is doing on a website.
This connection protects his privacy, but not his anonymity. The ISP knows Bob’s name because of the contract they signed, and it also knows the name of the website he is visiting, how often he does so, and how much traffic occurs between them. Moreover, if the website itself logs IP addresses, it would also likely be able to deanonymize Bob: nearly all stationary IP addresses and their respective locations are listed in databases sold by brokers.
These issues can be solved if Bob begins using Tor, which reroutes traffic in a way that obscures its origins and destinations, making it nearly impossible to figure out who is connecting to what.
Bob’s identity will be revealed only if he gives it up voluntarily.
Until there is Nothing left.
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