Deniability - How to hide your monero ? #167

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nihilist · 2024-11-21T08:25:28+01:00

nihilist commented

2024-11-21 08:25:28 +01:00

to be explained:

to access your monero wallet, all you need is your seed phrase.
all you need is to store that seed phrase somewhere where it can't be found even if you are forced to type in your password.
the adversary must not be able to link the monero address back to you. (that address is supposed to belong to some random anonymous guy online)
Legally speaking, you may be authorized to only have 10k€ cash (in france at least) so limit your decoy monero to that amount.
Any excess monero in the decoy monero wallet must be "sent as a donation to a random anonymous guy online" which secretely lands in your sensitive monero wallet, which doesn't have an upper limit, due to keeping it secret.
graph: host OS with the private VM and the sensitive VM, both containing a monero wallet, with the private use monero wallet being capped at 10k€ while the other one in the sensitive VM is not capped.

to be showcased:

in a sensitive VM, creating a monero wallet, and saving the seed phrase in the sensitive Keepass file
outside the sensitive VM, in a regular private-use VM, create a "decoy" monero wallet and save the passphrase in the private use Keepass

deniability scenario:

the adversary busts down your door, you hit CTRL+ALT and WIN+R to quickly shutdown the whonix VMs and reboot the host OS (that is in live mode)
the adversary forces you to open the host OS, in the private VM, and he forces you to send him all of your monero (which is 0.2XMR), while in reality the sensitive VM contains the rest of the monero (5.0 XMR)

to be explained: - to access your monero wallet, all you need is your seed phrase. - all you need is to store that seed phrase somewhere where it can't be found even if you are forced to type in your password. - the adversary must not be able to link the monero address back to you. (that address is supposed to belong to some random anonymous guy online) - Legally speaking, you may be authorized to only have 10k€ cash (in france at least) so limit your decoy monero to that amount. - Any excess monero in the decoy monero wallet must be "sent as a donation to a random anonymous guy online" which secretely lands in your sensitive monero wallet, which doesn't have an upper limit, due to keeping it secret. - graph: host OS with the private VM and the sensitive VM, both containing a monero wallet, with the private use monero wallet being capped at 10k€ while the other one in the sensitive VM is not capped. to be showcased: - in a sensitive VM, creating a monero wallet, and saving the seed phrase in the sensitive Keepass file - outside the sensitive VM, in a regular private-use VM, create a "decoy" monero wallet and save the passphrase in the private use Keepass deniability scenario: - the adversary busts down your door, you hit CTRL+ALT and WIN+R to quickly shutdown the whonix VMs and reboot the host OS (that is in live mode) - the adversary forces you to open the host OS, in the private VM, and he forces you to send him all of your monero (which is 0.2XMR), while in reality the sensitive VM contains the rest of the monero (5.0 XMR)

nihilist added this to the OPSEC Tutorials (paid contributions) project 2024-11-21 08:25:28 +01:00

nihilist added the

Complex

label 2024-11-21 08:25:37 +01:00

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