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Windows driver: remove filesystem detection mechanism when mounting volumes since it is not reliable.

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This commit is contained in:
Mounir IDRASSI 2017-07-20 16:18:08 +02:00
parent 7f2981f257
commit 5a9409a3af
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GPG Key ID: DD0C382D5FCFB8FC
1 changed files with 0 additions and 82 deletions
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82
src/Driver/Ntvol.c
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@ -692,8 +692,6 @@ NTSTATUS TCOpenVolume (PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject,
// mount it (i.e. not just to protect it)
if (volumeType == TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL || !mount->bProtectHiddenVolume)
{
LARGE_INTEGER dataOffset;
ULONG dataLength;
// Validate sector size
if (bRawDevice && Extension->cryptoInfo->SectorSize != Extension->HostBytesPerSector)
{
@ -710,86 +708,6 @@ NTSTATUS TCOpenVolume (PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject,
Extension->NumberOfCylinders = (Extension->DiskLength / Extension->BytesPerSector) + 1;
Extension->PartitionType = 0;
// Try to detect the filesystem used by the volume in order to give a correct value to Extension->PartitionType
dataOffset.QuadPart = (LONGLONG) Extension->cryptoInfo->volDataAreaOffset;
dataLength = bRawDevice ? Extension->HostBytesPerSector : TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE;
Dump ("Reading first data at %I64d\n", dataOffset.QuadPart);
if (NT_SUCCESS (ZwReadFile (Extension->hDeviceFile,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&IoStatusBlock,
readBuffer,
dataLength,
&dataOffset,
NULL)))
{
uint64 fsId = 0;
UINT64_STRUCT dataUnit;
dataUnit.Value = Extension->cryptoInfo->volDataAreaOffset / ENCRYPTION_DATA_UNIT_SIZE;
if (Extension->cryptoInfo->bPartitionInInactiveSysEncScope)
dataUnit.Value += Extension->cryptoInfo->FirstDataUnitNo.Value;
DecryptDataUnits ((unsigned char*) readBuffer, &dataUnit, dataLength / ENCRYPTION_DATA_UNIT_SIZE, Extension->cryptoInfo);
fsId = BE64 (*(uint64 *) readBuffer);
switch (fsId)
{
case 0xEB3C904D53444F53: // FAT16/FAT12
case 0xEB3C906D6B66732E: // mkfs.fat
case 0xEB3C906D6B646F73: // mkfs.vfat/mkdosfs
// workaround for FAT32 formatting by TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt
if (memcmp (readBuffer + 0x52, "FAT32 ", 8) == 0)
{
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_FAT32;
Dump ("FAT32 detected with FAT16 header\n");
}
else
{
if (memcmp (readBuffer + 0x36, "FAT12 ", 8) == 0)
{
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_FAT_12;
Dump ("FAT12 detected\n");
}
else
{
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_FAT_16;
Dump ("FAT16 detected\n");
}
}
break;
case 0xEB58906D6B66732E: // mkfs.fat
case 0xEB58906D6B646F73: // mkfs.vfat/mkdosfs
case 0xEB58904D53444F53: // FAT32
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_FAT32;
Dump ("FAT32 detected\n");
break;
case 0xEB52904E54465320: // NTFS
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_IFS;
Dump ("NTFS detected\n");
break;
case 0xEB76904558464154: // exFAT
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_IFS;
Dump ("exFAT detected\n");
break;
case 0x0000005265465300: // ReFS
Extension->PartitionType = PARTITION_IFS;
Dump ("ReFS detected\n");
break;
default:
Dump ("Unknown FS ID (0x%.8I64x)\n", fsId);
break;
}
// erase sensitive data
EncryptDataUnits ((unsigned char*) readBuffer, &dataUnit, dataLength / ENCRYPTION_DATA_UNIT_SIZE, Extension->cryptoInfo);
burn (readBuffer, dataLength);
}
Extension->bRawDevice = bRawDevice;
memset (Extension->wszVolume, 0, sizeof (Extension->wszVolume));