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https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt
synced 2024-11-27 13:33:29 +01:00
Enhance security by rising the iterations used in PBKDF2 : 327670 instead of 1000 when booting in encrypted system partition, and 2000000 instead of 2000 when using encrypted containers and partitions
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03867fbf56
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6b2e97c243
@ -4399,7 +4399,7 @@ static BOOL PerformBenchmark(HWND hwndDlg)
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case RIPEMD160:
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/* PKCS-5 test with HMAC-RIPEMD-160 used as the PRF */
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derive_key_ripemd160 ("passphrase-1234567890", 21, tmp_salt, 64, get_pkcs5_iteration_count(thid, FALSE), dk, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
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derive_key_ripemd160 (FALSE, "passphrase-1234567890", 21, tmp_salt, 64, get_pkcs5_iteration_count(thid, FALSE), dk, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
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break;
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case WHIRLPOOL:
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@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static TC_THREAD_PROC EncryptionThreadProc (void *threadArg)
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switch (workItem->KeyDerivation.Pkcs5Prf)
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{
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case RIPEMD160:
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derive_key_ripemd160 (workItem->KeyDerivation.Password, workItem->KeyDerivation.PasswordLength, workItem->KeyDerivation.Salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE,
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derive_key_ripemd160 (TRUE, workItem->KeyDerivation.Password, workItem->KeyDerivation.PasswordLength, workItem->KeyDerivation.Salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE,
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workItem->KeyDerivation.IterationCount, workItem->KeyDerivation.DerivedKey, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
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break;
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@ -387,12 +387,13 @@ void hmac_ripemd160 (char *key, int keylen, char *input, int len, char *digest)
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burn (&context, sizeof(context));
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}
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void derive_u_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *u, int b)
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void derive_u_ripemd160 (BOOL bNotTest, char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *u, int b)
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{
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char j[RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE], k[RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE];
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char init[128];
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char counter[4];
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int c, i;
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int c, i, l;
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int EnhanceSecurityLoops = (bNotTest)? 10 : 1;
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/* iteration 1 */
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memset (counter, 0, 4);
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@ -403,6 +404,8 @@ void derive_u_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int i
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memcpy (u, j, RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE);
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/* remaining iterations */
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for (l = 0; l < EnhanceSecurityLoops; l++)
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{
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for (c = 1; c < iterations; c++)
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{
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hmac_ripemd160 (pwd, pwd_len, j, RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE, k);
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@ -412,13 +415,14 @@ void derive_u_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int i
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j[i] = k[i];
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}
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}
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}
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/* Prevent possible leaks. */
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burn (j, sizeof(j));
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burn (k, sizeof(k));
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}
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void derive_key_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *dk, int dklen)
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void derive_key_ripemd160 (BOOL bNotTest, char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *dk, int dklen)
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{
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char u[RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE];
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int b, l, r;
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@ -437,13 +441,13 @@ void derive_key_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int
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/* first l - 1 blocks */
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for (b = 1; b < l; b++)
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{
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derive_u_ripemd160 (pwd, pwd_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, u, b);
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derive_u_ripemd160 (bNotTest, pwd, pwd_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, u, b);
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memcpy (dk, u, RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE);
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dk += RIPEMD160_DIGESTSIZE;
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}
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/* last block */
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derive_u_ripemd160 (pwd, pwd_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, u, b);
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derive_u_ripemd160 (bNotTest, pwd, pwd_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, u, b);
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memcpy (dk, u, r);
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@ -620,19 +624,22 @@ int get_pkcs5_iteration_count (int pkcs5_prf_id, BOOL bBoot)
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{
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switch (pkcs5_prf_id)
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{
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#ifdef TC_WINDOWS_BOOT
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case RIPEMD160:
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return (bBoot ? 1000 : 2000);
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return 32767; /* we multiply this number by 10 inside derive_u_ripemd160 */
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#ifndef TC_WINDOWS_BOOT
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#else
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case RIPEMD160:
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return bBoot? 32767 : 200000; /* we multiply this number by 10 inside derive_u_ripemd160 */
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case SHA512:
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return 1000;
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return 1000000;
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case SHA1: // Deprecated/legacy
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return 2000;
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return 2000000;
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case WHIRLPOOL:
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return 1000;
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return 1000000;
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#endif
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default:
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@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void hmac_sha1 (char *k, int lk, char *d, int ld, char *out, int t);
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void derive_u_sha1 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *u, int b);
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void derive_key_sha1 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *dk, int dklen);
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void hmac_ripemd160 (char *key, int keylen, char *input, int len, char *digest);
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void derive_u_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *u, int b);
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void derive_key_ripemd160 (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *dk, int dklen);
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void derive_u_ripemd160 (BOOL bNotTest, char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *u, int b);
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void derive_key_ripemd160 (BOOL bNotTest, char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *dk, int dklen);
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void hmac_whirlpool (char *k, int lk, char *d, int ld, char *out, int t);
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void derive_u_whirlpool (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *u, int b);
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void derive_key_whirlpool (char *pwd, int pwd_len, char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations, char *dk, int dklen);
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@ -1699,12 +1699,12 @@ BOOL test_pkcs5 ()
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#endif
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/* PKCS-5 test 1 with HMAC-RIPEMD-160 used as the PRF */
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derive_key_ripemd160 ("password", 8, "\x12\x34\x56\x78", 4, 5, dk, 4);
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derive_key_ripemd160 (FALSE, "password", 8, "\x12\x34\x56\x78", 4, 5, dk, 4);
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if (memcmp (dk, "\x7a\x3d\x7c\x03", 4) != 0)
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return FALSE;
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/* PKCS-5 test 2 with HMAC-RIPEMD-160 used as the PRF (derives a key longer than the underlying hash) */
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derive_key_ripemd160 ("password", 8, "\x12\x34\x56\x78", 4, 5, dk, 48);
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derive_key_ripemd160 (FALSE, "password", 8, "\x12\x34\x56\x78", 4, 5, dk, 48);
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if (memcmp (dk, "\x7a\x3d\x7c\x03\xe7\x26\x6b\xf8\x3d\x78\xfb\x29\xd2\x64\x1f\x56\xea\xf0\xe5\xf5\xcc\xc4\x3a\x31\xa8\x84\x70\xbf\xbd\x6f\x8e\x78\x24\x5a\xc0\x0a\xf6\xfa\xf0\xf6\xe9\x00\x47\x5f\x73\xce\xe1\x43", 48) != 0)
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return FALSE;
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@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ KeyReady: ;
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switch (pkcs5_prf)
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{
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case RIPEMD160:
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derive_key_ripemd160 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
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derive_key_ripemd160 (TRUE, keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
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PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
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break;
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@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ int ReadVolumeHeader (BOOL bBoot, char *header, Password *password, PCRYPTO_INFO
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cryptoInfo = *retInfo = crypto_open ();
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// PKCS5 PRF
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derive_key_ripemd160 (password->Text, (int) password->Length, header + HEADER_SALT_OFFSET,
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PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, bBoot ? 1000 : 2000, dk, sizeof (dk));
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derive_key_ripemd160 (TRUE, password->Text, (int) password->Length, header + HEADER_SALT_OFFSET,
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PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, 32767, dk, sizeof (dk));
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// Mode of operation
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cryptoInfo->mode = FIRST_MODE_OF_OPERATION_ID;
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@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (BOOL bBoot, char *header, int ea, int mode, Pass
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break;
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case RIPEMD160:
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derive_key_ripemd160 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
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derive_key_ripemd160 (TRUE, keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
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PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
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break;
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