+ Windows and Linux versions of VeraCrypt offer to use EMV compliant
+ smart cards as a feature. Indeed, the use of PKCS#11 compliant smart
+ cards is dedicated to users with more or less cybersecurity skills.
+ However, in some situations, having such a card strongly reduces the
+ plausible deniability of the user.
+
+
+ To overcome this problem, the idea is to allow the use of a type of
+ smart card owned by anyone: EMV compliant smart cards. According to
+ the standard of the same name, these cards spread all over the world
+ are used to carry out banking operations. Using internal data of the
+ user's EMV card as keyfiles will strengthen the security of his volume
+ while keeping his denial plausible.
+
+
+ For more technical information, please see the section
+ EMV Smart Cards in the chapter
+
+ Keyfiles.
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/doc/html/Keyfiles in VeraCrypt.html b/doc/html/Keyfiles in VeraCrypt.html
index ed940d53..eea6939a 100644
--- a/doc/html/Keyfiles in VeraCrypt.html
+++ b/doc/html/Keyfiles in VeraCrypt.html
@@ -114,6 +114,25 @@
Close All Security Token Sessions or define and use a hotkey combination (Settings >
Hot Keys > Close All Security Token Sessions).
+
+EMV Smart Cards
+
+Windows and Linux versions of VeraCrypt can use directly as keyfiles data extracted from EMV compliant smart cards, supporting Visa, Mastecard or Maestro applications. As with PKCS-11 compliant smart cards, to use such data as VeraCrypt keyfiles,
+click Add Token Files (in the keyfile dialog window). The last four digits of the card's Primary Account Number will be displayed, allowing the selection of the card as a keyfile source.
+
+The data extracted and concatenated into a single keyfile are as follow : ICC Public Key Certificate, Issuer Public Key Certificate and Card Production Life
+Cycle (CPLC) data. They are respectively identified by the tags '9F46', '90' and '9F7F' in the card's data management system. These two certificates are specific to an application deployed on the EMV card and used for the Dynamic Data Authentication of the card
+during banking transactions. CPLC data are specific to the card and not to any of its applications. They contain information on the production process of the smart card. Therefore both certificates and data are unique and static on any EMV compliant smart card.
+
+According to the ISO/IEC 7816 standard on which the EMV standard is based, communication with an EMV smart card is done through structured commands called APDUs, allowing to extract the data from the smart card. These data are encoded in the BER-TLV format,
+defined by the ASN.1 standard, and therefore need to be parsed before being concatenated into a keyfile. No PIN is required to access and retrieve data from the card. To cope with the diversity of smart cards readers on the market, librairies compliant with the Microsoft Personal
+Computer/Smart Card communication standard are used. The Winscard library is used. Natively available on Windows in System32, it then doesn't require any installation on this operating system. However, the libpcsclite1 package has to be installed on Linux.
+
+Since the card is read-only, it is not possible to import or delete data. However, data used as keyfiles can be exported locally in any binary file. During the entire cryptographic process of mounting or creating a volume, the certificates and CPLC data are never stored anywhere
+other than in the user's machine RAM. Once the process is complete, these RAM memory areas are rigorously erased.
+
+It important to note that this feature is optional and disabled by default. It can be enabled in the Security Token Preferences parameters by checking the box provided.
+
Keyfile Search Path
diff --git a/doc/html/Keyfiles.html b/doc/html/Keyfiles.html
index db4fb52c..04dd3463 100644
--- a/doc/html/Keyfiles.html
+++ b/doc/html/Keyfiles.html
@@ -1,81 +1,222 @@
-
+
-
-
-VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid
-
-
-
-
-
+
+
+
+ VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the
+ Paranoid
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
VeraCrypt keyfile is a file whose content is combined with a password. The user can use any kind of file as a VeraCrypt keyfile. The user can also generate a keyfile using the built-in keyfile generator, which utilizes the VeraCrypt RNG to generate a file
- with random content (for more information, see the section
-Random Number Generator).
-
The maximum size of a keyfile is not limited; however, only its first 1,048,576 bytes (1 MiB) are processed (all remaining bytes are ignored due to performance issues connected with processing extremely large files). The user can supply one or more keyfiles
- (the number of keyfiles is not limited).
-
Keyfiles can be stored on PKCS-11-compliant [23] security tokens and smart cards protected by multiple PIN codes (which can be entered either using a hardware PIN pad or via the VeraCrypt GUI).
-
Keyfiles are processed and applied to a password using the following method:
-
-
Let P be a VeraCrypt volume password supplied by user (may be empty)
-
Let KP be the keyfile pool
Let kpl be the size of the keyfile pool KP, in bytes (64, i.e., 512 bits);
-
kpl must be a multiple of the output size of a hash function H
-
Let pl be the length of the password P, in bytes (in the current version: 0 ≤
-pl ≤ 64)
if kpl > pl, append (kpl – pl) zero bytes to the password
-P (thus pl = kpl)
Fill the keyfile pool KP with kpl zero bytes.
For each keyfile perform the following steps:
-
-
Set the position of the keyfile pool cursor to the beginning of the pool
Initialize the hash function H
Load all bytes of the keyfile one by one, and for each loaded byte perform the following steps:
-
-
Hash the loaded byte using the hash function H without initializing the hash, to obtain an intermediate hash (state)
-M. Do not finalize the hash (the state is retained for next round).
Divide the state M into individual bytes.
-For example, if the hash output size is 4 bytes, (T0 || T1 ||
-T2 || T3) = M
Write these bytes (obtained in step 7.c.ii) individually to the keyfile pool with the modulo 28 addition operation (not by replacing the old values in the pool) at the position of the pool cursor. After a byte is written, the pool cursor position
- is advanced by one byte. When the cursor reaches the end of the pool, its position is set to the beginning of the pool.
