Deniability - When protests go wrong - Simplex Disappearing Messages #63

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nihilist · 2024-09-27T22:51:05+02:00

nihilist commented

2024-09-27 22:51:05 +02:00

Situation:

when you are in a protest doing some sensible stuff, and you get caught by the authorities and your phone gets taken
they force you to unlock it, so that they can access your simplex chats, and they can read what's in it

Solution:

link to "how to stay anonymous during protests", as you need to use the "anonymous secondary phone"
In the secondary phone, creating a simplex hidden account, and in it, you create a chatroom where everyone must join in incognito mode, with disappearing messages (5 mins max)
that chatroom can be used when you are outdoors protesting, to communicate with the other protesters.
in that chatroom, strict anonymity, don't call anyone by their real name, only their random pseudonyms, [sum nihil] it doesnt matter who does what, what matters is that the work gets done. >> in case if one of the phones got seized by the authorities and if they can read the chat cannot link it back to whoever did it.
(optional and potentially risky) setup a grapheneOS duress password in case if you are forced to type your phone password
coordinate with the other peers on how to figure out if someone got busted:
in case if one of the peers gets their phone seized, the adversary can't read the messages that got sent more than 5 minutes ago

Post-protest:

back at home on your personal devices, in a chat with all the protesters simply send them "Hi", and all of them must reply "Hello". if one of them is not saying hello ping them until they do. this is to validate if they got home safely or if they are in custody

Situation: - when you are in a protest doing some sensible stuff, and you get caught by the authorities and your phone gets taken - they force you to unlock it, so that they can access your simplex chats, and they can read what's in it Solution: - link to "how to stay anonymous during protests", as you need to use the "anonymous secondary phone" - In the secondary phone, creating a simplex hidden account, and in it, you create a chatroom where everyone must join in incognito mode, with disappearing messages (5 mins max) - that chatroom can be used when you are outdoors protesting, to communicate with the other protesters. - in that chatroom, strict anonymity, don't call anyone by their real name, only their random pseudonyms, [sum nihil] it doesnt matter who does what, what matters is that the work gets done. >> in case if one of the phones got seized by the authorities and if they can read the chat cannot link it back to whoever did it. - (optional and potentially risky) setup a grapheneOS duress password in case if you are forced to type your phone password - coordinate with the other peers on how to figure out if someone got busted: - in case if one of the peers gets their phone seized, the adversary can't read the messages that got sent more than 5 minutes ago Post-protest: - back at home on your personal devices, in a chat with all the protesters simply send them "Hi", and all of them must reply "Hello". if one of them is not saying hello ping them until they do. this is to validate if they got home safely or if they are in custody

nihilist added the

Simple

label 2024-09-27 22:51:05 +02:00

nihilist added this to the OPSEC Tutorials (paid contributions) project 2024-09-27 22:51:05 +02:00

nihilist commented

2024-10-05 09:00:06 +02:00

Secondary addition: the ability for you to hide a profile on simplex, when not chosen it remains hidden, and you actually need to type the name to reveal the profile (hence deniable !)

however, once your simplex DB is decrypted, can it be proven that the hidden profile does in fact exist ? >> need to be checked

Secondary addition: the ability for you to hide a profile on simplex, when not chosen it remains hidden, and you actually need to type the name to reveal the profile (hence deniable !) however, once your simplex DB is decrypted, can it be proven that the hidden profile does in fact exist ? >> need to be checked

nihilist referenced this issue

2024-10-08 09:32:34 +02:00

Anonymity - How to remain Anonymous during a protest #32

nihilist referenced this issue

2024-10-09 17:11:38 +02:00

update "How to remain Anonymous during a protest" #142

nihilist commented

2024-10-28 08:38:06 +01:00

third addition: showcase Graphene OS duress password to effectively destroy the phone when forced to type the password https://grapheneos.org/features#duress

but add a disclaimer, that this will clearly show to the adversary that you do not intend to cooperate, unlike with the previous deniability features of simplex

third addition: showcase Graphene OS duress password to effectively destroy the phone when forced to type the password https://grapheneos.org/features#duress but add a disclaimer, that this will clearly show to the adversary that you do not intend to cooperate, unlike with the previous deniability features of simplex

nihilist added

Doable

and removed

Simple

labels 2024-10-28 08:38:13 +01:00

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