-
-
-
Apply the content of the keyfile pool to the password P using the following method:
-
-
Divide the password P into individual bytes B0...Bpl-1.
-Note that if the password was shorter than the keyfile pool, then the password was padded with zero bytes to the length of the pool in Step 5 (hence, at this point the length of the password is always greater than or equal to the length of the keyfile pool).
-
Divide the keyfile pool KP into individual bytes G0...Gkpl-1
-
For 0 ≤ i < kpl perform: Bi = Bi ⊕ Gi
P = B0 || B1 || ... || Bpl-2 ||
-Bpl-1
-
The password P (after the keyfile pool content has been applied to it) is now passed to the header key derivation function PBKDF2 (PKCS #5 v2), which processes it (along with salt and other data) using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm
- selected by the user (e.g., SHA-512). See the section
-Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count for more information.
-
-
The role of the hash function H is merely to perform diffusion [2]. CRC-32 is used as the hash function
-H. Note that the output of CRC-32 is subsequently processed using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm: The keyfile pool content (in addition to being hashed using CRC-32) is applied to the password, which is then passed to the header key derivation
- function PBKDF2 (PKCS #5 v2), which processes it (along with salt and other data) using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm selected by the user (e.g., SHA-512). The resultant values are used to form the header key and the secondary header key (XTS mode).
+ VeraCrypt keyfile is a file whose content is combined with a password.
+ The user can use any kind of file as a VeraCrypt keyfile. The user can
+ also generate a keyfile using the built-in keyfile generator, which
+ utilizes the VeraCrypt RNG to generate a file with random content (for
+ more information, see the section
+
+ Random Number Generator).
+
+
+ The maximum size of a keyfile is not limited; however, only its first
+ 1,048,576 bytes (1 MiB) are processed (all remaining bytes are ignored
+ due to performance issues connected with processing extremely large
+ files). The user can supply one or more keyfiles (the number of
+ keyfiles is not limited).
+
+
+ Keyfiles can be stored on PKCS-11-compliant [23] security tokens and
+ smart cards protected by multiple PIN codes (which can be entered
+ either using a hardware PIN pad or via the VeraCrypt GUI).
+
+
+ EMV-compliant smart cards' data can be used as keyfile, see chapter
+
+ EMV Smart Cards.
+
+
+ Keyfiles are processed and applied to a password using the following
+ method:
+
+
+
+ Let P be a VeraCrypt volume password supplied by user (may
+ be empty)
+
+
Let KP be the keyfile pool
+
+ Let kpl be the size of the keyfile pool KP, in
+ bytes (64, i.e., 512 bits);
+
+ kpl must be a multiple of the output size of a hash function H
+
+
+
+ Let pl be the length of the password P, in bytes
+ (in the current version: 0 ≤ pl ≤ 64)
+
+
+ if kpl > pl, append (kpl – pl) zero bytes
+ to the password P (thus pl = kpl)
+
+
+ Fill the keyfile pool KP with kpl zero bytes.
+
+
+ For each keyfile perform the following steps:
+
+
+ Set the position of the keyfile pool cursor to the beginning of
+ the pool
+
+
Initialize the hash function H
+
+ Load all bytes of the keyfile one by one, and for each loaded
+ byte perform the following steps:
+
+
+ Hash the loaded byte using the hash function
+ H without initializing the hash, to obtain an
+ intermediate hash (state) M. Do not finalize the
+ hash (the state is retained for next round).
+
+
+ Divide the state M into individual bytes.
+ For example, if the hash output size is 4 bytes, (T0 || T1 || T2 || T3) = M
+
+
+ Write these bytes (obtained in step 7.c.ii) individually to
+ the keyfile pool with the modulo 28 addition
+ operation (not by replacing the old values in the pool) at
+ the position of the pool cursor. After a byte is written,
+ the pool cursor position is advanced by one byte. When the
+ cursor reaches the end of the pool, its position is set to
+ the beginning of the pool.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Apply the content of the keyfile pool to the password
+ P using the following method:
+
+
+ Divide the password P into individual bytes B0...Bpl-1.
+ Note that if the password was shorter than the keyfile pool,
+ then the password was padded with zero bytes to the length of
+ the pool in Step 5 (hence, at this point the length of the
+ password is always greater than or equal to the length of the
+ keyfile pool).
+
+
+ Divide the keyfile pool KP into individual bytes
+ G0...Gkpl-1
+
+
For 0 ≤ i < kpl perform: Bi = Bi ⊕ Gi
+
+ P = B0 || B1 ||
+ ... || Bpl-2 || Bpl-1
+
+
+
+
+ The password P (after the keyfile pool content has been
+ applied to it) is now passed to the header key derivation function
+ PBKDF2 (PKCS #5 v2), which processes it (along with salt and other
+ data) using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm selected by
+ the user (e.g., SHA-512). See the section
+
+ Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count
+ for more information.
+
+
+
+ The role of the hash function H is merely to perform
+ diffusion [2]. CRC-32 is used as the hash function H. Note
+ that the output of CRC-32 is subsequently processed using a
+ cryptographically secure hash algorithm: The keyfile pool content (in
+ addition to being hashed using CRC-32) is applied to the password,
+ which is then passed to the header key derivation function PBKDF2
+ (PKCS #5 v2), which processes it (along with salt and other data)
+ using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm selected by the user
+ (e.g., SHA-512). The resultant values are used to form the header key
+ and the secondary header key (XTS mode).
+